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ABSTRACT
In one hundred days between April 6 and July 15, 1994, the Rwandan genocide took
away the lives of approximately 800,000 Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus. The United
Nations estimated that between 250,000 and 500,000 individuals were raped or sexually
assaulted during the genocide, and rape was used as a tool of war with a clear genocidal intent to
destroy the enemy. Both men and women subjected to rape, gang rape, sexual torture, sexual
slavery, sexual mutilation, and various other types of abuse and humiliation. As the genocide
ended with the victory of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), Rwanda was
confronted with a multitude of challenges, including holding perpetrators accountable, helping
survivors reconcile with the past, and moving the country towards reconstruction. As an attempt
to reckon with this painful past and the emerging challenges at present, Rwanda and the
international community turned to transitional justice and hoped to deliver justice and
reconciliation. Internationally, the United Nations Security Council established International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to investigate and prosecute high-level perpetrators, and various
countries held trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction to try perpetrators who fled
Rwanda after the genocide. Domestically, Rwanda sought justice and reconciliation in the
national courts, the local gacaca courts, and various reparation programs.
At the most preliminary level, this thesis provides a systematic comparative analysis of
the strengths and weaknesses of international and domestic transitional justice mechanisms in
bringing comprehensive justice – both retributive and restorative – to victims of rape and sexual
violence during the genocide. This thesis argues that no mechanisms were perfect; each
mechanism had different strengths and weaknesses. Internationally, the ICTR and universal
jurisdiction trials in other states were particularly successful in creating jurisprudential norms of

ii

prosecuting rape and sexual violence as serious crimes under international law. Domestically, the
national courts and gacaca functioned as concurrent justice mechanisms, and were together able
to uncover some truth about the genocide and prosecuted approximately 9,000 individuals for
rape or sexual torture. Additionally, assistance programs, especially in terms of housing and
healthcare, were delivered to some sexual violence survivors. Despite these achievements, both
international and domestic transitional justice faced several shortcomings in bringing
comprehensive justice for victims of rape and sexual violence. Compared to the estimated
250,000 to 500,000 rape cases during the genocide, retributive justice delivery in all levels was
inadequate. Additionally, all mechanisms were not very successful at investigating and
prosecuting sexual violence against male and Hutu victims. No mechanism was successful at
uncovering truth about and prosecuting crimes committed by the RPF, and this appearance of
“victor’s justice” was detrimental to national reconciliation between the two ethnic groups in
Rwanda. Moreover, the operation of reparation programs within Rwanda also marginalized a
large number of survivors of rape and sexual violence.
Because of these shortcomings, this thesis argues that to many Rwandan victims of
sexual crimes, truth, justice, and reconciliation were impossible. The thesis points out that
different survivors had different conceptions of justice and reconciliation, and that social stigmas
surrounding sexual crimes were a constant independent variable that inhibited the justice
process. The thesis ends with a summary of research findings and provides recommendations for
future research and future transitional justice projects.
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1. THE AFTERMATH
INTRODUCTION
At some point, a FAR soldier picked me out of the group and took me to a nearby
bush. This soldier raped me. After he was done with me, he took me to a house
and told the owners of the house to keep me safe so that he could rape me every
time he came. He told them if anything happened to me he would kill them. Over
five days, I was raped five times a day.1
At 8:30 pm on April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana
and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down during its descent approach into
Kigali International Airport, killing everyone on board. What immediately followed was the start
of one of the fastest and most horrific genocidal conflicts the world has witnessed since the
Holocaust. President Habyarimana’s death provided Hutu extremists with complete control of
the government, the military, and security services, effectively setting in motion the genocide of
Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus. In 100 days between April 6 and July 15, 1994, the
genocide resulted in the deaths of approximately 800,000 people at the rate of 333 1/3 deaths per
hour and 5½ deaths per minute. 2 Hutu extremists employed various genocidal strategies,
including using state-sponsored and privately owned media outlets, to propel violence against
Tutsi “cockroaches.”3 The principals of the genocide were able to mobilize a large population to
participate in widespread killing to an unprecedented degree. To many, death, however, did not
come quickly. The level of brutality exceeded imagination; victims were tortured both physically
and psychologically before death, and subjected to the most painful and humiliating treatments
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possible. Some were buried alive; some were mutilated and left to bleed to death, while others
were forced to kill their children, spouses, or friends before being killed themselves.4
Twenty-two years have passed, and the Rwandan genocide is still regarded as one of the
most horrific mass atrocities in recent history. However, many forget that one of its most brutal
aspects was the widespread use of rape and sexual assaults as genocidal tools. In the years
leading up to the genocide, Tutsi women were especially targeted by genocidal propaganda. In
December 1990, the Hutu paper Kangura, meaning "Wake up," published its "Ten
Commandments of the Hutu" with special references to Tutsi women:
1.
§
§
§
2.
3.

Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she is, works for the
interests of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any
Hutu who:
Marries a Tutsi woman;
Befriends a Tutsi woman;
Employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or concubine.
Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and
conscientious in their role as woman, wife, and mother of the family. Are
they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest?
Hutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons
back to reason. 5

Through these Commandments, Kangura created the conditions that made sexual attacks of
Tutsi women a foreseeable part of the genocide.6 Tutsi women were also accused of using their
sexuality to enslave Hutu men for the promotion of Tutsi hegemony.7 Moreover, the depiction of
Tutsi women through the propaganda contributed to the attitudes toward them – “that they were
objects to be dominated, humiliated, dehumanized, and destroyed.”8 United Nations officials
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Ibid 45
Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic, 2002), 338-339
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Usta Kaitesi, Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence: The Legacy of the ICTR, Rwanda's Ordinary Courts and
Gacaca Courts (Cambridge, Antwerp, and Portland, OR: Intersentia, 2014), 71
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Ibid 7
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Alex Obote-Odora, "Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR Contribution," New England Journal
of International and Comparative Law I. 12 (2005): 140
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estimated that between 250,000 and 500,000 people were raped during the 100 days of conflict.9
Rape was often committed in public spaces such as schools and roadblocks, in view of husbands,
children, and relatives. With neither children nor the elderly spared, Rwandan women were
subjected to rape, gang rape, sexual torture, sexual slavery, sexual mutilation, the cutting open of
wombs and removing of fetuses, and other types of abuses and humiliation.10 As social and
political weapons, rape and sexual assaults functioned to fulfill genocidal visions by leading to
physical death, community breakdown, and the dilution of the next generation.11 It is crucial to
note that Tutsi men and boys, as well as Hutu women who were married to Tutsi men and/or
deemed sympathizers of the Tutsi, also suffered from sexual violence, albeit to a much lesser
extent.12 It is this combination of frequency, pervasiveness, and brutality with a clear genocidal
vision that made rape an actual tool of genocide itself.
The long-term impact of gender-based violence, however, did not stop when the genocide
ended, as Rwandan women were left in extremely dire socioeconomic conditions. Many rape
survivors were infected with HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, and either died or are
dying of HIV/AIDS.13 Since many traditional male breadwinners of the family were either killed
or imprisoned, women became heads of the households and bore the burden of not only
supporting themselves and their children, but also of providing food for their imprisoned
relatives.14 An estimated 5,000 babies were born as a result of rape during the genocide, and
innocently served as a painful reminder of the traumatic events their mothers experienced.15 In
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addition, many women faced humiliation, loss of respect and dignity, and extreme stigmatization
by community members once it was known that they were raped. The list of traumatic effects of
rape and gender-based violence goes on, and the ultimate question remains: Could there ever be
justice for Rwandan victims of rape and sexual violence, and what would such justice look like?
This question of justice arose within the multitude of challenges facing post-genocide
Rwanda. The military victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) brought the end of the
genocide, leaving the country with a damaged social fabric, economy, and capacity to deliver
essential public services. Torn apart by the death of almost one million Tutsis and moderate
Hutus, with thousands remaining as refugees and internally displaced people, Rwanda was
confronted with the difficult dilemma of how to deliver justice for survivors and hold
perpetrators accountable while simultaneously moving the country towards reconstruction and
reconciliation. These issues of immediate urgency emerged at a crucial moment in history when
the international community was also concerned with ending the culture of impunity for gross
human rights violations – not just in Rwanda, but also across the globe.16 For instance, in
Europe, atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia resulted in the establishment of the ad
hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in August 1993, a few
months prior to the start of the Rwandan genocide. The creation of an international tribunal
mandated by the United Nations was the culmination of the international community’s efforts to
date to bring accountability for gross human rights violations in international politics, especially
in the aftermath of war. The irony, however, lay in the fact that the same community,
exemplified by the United Nations and its Security Council, did almost nothing to either prevent
or stop the genocide in Rwanda despite having early and sufficient evidence that such a genocide

16
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took place.17 To confront the various demands for justice and reconciliation, Rwanda and the
international community turned to an emerging field of praxis and study: transitional justice.18
Transitional justice is not a specific type of justice, but rather “an approach to achieving
justice” for countries in the wake of conflict and/or state repression.19 It refers to a set of judicial
and non-judicial mechanisms utilized by states to reckon with the legacy of gross human rights
violations. These mechanisms include, but are not limited to, criminal prosecution, truth
commissions, reparations programs, and institutional reforms.20 Through these various methods,
states aim to accomplish various goals, including: holding perpetrators accountable for gross
human rights violations, providing opportunities for healing for victims, uncovering truth and
testimony to create an official historical record and a “collective memory,” eliminating impunity
to cultivate a culture of respect for human rights, promoting reconciliation across social
divisions, and recommending ways to deter future repetitions of gross human rights violations.21
Within the universe of transitional justice for Rwanda, various mechanisms were
implemented. Within the confine of this thesis, the following mechanisms are selected as the
main objects of investigation. In terms of criminal prosecution, four mechanisms were
implemented. In the international sphere, the United Nations mandated and created the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to investigate and prosecute masterminds of
the genocide responsible for gross human rights violations. In addition, many countries to which
genocide planners had fled, including Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United
States, implemented trials to prosecute genocide crimes based on the principle of universal
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jurisdiction.22 Within Rwanda, the state made various attempts to prosecute every participant of
the genocide in its domestic courts. These attempts proved to be unworkable, as the justice
system was so overwhelmed by the genocide caseload that some serious crimes, such as rape,
were not being investigated and prosecuted.23 Rwanda then turned to a traditional form of justice
by modifying and reinstalling the gacaca courts, a form of communal and local justice whose
name means “justice on the grass” in Kinyarwanda. Gacaca in its traditional form was as a
system of communal justice in which prisoners were brought before lay judges, who were often
elected from the village populations and trained briefly in a system of dispensing justice.24 While
the traditional form of gacaca was purely restorative, the modification and reinstallation of the
gacaca system after the genocide contained both retributive and restorative elements. In addition,
the thesis also investigates the effectiveness of domestic reparation programs in delivering
economic justice and facilitating reconciliation for victims of rape and sexual assault.
This thesis argues that both local and international transitional justice mechanisms for
post-genocide Rwanda were imperfect; each possessed different strengths and weaknesses in
bringing both retributive and restorative justice to victims of rape and sexual violence. Some
measure of justice was delivered; some truth was uncovered; and some reparation was paid to
victims. Internationally, the ICTR and trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction were
able to prosecute a handful of high-level perpetrators. The ICTR was particularly successful in
creating jurisprudential norms on prosecuting rape and sexual violence under international law.
Domestically, the national courts and gacaca operated as concurrent justice mechanisms, and
were also able to prosecute approximately 9,000 perpetrators of sexual violence. The Rwandan
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government also paid more attention to reparations and developing new laws that attempted to
improve women’s sociopolitical and economic status. Both domestic and international
mechanisms were able to contribute to some aspects of reconciliation for victims of rape and
sexual violence.
Despite these achievements, all mechanisms faced several shortcomings. Compared to
the estimated figure of between 250,000 and 500,000 cases of rape and sexual violence during
the genocide, retributive justice delivery was inadequate. In addition, all mechanisms were
insufficient in bringing justice to male and Hutu victims of rape and sexual violence, and no
mechanisms were able to uncover truth and prosecute crimes committed by the RPF. Ethnic
tensions between the Hutu and the Tutsi dominated Rwanda and underpinned the genocide, and
this appearance of “victor’s justice” constituted a major impediment to national reconciliation.
International mechanisms focused predominantly on retributive justice, and paid inadequate
attention to reparations and reconciliation. While reconciliation was one of the ICTR’s objectives
listed in its mandate, the Tribunal’s foreign location in Arusha and its lack of public outreach
effort significantly undermined its contribution to reconciliation. Within Rwanda, the national
courts system was devastated after the genocide and overburdened by the large number of
detained genocide suspects. It was not until gacaca was implemented as a concurrent justice
mechanism that national mechanisms were able to bring more perpetrators to justice. Gacaca
was a local justice mechanism situated within each community, and this proximity proved to be a
double-edge sword: it was able to facilitate justice for some victims, but simultaneously
maximized the fears of social stigmas and reprisals for many others. Additionally, while gacaca
was implemented to facilitate the pursuit of both truth and justice, it decidedly focused on justice
at the expense of truth, despite the fact that not much justice was actually served. Finally, the

7

operation of reparation programs also marginalized a large number of survivors of rape and
sexual violence. The thesis concludes that social stigmas surrounding victims of rape and sexual
violence were an independent variable that inhibited the justice process. Survivors of sexual
crimes had different conceptions of justice and reconciliation, and to many, a full measure of
justice was unfortunately impossible.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Justice is most effective when it works in tandem with other processes of national
reconstruction and reflects the crucial needs of those most affected by violence.25 To victims of
rape and sexual violence in Rwanda, these “crucial needs” included the pursuit of justice, the
uncovering of truth about what happened during the past, and reparations, especially in terms of
housing and access to healthcare. Justice for Rwandan victims of rape and gender-based
violence, in order to be comprehensive and effective, must therefore be both retributive and
restorative. Retributive justice requires criminal prosecution and “punishment of the guilty.”26 In
a society that values the close-knit spirit of families and communities like Rwanda, however,
victims of rape are usually stigmatized and ostracized by their own community, preventing them
from coming forward about their traumatic experiences in court. In addition, the public nature of
judicial processes often constitutes an inhospitable environment for victims of gender-based
violence. It is how different transitional justice mechanisms attempted to resolve this tension
between the public nature of criminal prosecution and the personal nature of rape and sexual
assault that this thesis seeks to analyze.
Since Rwandan women were left in extremely dire socioeconomic conditions after the
genocide, justice solely in terms of criminal prosecution does not suffice. Restorative justice is
25

Ibid 11
Jennifer J. Llewellyn, “Restorative Justice in Transitions and Beyond,” in Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and
Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies, ed. Tristan Anne Borer (University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 90
26
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therefore a crucial element of investigation in this thesis. Restorative justice seeks to recognize
and address the harms to all of the relationships involved during the conflict, including, but not
limited to, the relationship between “the victim and wrongdoer, between the victim and
wrongdoer and their respective and various communities, and between the different communities
involved.”27 Restorative justice is thus often described as justice for victims or sometimes as
restoration of the moral order, which may be achieved through other means than prosecution and
punishment.28 While different scholars disagree on a single definition of restorative justice, the
consensus remains that its focus should be less on crime and more on compensating for the harm
done to the victim and the society, especially through reparation programs.29
In the context of restorative justice, feminist transitional justice scholars30 have pointed
out that while it is well known that war is gendered, less recognized is that peace is gendered as
well.31 The preoccupation of transitional justice with violations of public political and civil rights
has the tendency to marginalize the various harms experienced by women, especially violations
of economic, social and cultural rights, because they are usually deemed private and nonpolitical.32 This preoccupation thus usually results in the exclusion of women and omission of
gendered harms from transitional justice procedures.33 As a result, this thesis looks at the
peacetime status of Rwandan victims of rape and gendered-based violence holistically. Through
the lens of restorative transitional justice, the delivery of second-generation human rights usually
27
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translates into reparations programs and the process of reconciliation and re-integration of
victims into their communities.
The concept of “reconciliation” deserves particular attention. While reconciliation is
often described as a desirable and crucial step towards a sustainable peace, there is no widely
agreed-upon definition for reconciliation. Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein argue that
reconciliation can be defined as the development of a mutual conciliatory accommodation
between different persons or groups engaging in war and political violence.34 Tristan Borer
offers an approach to defining reconciliation by dividing it into two overarching subcategories:
individual reconciliation (IR) and national unity reconciliation (NUR).35 While IR is usually
associated with healing, apology, and forgiveness, NUR is usually described in terms of
tolerance, peaceful coexistence, the rule of law, human rights culture, and democracy. Borer
argues that while the IR and NUR models of reconciliation are qualitatively different and serve
different functions, both are necessary for sustainable peace.36 In addition, Pablo de Greiff offers
a comprehensive conception of reconciliation:
Reconciliation, minimally, is the condition under which citizens can trust one
another as citizens again (or anew). That means that they are sufficiently
committed to the norms and values that motivate their ruling institutions,
sufficiently confident that those who operate those institutions do so also on the
basis of those norms and values, and sufficiently secure about their fellow
citizens’ commitment to abide by and uphold these basic norms and values.37
Reconciliation is therefore a complex and nuanced process that must be developed
incrementally. Situating the concept of reconciliation in the context of Rwanda, the National
Unity and Reconciliation Commission of Rwanda defines reconciliation by dividing it into six
34
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36
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different yet overlapping variables: 1) understanding the past, present and envisioning the future
of Rwanda, 2) citizenship and identity, 3) political culture, 4) security, 5) justice, and 6) social
cohesion.38 Because of the Commission’s legitimacy and cultural understanding of Rwandan
society, and the report’s extensive research and survey methodology, this thesis seeks to use this
nuanced definition of reconciliation through a gender sensitive lens.
First, reconciliation requires acknowledging of the past and educating future generations
of the genocide, which must include recognition of the widespread use of rape and sexual
assaults during the genocide. Second, the sense of citizenship and national identity must be
shared by victims of rape and sexual assaults, which can be partly constructed by the gradual
changes in local communities’ perceptions of the victims. Third, the citizens’ confidence in
governmental institutions and the political culture can only be developed through the
government’s specific attention to victims of rape and sexual assault, which can be demonstrated
through reparation programs. Fourth, security and justice can be developed from both retributive
and restorative justice for victims, which this thesis seeks to analyze. Finally, social cohesion
must mean the reintegration of victims of rape and sexual assaults in their communities. This
reintegration can only be developed incrementally through the construction of an equal gender
relation between men and women, and the elimination of the social stigma and ostracism facing
victims of rape and sexual assaults. These different elements of reconciliation, especially social
cohesion, will take a long time to be implemented and are difficult to quantify. Since all
transitional justice mechanisms for Rwanda have just recently ended, this thesis attempts to
evaluate these mechanisms’ immediate impacts on victims of rape and sexual assault. The longterm process of reconciliation must be facilitated by future policies, and this thesis seeks to
provide some recommendations for these future projects.
38
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The notion of “justice” investigated in this thesis is therefore both retributive and
restorative. In assessing the strengths and weakness of different transitional justice mechanisms,
the thesis seeks to analyze various elements of comprehensive justice. These elements include: 1)
accountability for perpetrators of rape and gender-based violence, 2) economic justice for victim
through reparations program, 3) reconciliation for and reintegration of survivors of rape and
gender-based violence into their communities, and 4) post-transitional justice national and
international legal developments concerning survivors of rape and sexual violence.
Research Questions
Drawing on scholarship on gender-based violence and transitional justice as a theoretical
framework, the thesis employs national (domestic courts, the gacaca system, and reparation
programs) and international (the ICTR and trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction)
engagement in Rwanda’s transitional justice in a comparative case study. This thesis contributes
to the growing field of transitional justice by focusing on the following research questions:
1) Given the personal nature of rape and gender-based violence, and the social stigma
surrounding victims of such crimes, what were the strengths and weaknesses of local and
international transitional justice mechanisms in delivering the aforementioned elements
of restorative and retributive justice for victims of rape and gender-based violence?
2) Did the objectives of local and international transitional justice mechanisms, in some
cases, work against each other? If so, how did these discrepancies affect the outcomes of
transitional justice for victims of rape and gender-based violence?
3) To what extent did different transitional justice mechanisms pay attention to violations of
both first-generation (civil and political) rights and second-generation (economic, social,
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and cultural) rights? How did this attention, or lack thereof, affect these mechanisms’
ability to deliver comprehensive justice for women?
The scope of this thesis is summarized in this diagram:
International
Retributive Justice
(accountability and
setting legal
precedents)
Restorative Justice
(reparations and
reconciliation)

A
- The ICTR
- Trials based on the
principle of universal
jurisdiction
C

Domestic/Local
B
- National criminal
court system
- The Gacaca system
D
- The Gacaca system
- Domestic reparation
programs

Hypotheses
The following are the thesis’s principal hypotheses:
In terms of retributive justice
A: The physical distance of the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, the language barrier between
the victims and the Tribunal, and the public nature of an international tribunal would create an
inhospitable environment for victims to come forwards. Third-party trials based on the principle
of universal jurisdiction would face the same challenges.
The ICTR and trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, however, had the
potential to push for more development in international law concerning victims of rape and
gender-based violence, and women’s rights in general. The findings of the ICTR had the
potential to influence the construction of the Rome Statue and future cases at the International
Criminal Court.
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B: Given the damaged state capacity after the genocide and the widespread participation
of civilians as génocidaires, the domestic criminal system was unlikely to have brought justice to
victims of rape and sexual violence in Rwandan.
The local gacaca system, in contrast, had the potential to be more effective at
investigating and trying cases of rape and gender-based violence. Because of gacaca’s public
nature and the stigmatization of their respective communities, victims would face the same
challenges of testifying about their experiences in international courts. However, gacaca was a
traditional system situated within the local community and had significant cultural legitimacy.
This communal environment and legitimacy could potentially create a less hostile environment
for victims to come forward.
In terms of restorative justice
C: The ICTR would show several weaknesses in delivering economic justice and
facilitating reconciliation for victims of rape and gender-based violence. Given its preoccupation
with prosecuting the masterminds of the genocide, the ICTR would show a tendency towards
prosecuting violations of first-generation and bodily-integrity human rights, while neglecting the
importance of economic, social, and cultural rights.
D: While the modification of the gacaca courts included retributive elements, its
communal environment and restorative elements still remained. The gacaca system was likely to
be effective in facilitating reconciliation for victims of rape and sexual assaults. In addition, local
nongovernmental organizations would have a better chance of working with the gacaca system
than with the ICTR in pushing for more economic justice and reparation programs to facilitate
reconciliation.
Case Selection and Contribution to the Literature
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Transitional justice is emerging as one of the most exciting and complex interdisciplinary
fields of social science. Many political scientists and legal scholars, such as Ruti Teitel, Neil
Kritz, A. James McAdams, and William Schabas, have published extensively on the topic.39
There is also a substantial amount of scholarship in the field on transitional justice on Rwanda,
with scholars Timothy Longman, Mark Drumbl, and Phil Clark emerging as some of the most
prolific.40 Similarly, given the widespread use of rape and sexual assault in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia, many feminist scholars such as Cynthia Enloe, James Waller, and Janie
Leatherman have written extensively on this horrendous tool of war and its prominence in armed
conflicts. 41 The integration of transitional justice and feminist scholarship on gendered
dimensions of war is, however, less developed. There is not as much literature on the
effectiveness of transitional justice mechanisms in addressing the legacy of sexual violence and
improving the conditions of victims of rape after conflicts. Even less literature has been written
on transitional justice and gender-based violence in Rwanda itself. The thesis addresses this gap
in the literature by providing a comprehensive and comparative study of transitional justice in
post-genocide Rwanda through a gender-sensitive lens.
Rwanda’s engagement in transitional justice provides an interesting case study because
its combination of both a national legal response and an international judicial intervention is
without many precedents. In assessing the successes of transitional justice in providing
accountability for gender-based crimes, this thesis engages in a comparative analysis of the
international and local sets of mechanisms along the various dimensions of justice mentioned
39
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above. While criminal prosecution aimed at holding perpetrators accountable and ending the
culture of impunity, there existed fundamental differences in their targets for prosecution.
Internationally, the ICTR and trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction focused on
investigating and prosecuting the crimes committed by the masterminds and planners of
genocide, many of whom used promises of rape and sexual assault against Tutsi women as a
strategy for recruitment.42 Domestically, Rwanda’s national criminal system and gacaca courts
focused their efforts on trying génocidaires at lower levels who engaged in direct killing and
raping of Rwandan women. The outcomes of these different trials have left and will leave
distinctive marks on the development of national and international laws with regards to victims
of rape and sexual assault. The strengths and weaknesses of the local and the international
mechanisms are one of the main motivations behind this thesis.
Sources
Primary and secondary literature serves as the main resources for this research. Primary
research includes reports produced by the four main judicial procedures (the ICTR, trials based
on the principle of universal jurisdiction, Rwanda’s domestic court, and the gacaca court),
legislative documents pertaining to the rights of victims of rape and sexual assaults, and
international treaty reports by the Rwandan government. Academic and legal scholarship (such
as journal articles and books), reports produced by local, regional, and international NGOs (such
as the International Center for Transitional Justice, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty
International), and reports produced by the United Nations in its investigation of human rights
violations in Rwanda serve as secondary sources. It is crucial to note that in investigating the
situation of Rwandan women during and after the genocide, victims’ testimonies provide crucial
and invaluable insights. Since my financial resources, lack of training in interviewing victims of
42
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rape and sexual assault, and the possibilities of secondary traumatization for victims prevent me
from conducting this type of interview myself, I actively look for these testimonies provided in
secondary sources.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The general question that emerged after the genocide, and still remains of crucial
importance in intellectual and scholarly debates today, is what social, economic, and political
factors inspired the genocide? At the most preliminary level, this section aims to provide a brief
history of Rwanda leading up to the genocide, and how the ever-changing notions of ethnicity
have affected Rwandan society.
The Rwandan genocide has been historically categorized as an ethnic conflict, since its
clear genocidal vision was to annihilate the Tutsi population in the country. The argument that
“tribalism” and ancient tribal hatred drove the Rwandan genocide is, however, misleading. First,
using “tribe” as a category in describing Rwanda’s ethnic category is technically false.43 By the
mid-18th century, Rwanda was a centralized state, inhabited by the agriculturalist Hutu majority,
the cattle-herding Tutsi minority, and the Twa, who accounted for only 1% of the population.44
The integration of these different groups was extensive. Prior to European colonization, Hutus
and Tutsis spoke the same language (Kinyarwanda), belonged to the same clans, honored the
same gods, and had the same cultural practices. Many lived in the same regions and mostly in the
same neighborhoods, and interethnic marriage was common. These communities were ruled by
an absolute monarchy, as the all-powerful king maintained power through a hierarchy of
competing chiefs, the majority of whom were Tutsi.45 This monopolization of power within the
Tutsi, however, did not result in systematic or continuous violence among communities, thus
43
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dispensing with the notion of “ancient tribal hatred.” Benjamin Valentino argues that during this
pre-colonial period, Tutsi and Hutu seemed to have considered themselves more akin to castes or
classes than to ethnic groups,46 while Scott Strauss adds that people could even “become” Tutsi
by acquiring enough cattle.47
The concept of race and ethnicity, however, changed drastically when German and
Belgian colonial powers arrived in 1894 and 1919 respectively. While European rule did not
invent the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi,” this colonial intervention nevertheless racialized these
ethnic categories, rendering them exclusive and immutable.48 Impressed by a complex judicial
system, European explorers and missionaries believed they had found in the Rwandan Tutsi a
superior race of “natural born leaders,” while simultaneously considering the Hutu an inferior
race.49 Involving “modern scientific” methods such as the measurement of nose and skull sizes,
colonial anthropologists described Hutus as short, stocky, dark-skinned, and wide-nosed, while
presenting Tutsis as tall, elegant, light-skinned, and thin-nosed. 50 Most importantly, in the 1930s,
Belgian colonial officers instituted a rigid system of ethnic classification and introduced identity
cards that labeled Rwandans according to their ethnicity, which was a crucial facilitator in the
identification and widespread killing of Tutsis during the genocide. This systematic race thinking
thus became the basis for power allocation in the colonial system, reinforcing Tutsi dominance.
European colonial rules rendered “race” the central determinant of power, and turned “race” into
a symbol of oppression that largely discriminated against the Hutu.51 Rwandans seemed to have
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adopted these conceptions of race as well, further cementing the bi-polar differentiation between
Hutus and Tutsis, and fueling hatred and division within the society.52
Major changes in the Belgian colonial administration occurred after World War II. Under
pressure from the newly established United Nations and the continental movement for
independence in Africa, Belgium started the process of decolonization and relinquished its
formal political power by introducing reforms to increase Hutu political representation.53 Some
Catholic missionaries took this opportunity to address the oppression of Hutu masses and created
a new Hutu political class. Through a series of legislation, the colonial government and the
Church used their influence to implement a transfer of power from the Tutsi aristocracy to Hutu
elites.54 The emergence of a new Hutu political class constituted the core of the 1959 “Hutu
Revolution,” which installed a new Hutu president and Hutu-dominated government and purged
Tutsis from positions of authority.55 The 1960 – 1961 legislative elections led to a large-scale
victory of Parmehutu, a radical Hutu and anti-Tutsi party. Widespread violence against the Tutsi
occurred, killing hundreds of Tutsis and forcing many to flee the country. Between 1961 and
1963, many Tutsi refugees in Burundi and Uganda attempted to return to the country by
launching small guerrilla attacks. While this attempt was stopped easily, the anti-Tutsi mentality
led to organized massacres of innocent Tutsi civilians, leading to the deaths of up to 30,000
Tutsis and resulting in more than 100,000 Tutsis forcibly fleeing the country.56 The 1959 Hutu
Revolution thus marked the crucial transformation of ethnic identities in Rwanda. Racialized
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ethnicities both overshadowed the organization of the country and became Rwanda’s central
political idiom.57
The newly established Hutu government in 1960s Rwanda was, however, neither
democratic nor averse to repression. The post-independence Rwandan government was
confronted with a dual mandate: 1) defining and solidifying the state as an institution with
authority, and 2) strengthening the control of state power held by the new Hutu elites.58 The state
controlled all aspects of lives, from education, health care, rural development, to the promotion
of cultural and social values. Through this absolute and comprehensive control of state power,
the elites were able to fulfill the second part of their mandate through violent means in both the
first Republic (1962-1973) under Grégoire Kayibanda and the second Republic (1973-1994)
under General Juvénal Habyarimana. The Kayibanda regime implemented widespread
persecution of most former Tutsi power-holders and all Tutsi politicians, and a few opposition
Hutu politicians. The second Republic was an equally autocratic military dictatorship that killed
many powerful figures from the first Republic and violently cracked down on opposition and
dissidents.59
Despite their autocratic nature, both regimes were very successful in legitimizing
themselves in front of both domestic and international forces by employing an ethnic, “social
revolution” argument and a “development” argument. The “social revolution” ideology argued
that Rwanda belonged to the Hutus, its original inhabitants who were subjugated for centuries by
both the Tutsi and European colonizers. Referencing discrimination against Hutus under the
colonial period, this argument constructed the government as the legitimate representative of the
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majority Hutu and as Hutus’ sole defense against Tutsis’ attempt to enslave the country again.60
This argument was intricately linked to the second one, which argued that the state’s sole
objective was to facilitate economic development for the underdeveloped Hutu masses. Such
ideology thus legitimized the state’s interference in all aspects of social life, and diverted
attention from crucial political and social problems within the country.61 These two arguments
together reiterated a dehumanizing notion of Tutsi evilness and helped foster an ethnic-based
intra-Hutu and anti-Tutsi societal division. It is crucial to note that even during this period,
political rhetoric sustained by these two ideologies already contained genocidal languages.
Prejudice, discrimination, and racism against the Tutsi became institutionalized; violence and
human rights abuses against the Tutsi were glorified as acts of heroism protected by almost
complete impunity.62
By the end of the 1980s, the Habyarimana government faced pressure from several
fronts. Obligated to undergo structural adjustment programs, Rwanda faced a decline in food
production per capita, a collapse in international coffee prices, and a major fall in farm cash
incomes.63 Habyarimana’s domestic political crackdown backfired, which resulted in an increase
in internal opposition to the single-party system. In addition, with the fall of communism in
Europe, Western donors no longer accepted single-party dictatorships, and Rwanda was no
exception. Under pressure from France, President Habyarimana formally ended the exclusive
rule of his party, allowing for a vigorous Hutu opposition to rise and to challenge his presidency.
The largest opposition party was the Mouvement Démocratique Republicain (MDR).64
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In October 1990, Tutsi refugees under the banner of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
attacked Rwanda from southern Uganda, setting in motion a civil war between the Hutudominated government and the Tutsi-dominated rebellion. The Rwandan army, with the
assistance of foreign troops, managed to turn back on RPF invasion. The civil war did not end,
however, as the RPF shifted to low-level guerrilla warfare and cross-borders raids from Uganda
into Rwanda.65 By early 1992, it became clear that the Rwanda government lacked the capacity
to defeat the RPF. In April 1992, President Habyarimana formed a coalition government with the
political opposition and started peace negotiations with RPF rebels. The agendas during these
peace talks included negotiations of a ceasefire, repatriation of Tutsi refugees, and a
comprehensive political agreement for power sharing with the RPF. 66 Peace negotiations
culminated in the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 1993, and the United Nations
deployed a peacekeeping force, led by General Romeo Dallaire of Canada, to Rwanda. By nearly
all accounts, the Arusha Accords were a triumph for the RPF.67 The Accords created a viable
threat to the monopolization of political and economic powers held by Hutu elites. Hutu
extremists also saw the civil war in early 1990s as a Tutsi-caused threat to Hutu political and
economic predominance in general. They also believed that the Tutsi posed a threat to the
physical safety of all Hutus in Rwanda.68 In addition, Prunier argues that when the political
landscape looked as if the Tutsi were gaining extensive power through the Arusha Accords,
“such a desperate threat called for desperate remedies.”69
In the 1990-1993 period, the Hutu elites triggered a series of informal and irregular
measures that laid the groundwork for the genocide in 1994. First, the hardliners linked the
65

Valentino 179
Strauss 24, 25
67
Valentino 181
68
Ibid 183
69
Prunier 226
66

22

Tutsi-dominated RPF to the Tutsi population living in Rwanda, calling them rebel “accomplices”
and subsequently arrested as many as 13,000 civilians, mostly Tutsi.70 Second, the Rwandan
army expanded dramatically and launched a civilian defense program to train civilian authorities
in firearms use. This training mandate therefore incorporated civilians into the war, setting the
stage for civilian participation in the genocide. Third, extremist politician and military officials
started funding and organizing Hutu militia groups, including the Interahamwe (“those who
stand or fight together) and Impuzamugambi (“those with a single purpose”). These groups
terrorized domestic political opponents, the RPF guerrillas, and Tutsi civilian “accomplices.”71
The training program for the Interahamwe also included instructions to create “death lists” of
Tutsis, which would allow militiamen to exterminate Tutsi civilians.72
Fourth, Habyarimana’s party, the Mouvement Républicain National Pour la Démocratie
et le Développement (MRND) and its supporters funded and distributed racist propaganda
against the Tutsi. Among the most notorious platforms was the radio station Radio Télévision
Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC), which broadcasted messages perpetuating fear-mongering
about the ruthlessness of the RPF, ethnic nationalism, and ethnic stereotyping. In addition, the
aforementioned “Hutu Ten Commandments” published by the extremist Kangura also instructed
Hutus to break ties with Tutsis and to protect the gains of the Hutu Revolution.73 The final
development was the creation of a political alliance known as “Hutu Power.” The assassination
of the elected Hutu President Ndadaye in Burundi by Tutsi military officers reverberated in the
Rwandan political sphere. Hardliners took this opportunity to claim that Tutsis would never
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share power and only sought domination of Hutus.74 The solidification of Hutu power indicated
radicalization among nationalist and ethnic lines, as Hutu elite openly embraced exclusivist
nationalism that framed Tutsis as a common enemy. In addition, various developments – the
militia training and the “death lists,” among others – also suggested that by early 1994, Hutu
extremists had already undergone extreme radicalization and showed genocidal tendency
towards Tutsis.75 During this period, the government was allegedly responsible for at least 16
major episodes of massacres against the Tutsi population.76
Several factors affected the final decisions to launch a systematic genocide. First, the
extremists’ efforts to deal with the Tutsi threat had failed, as the Arusha Accords provided the
RPF with extensive political power. Second, the Hutu extremists showed a tendency to view the
Hutu-Tutsi conflict in quasi-racial terms, assuming that all Tutsis were enemies and that
cooperation between the two ethnicities was therefore impossible.77 These hardliners argued that
virtually all Tutsis were supporters of the RPF. Finally, the desire of Hutu extremists to not
repeat the “mistake of 1959” appeared to have been one of the most crucial factors in facilitating
the decision for genocide.78 Prunier argues that the extremists thought of the genocide as a matter
of survival, for the “mistake of 1959” had allowed for children of many refugees to come back
and threaten Hutu hegemony.79 This cold logic was shown most clearly in Colonel Bagosara’s
speech at a party two days before the genocide began, in which he claimed that, “the only
plausible solution for Rwanda would be the elimination of the Tutsi.” President Habyarimana
himself also lost a significant amount of support and trust due to his failure to protect Hutu
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power from the RPF invasion. Many scholars speculated that the Hutu extremists were
responsible for shooting down the airplane carrying Habyarimana on April 6, 1994.80 What
immediately followed was one of the most horrific chapters of human history. It was within this
historical context that gross human rights violations and gender-based violence occurred. This
thesis seeks to analyze how international, national, and local transitional justice mechanisms
attempted to address this gendered legacy.
CHAPTER OVERVIEWS
The thesis is divided into five chapters. This first chapter introduces the thesis and its
research design, and provides a brief historical background to the social and political tension
leading up to the genocide. The second chapter is a review of literature in the field. It first
provides a theoretical framework for understanding rape and sexual assaults as a tool of genocide
and a weapon in armed conflicts. It then offers an overview of the major concepts, definitions,
and debates within the field of transitional justice. The chapter ends with the issues surrounding
gender justice within the context of transitional justice, and situates the thesis within the
literature.
The third and fourth chapters are detailed cases study of international and local
transitional justice mechanisms in post-genocide Rwanda. The third chapter focuses on the
establishment of the ICTR and the creation of trials based on the principle of universal
jurisdiction in other states. It evaluates the strengths and weaknesses, as well as successes and
failures, of international mechanisms in bringing comprehensive justice for victims of rape and
sexual violence. The chapter focuses specifically on the ICTR, and analyzes how its
shortcomings and achievements could serve as precedents for future tribunals, especially the
ICC, in prosecuting sexual crimes under international law.
80
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The fourth chapter begins with a quick overview of Rwanda’s attempt to prosecute
participants of the genocide in its national criminal court system, which proved to be insufficient
and ineffective. It then focuses primarily on the modification and reinstallation of the gacaca
courts, and evaluates its success in delivering gender-sensitive justice. The chapter shows that
the modern gacaca was a significant departure from its traditional version that was popular to
Rwandan society, which resulted in various tensions and incompatible goals within the modern
gacaca system. The extent to which gacaca was successful in bringing comprehensive justice to
victims of sexual violence depended on how the victims defined justice and reconciliation. In
addition, the chapter also evaluates whether reparation programs within Rwanda were able to
provide assistance to survivors of sexual violence.
The last chapter is a comparative analysis of domestic and international transitional
justice mechanisms with regards to their effectiveness in providing accountability for the legacy
of rape and sexual violence during the genocide. It summarizes the thesis’s research findings and
provides recommendations for future research and transitional justice projects.
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2. GENDERED WAR, GENDERED PEACE
GENDER, ARMED CONFLICTS, AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

The past, as William Faulkner contends, is not even past. History lives on in Rwanda. As
President Paul Kagame said, “Every Rwandan is either a genocide survivor or a perpetrator, or the
friend or relative of a survivor or perpetrator.”81 The question of, and to some extent, the tension
between, justice and reconciliation emerged almost immediately as the country attempted to reckon
with its painful past. Within the multitude of challenges confronting post-genocide Rwanda, the
question of how to bring justice and reconciliation to victims of rape and sexual assault was one of
the hardest to answer. This was a crucial national matter, because how the country reckoned with
its past could and would set precedents for new political and social norms that dictated the
emerging post-genocide regime. For survivors of gender-based violence, these norms would also
impact their reconciliation and reintegration into their communities.
As Juan E. Méndez, a prominent authority on legal transitional justice, argues, the hardest
question is, “how to pursue the objectives of justice and reconciliation without falling into
tokenism and a false morality that only thinly disguises the perpetuation of impunity.”82 In order to
fully understand how Rwandan victims of rape and sexual assaults were impacted by these
“objectives of justice and reconciliation,” it is necessary to understand the overarching issues
facing women in both armed conflicts and transitional justice. This chapter is a review of the
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literature and provides a brief overview of the gendered impacts of both armed conflicts and
transitional justice on women and situating the thesis in the literature.
GENDER AND ARMED CONFLICTS
Militarized Hyper-Masculinity and Sexual Violence
Hyper-masculinity dominates war and military training, which is a process of socializing
soldiers into an extreme kind of masculinity that capitalizes on young men’s sexual insecurities
and identities.83 This gender dimension of war and militarism is guided by the gender ideology
that men are the protector, women are the protected, and war is men’s chosen province in which
they can prove their masculinity.84 This protector/protected dichotomy imposes profound political
consequences on women, as they are often associated with being victims, weak, and passive.85
More importantly, such dichotomy also renders women extremely vulnerable to sexual violence
committed by enemy’s men.86 This resort to sexual violence is a direct way of getting at the
enemy by highlighting their failure to protect their women, thus emasculating and humiliating the
enemy. The use of sexual violence and all forms of gender-based violence against women
therefore becomes a symbolic tool of assaulting men’s pride and national honor.87
Sexual violence takes various forms in armed conflicts, and the use of sexual violence as a
tool of war has become an epidemic commonality. Janie Leatherman categorizes and
conceptualizes sexual violence in armed conflicts as a runaway norm that crosses four different
thresholds of violence: type of violence, target, agency, and loss of neutrality and safe space.88
Leatherman defines runaway norms as “a special class of norms that produce social harms and
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public bads,” and argues that these norms legitimize and incentivize different conflict processes
that result in gross violations of human dignity.89 In genocides especially, Leatherman argues that
rape and other forms of gender-based violence, such as genital mutilation and other means of
degradation directed against sexual organs or the female body, point to the gendered nature of
genocide, or “gendercide.”90 Within the multitude of sexual violence in armed conflicts, rape is the
most commonly used form of violence against women.91
Despite this commonality, scholars often situate rape and sexual violence in armed
conflicts differently. Primordial approaches to gender and sexuality suggests that since men are
aggressors against women, they employ rape and sexual violence to pursue and maintain
dominance over women.92 Instrumentalist feminists, on the other hand, contend that rape and
sexual violence is used as a means to achieve a specific end, such as the use of rape as a genocidal
tool in Rwanda. Furthermore, a social constructivist approach highlights that understanding rape
and sexual assault in armed conflicts requires a careful analysis of the overarching socio-cultural
framework in which gender, sexuality, and ethnic power intersect. 93 For example, Catherine
MacKinnon argues that in the case of the former Yugoslavia, sexual violence and rape must be
understood as part of a larger strategy of violence against women and their ethno-religious
community.94
Rape and Sexual Violence as A Tool of Genocide
The instrumentalist approach to understanding rape and sexual violence points to a crucial
aspect of violence in Rwanda: the use of rape as a genocidal tool. Scholars, however, are divided
89
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on whether rape should be recognized as a tool of genocide.95 On one hand, scholars such as
Catherine MacKinnon contend that rape, as in the case of Bosnian Muslim women raped by Serbs
during the Yugoslav wars, was genocidal because it tended to destroy the victim and her Bosnian
community.96 Scholars in this line of thought emphasize intersectionality; they believe that the
intersection of gender and ethnicity is a factor that can aggravate the victims’ situation.97 On the
other hand, Rhonda Copelon and her supporters argue that rape occurs against women not because
of the social or ethnic group to which they belong, but because they are women.98 This rather
essentialist approach to understanding rape in armed conflicts promotes the notion of womanhood
as a homogenous victim group.99 This thesis aligns with MacKinnon’s line of argument and
believes that in the case of Rwanda, the use of rape and sexual assault was genocidal. While the
majority of victims of sexual violence are women, men and boys too can be sexually attacked.
While men have been portrayed primarily as perpetrators, women can also assume this role to
commit and facilitate sexual violence.100
James Waller argues that during genocidal conflicts, rape often serves a macro-level
purpose and is central to regime policy and directive.101 Waller writes that as a “political and social
tool or weapon, rape can fulfill visions of genocide and ethnic cleansing by leading to physical
death, community breakdown (including disruption of traditional gender roles), and the “dilution”
of the next generation (including the intentional transmission of sexual diseases).”102 Leatherman
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adds that rape is also a tool of branding, for rape creates “a lasting physical and psychological
scar,” “invokes and re-invokes the horror of the original violation,” and “preserves and
communicates the power of the perpetrators over family members and others in the community.”103
In other words, the use of rape in genocidal conflicts is not result of “a few bad apples,” but rather
represents a systemic method of violence employed with clear political motivation. As Catherine
MacKinnon argues:
This is not rape out of control. It is rape under control. It is also rape unto death,
rape as massacre, rape to kill and to make the victims wish they were dead. It is
rape as an instrument of forced exile, rape to make you leave your home and never
want to go back. It is rape to be seen and heard and watched and told to others: rape
as spectacle. It is rape to drive a wedge through a community, to shatter a society,
to destroy a people. It is rape as genocide. 104
The gender ideology that men are the protector and women are the protected is central to
understanding rape as a tool of genocide. According to patriarchal principles, women are the male
enemy’s property and should be used as an instrument to defeat the enemy. Raping a woman in
armed conflict is thus a political act against her husband, father, and brother, and thus becomes a
way to blame the enemy’s men, ethnicity, and country for failing to protect their women.105 As
Susan Brownmiller argues, “a simple rule of thumb in war is that the winning side is the side that
does the raping.”106 However, women also become the victims of the losing side, for raping
women of the winning side is an act of retaliation and revenge. In a “never-ending cycle of
revenge,”107 women find themselves raped because of the “manifestation of the heroic fighting
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men engaged in good fight.”108 Rape, however, is not a tool only reserved for emasculating and
humiliating the enemy. Women also face the prospect of being raped both by soldiers from their
own countries and by peacekeepers – men who are supposed to be their protectors.109
The Rwandan genocide exemplified the use of rape as a tool of war and genocide. Chiseche
Salome Mibenge writes that two gendered and interwoven themes underpinned the construction of
sexual violence as a weapon of war in Rwanda:
First, extremists used sexual violence to reclaim the lost ground of patriarchy and
reassert a male dominance over Rwandan women. Second, sexual violence was
supposed to perpetuate Hutu dominance and destroy all threats to racial purity and
unity.110
Tutsi women were raped both because of their ethnicity and their gender, and their bodies became
the figurative and literal sites of combats.111 Following the notion of a “never-ending cycle of
revenge,” Tutsi soldiers of the RPF also raped Hutu women in revenge for Tutsi women raped by
Hutu men. Moreover, Tutsi girls and women were also obliged to “offer themselves” to RPF
soldiers to avoid being regarded as sympathizers of the Hutu government.112 In both sides of the
conflict, women were raped to pay for what men from other side had done. Rape was also used as a
tool of torture, as perpetrators employed amputation and mutilation of victims’ breast, vaginas, and
buttocks, or features deemed to be Tutsi such as small noses or long fingers.113 Rape was also used
as a weapon of genocide to kill and spread HIV/AIDS by perpetrators who often knew they carried
the disease. This strategy proved to be horrendously successful, as 15 years after the genocide, an
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estimated 70% of rape survivors were HIV-positive.114 Furthermore, the traditional roles of women
as mothers and child-bearers were also politicized and used for ethnic cleansing. Both Tutsis and
Hutus used women as “reproductive vessels,” and raped them to make them bear the children of
the rapists’ ethnic identity.115 Rwandan women were raped because it was widely recognized that
victims of rape were never acceptable to the patriarchal community and to herself, and rape could
destroy a woman’s chance of marriage. Survivors of rape almost always live with physical and
emotional trauma while simultaneously being treated by their family and community as “damaged
goods, living symbols of the nation’s humiliation and bearers of ‘enemy children.’”116
The warrior culture and its socialization of soldiers into a militarized hyper-masculinity
have long lasting impacts even when armed conflicts have officially ended. In the United States,
combat trauma and the stress of redeployment set the stage for homicide and domestic violence,
and researchers have argued that those diagnosed with PTSD are “significantly more likely to
perpetuate violence towards their partners.”117 In Bosnia, domestic violence also increased after the
conflict. In a militarized, hyper-masculinized environment, men turned the abstract hatred of other
nationalities into the concrete hatred of close relatives likes wives and children.118Jacquie True also
argues that despite the official disarmament, domestic violence will escalate in post-conflict
societies due to the “heightened militarization of the society and the celebration of armed
masculinity.”119 Soldiers can also prey upon women for sexual advantage with impunity when the
normal fabric of law enforcement and justice are disabled by wars. This impunity results from the
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reality that immediate post-war violence against women is never prioritized during the process of
national reconstruction, and is almost always considered an issue to be put off until later.120 As a
result, while the signing of a formal peace agreement can end armed conflicts; rape, sexual assault,
forced pregnancy, prostitution, and trafficking continue to haunt women’s lives.121 It is therefore
widely acknowledged that domestic and sexual violence tends to increase in almost all postconflict societies across the world.
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
The term “transitional justice” itself is relatively new. Initially dominated by legal scholars,
the field of transitional justice at its early stage was predominantly occupied with the questions of
accountability in democratic transitions.122 As Ruti Teitel defines, the conception of justice in
political transitions is characterized by “legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive
predecessor regimes.”123 The field, however, emerged out of its legal focus and became more
interdisciplinary, as scholars of anthropology, psychology, political science, and sociology
contribute significantly to the literature. The focus beyond legal justice then included non-legal
concepts, including truth telling, reparations, healing, and forgiveness. Consequently, mechanisms
of transitional justice became more diverse and included truth commission, reparation programs,
institutional reforms, and memory projects, among many others. While there is no single and
unanimously accepted definition of transitional justice, many of its elements remain universal. The
International Center for Transitional Justice, the most well-known and respected research
institution in the field, defines transitional justice as:
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Transitional justice is not a ‘special’ kind of justice, but an approach to achieving
justice in times of transition from conflict and/or state repression. By trying to
achieve accountability and redressing victims, transitional justice provides
recognition of the rights of victims, promotes civic trust and strengthens the
democratic rule of law. 124
In addition, one of the most holistic definitions of transitional justice came from the former United
Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 2004 report, in which he defines transitional justice as:
The notion of “transitional justice” discussed in the present report comprises the full
range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability,
serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and nonjudicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at
all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform,
vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof. 125
This complex understanding points to two crucial and universal aspects of transitional justice.
First, it is widely accepted and understood that states cannot bury their past wrongdoings and
human rights violations. The pursuit of retrospective justice is a crucial task of democratization, for
it sets the fundamental characters of a new social and political order based on the rule of law and
respect for human dignity.126 Second, through transitional justice, the road to democracy and the
rule of law must be constructed by a holistic and “full range” of mechanisms. This holistic
approach, which must include both retributive and restorative justice, sometimes clashes with the
tendency of governments to believe that different measures can be traded off against one
another.127
The Evolution of Transitional Justice
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The origin of transitional justice can be traced back to the post-World War II period.128
This period was the heyday of international justice; the world witnessed a critical turning point
from prior domestic responses to international responses.129 In an effort to deal with the atrocities
committed by Nazi Germany and Japan, the international community created two international
tribunals: the 1945 International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Nuremberg Trials) and the 1946
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Trials). These trials hold historic
significance by expanding the application of international law to individuals instead of to only
states, and by stressing and prioritizing international law over domestic law.130 The creation and
jurisdiction of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials showcased that the principles of individual and
group human rights were of international concern, and that international judicial intervention in
bringing accountability for human rights violations could overrule the concept of national
sovereignty. 131 Since the concept of national sovereignty had been the guiding principle of
international relations since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, this weakening of judicial sovereignty
was a stepping-stone to the creation of the ICTR and the judicial intervention of the international
community decades later.
The post-World War II period also marked the creation of the United Nations (UN), its
human rights charter, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The creation of both the UN and
the ICJ represented a landmark attempt to fight against impunity for gross human rights violations.
Almost immediately afterwards, delegates passed the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, creating the

128

Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 70
Ibid 73
130
Hinton 2,3
131
Gahima 2
129

36

core structure of the international human rights regime.132 The next few decades saw the adoption
of various treaties concerning civil and political rights, economic, social, and cultural rights,
torture, and discrimination. In addition, the world also witnessed the growth of regional human
rights courts in Africa, Europe, and Latin America, and the creation of influential human rights
organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.133 This international
commitment to individual human rights also informed domestic and comparative law, as
exemplified by the emergence of a wave of related constitutionalism.134 As the Cold War dictated
the bipolarization of the international order, this growing human rights regime came to a halt in the
1950s. Despite its short-lived length, this immediate post-War period, in which state and individual
wrongdoings were criminalized and a universal rights scheme was established, forms the basis of
modern human rights law.135
Modern transitional justice took shape in the 1980s, as a body of literature concerning
transitional justice emerged when a number of African (Uganda, Zimbabwe) and Latin American
(Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Uruguay) countries transitioned from dictatorships and
authoritarian governments towards democracy.136 In addition, the end of the Cold War and the
collapse of the Soviet Union also marked the beginning of democratization in Eastern Europe and
South Africa. 137 Following this global movement towards democratization, a new phase of
transitional justice commenced and moved beyond retributive justice and criminal prosecution.
The rule of law was adhered to through trials by nation-states to legitimize the successor regime
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and advance nation building.138 However, instead of solely focusing on holding the predecessor
regime accountable, transitional justice also turned towards questioning how to heal a society after
a painful past and to include various rule of law values, such as peace and reconciliation between
former enemies. This shift away from legal justice reflected a change in the understanding of
transitional justice, which was linked with more complex conditions of nation building.139 With a
clear need for both justice and reconciliation, scholars and practitioners questioned what type of
mechanism was most appropriate. The debate soon revolved around the question of trials versus
non-trial approaches, with those arguing for prosecution pitted against those in favor of amnesty.140
In the context of transition, this debate took place when families of victims of former
regimes and other survivors started increasing their demands for information about atrocities and
human rights violations committed in the past. 141 Uncovering the truth about human rights
violations was considered of crucial importance to democratization, and truth telling was the
central focus of transitional justice studies. As Luc Huyse argues, “dealing with the past is an
inescapable task for new democratic regimes.”142 Many then turned to truth commissions, the most
commonly used and prominent non-trial transitional justice mechanism. Transitional justice
through truth commissions became a vehicle for victims to reconcile and recover from past harms,
and a form of dialogue between victims and their perpetrators.143 Reconciliation thus became both
a national and a personal matter: while society as a whole struggled to confront its past, individuals
simultaneously attempted to rebuild and restore their social and political identity. While
questionable and often debated, it is often suggested that truth commissions, by uncovering the
138
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truth and giving victims a chance to speak, offer victims an opportunity for healing or “cathartic”
experiences.144 In addition, Pablo De Greiff argues that truth-telling mechanisms can facilitate the
establishment or the entrenchment of the rule of law by promoting civic trust. 145 Truth
commissions have continued to be adapted, and the most well-known and extensively studied
institution is the 1995-2002 Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa.
This forward-looking focus on national and individual reconciliation underlined modern
transitional justice. In tandem with the backward-looking mechanism of criminal prosecution,
transitional justice during this time also included apologies, reparations, memoirs and other ways
of settling account in regards to past wrongdoings and human rights violations.146 In addition, this
phase of transitional justice also witnessed a change in relevant political actors from those with
legal and political authority to those with moral authority in the society, such as churches, NGOs,
and human rights groups.147 Furthermore, this phase of transitional justice reflected a struggle
between local and global decisions, increasing the complexity and interconnectedness of
transitional justice, globalization, and sovereignty. The crucial question was whether and to what
extent the response to human rights violations should remain under the control of the state where
the harm occurred.148
This tension was extremely visible in both the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The violent
acts in the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides were witnessed by the entire world. Eager to redeem
itself, the United Nations established the ICTY and ICTR in 1993 and 1994 respectively. In the
context of increasing globalization, the intersection of the principles of jurisdiction and sovereignty
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has and will raise profound questions.149 However, it is now widely accepted that there exists a
duty, whether on national or international level, to implement both restorative and retributive
measures to uncover truths and prosecute crimes of genocide, crime against humanity, war crimes,
and torture.150 This duty is a crucial tenet of transitional justice, which has become significantly
interdisciplinary by the end of the twentieth century.
Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Objectives
As aforementioned, as the field of transitional justice emerged and expanded out of its
legal-focused inception, a variety of mechanisms have been employed. While the insistence on
confronting the past in countries in transition has become almost universal, the range of options
remains vast and depends on the social, cultural, and political context of each country.151
One of the most common institutions of transitional justice is criminal prosecution.
Varying from domestic and local trials to international tribunals, criminal prosecution is a
retributive mechanism aimed at investigating the crimes committed during conflicts, holding
perpetrators accountable, and punishing them for their abuse.152 As Martha Minow argues, trials
“transfer the individuals’ desires for revenge to the state or official bodies,” and respond to the
demand for accountability, acknowledgment of past harm, and punishment.153 Many countries,
such as Peru, Venezuela, and Egypt have used their respective domestic criminal systems to
prosecute perpetrators, while in many other instances, such as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia,
the international community intervened judicially by opening ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY
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and ICTR, or through the International Criminal Court.154 In countries where post-conflict societies
either lack the political will or capacity to prosecute perpetrators, hybrid courts, which include both
international and domestic actors and use international legal standards, have been implemented for
the pursuit of justice, such as in Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, and Cambodia. Criminal and
retributive justice is usually the first and most prominent demand, yet also one of the most difficult.
Countries emerging out of a sustained period of conflict usually have a devastated judicial system,
in which judges may be politically compromised, corrupt, timid, and/or lack expertise and
resources.155 In addition, victims often play a limited role in this retributive justice process, and
reconciliation is usually not the goal of criminal trials.156
Within the repertoire of non-judicial approaches to transitional justice, truth commissions
are the most common. Truth commissions are temporary, non-judicial bodies that are authorized by
the state to investigate a pattern of events in a sustained period of time, to engage directly with the
affected population, and to gather information about their experiences.157 While the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission is the most well known and extensively studied, 44 other
truth commissions have been set up in various countries, such as Argentina, Sri Lanka, Chile, Peru,
and El Salvador, among many others.158 Truth commissions are established to gather truth and
construct an official historical record of human rights abuses to help victims find closure and signal
an official commitment to prevent the reoccurrence of atrocities.159 Psychological research points
to the notion that truth telling itself is important, as survivors can be helped by sharing their story
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to sympathetic listeners and by situating their stories within the larger social context.160 In addition,
just as individuals need “closure,” a traumatized society can also benefit from a public airing
leading to closure, setting the stage for former enemies to live together and creating a framework
for non-recurrence of violence and human rights violations.161 Other non-retributive transitional
justice mechanisms include reparations and memory projects. Reparations can be both material
(through financial payments and social services) and/or symbolic (through public acknowledgment
or apology). Reparations can also occur in tandem with institutional reforms to prevent recurrence
of abusive practices and to revise the laws that facilitated such practices in the first place.162
Memory projects, such as monuments, annual prayer ceremonies, or mass graves, create official
records, preserve memories of people and events, and serve as public acknowledgment of past
wrongdoings to restore the dignity of victims.163
Furthermore, many transitional justice mechanisms include both retributive and nonretributive elements. Some countries employ lustration, which identifies and removes politicians
from former regime from public office.164 This method has been criticized for lacking due-process
guarantees and for relying on false intelligence from the prior regime, and has been rare outside of
Eastern Europe.165 Similar to lustration, some states also employ vetting or purging to remove
those with a record of human rights abuse from security forces and other public positions.166 In
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addition, many countries also grant amnesties to perpetrators in exchange for truth and mark a
turning point from the conflict-ridden past to a new and more peaceful present.167
The universe of transitional justice is therefore very diverse, and its mechanisms are not
mutually exclusive. The establishment of different transitional justice mechanisms points to a wide
range of goals. Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey R. Chapman provide a brief
summary of what has been often accepted as the overall objectives of transitional justice:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

restoring dignity to victims and promoting psychological healing; ending
violence and human rights abuses and preventing them in the future;
creating a “collective memory” or a common history for a new future not
determined by the past;
forging the basis for a democratic political order that respects and protects
human rights
identifying the architects of the past violence and excluding, shaming, and
diminishing perpetrators for their offences;
legitimating and promoting the stability of the new regime;
promoting reconciliation across social divisions;
educating the population about the past; and
recommending ways to deter future violations and atrocities. 168

Drawing upon these objectives of transitional justice, Pablo de Greiff concludes that all
measures of transitional justice share two mediate goals (providing recognition to victims and
fostering civic trust) and two final goals (contributing to reconciliation and to democratization).169
In times of political transition, transitional justice aims to grant victims “moral standing as
individual human beings” and “to provide victims a sense of recognition not only as victims but as
(equal) right-bearers and, ultimately, citizens.170 Trust, on the other hand, involves an expectation
of shared commitments to norms and values. This type of civil trust is a “disposition that can
develop among citizens who are strangers to one another and who are members of the same
community only in the sense in which they are fellow members of the same political
167

DeMeritt 182
Van de Merwe et. al, Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice, 3
169
De Greiff, “Theorizing Transitional Justice, 40
170
Ibid 42
168

43

community.” 171 To victims and survivors of violence, civil trust can be attained by an
institutionalized effort to confront the past as a good-faith effort to come clean, to understand and
acknowledge long-term patterns of socialization, and to initiate a new political project around
shared norms and values.172
In connecting short- and long-term goals of transitional justice, De Greiff argues that
recognition and civic trust are both preconditions and consequences of justice and reconciliation.
Reconciliation, as defined earlier, refers to a state of social relations characterized by civic and
norm-based trust.173 It is crucial to note that this civic trust refers to both trust among individuals
and trust between individuals and political institutions. Making institutions trustworthy, especially
to survivors of violence, requires an institutional transformation for which transitional justice
mechanisms can set the stage but not produce. 174 In a similar light, while the end goal of
transitional justice is democracy, transitional justice mechanisms by themselves cannot produce
democracy. Transitional justice can, however, contribute to democratization through its
commitment to and the (re)establishment of the rule of law. De Greiff argues that different
mechanisms, such as criminal prosecution and truth commissions, all represent to a promise of the
rule of law.175 The rule of law can be promoted as a range of traditional liberal civil rights that
victims of violence are recognized to have as citizens, and as social norms and principles that form
the basis of civic trust as enshrined in laws.176 These rights and norms must translate into the rights
to political participation.177
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These short- and long-term goals of transitional justice are particularly important in the
case of Rwanda, where Tutsis and Hutus lived in integrated communities and interethnic marriages
were common before the genocide. On the individual level, victims of rape and sexual assaults had
to confront the possibility of reintegrating into their communities where their perpetrators lived.
Transitional justice mechanisms, in order to facilitate reconciliation, must acknowledge and
legitimize the victims’ experiences, develop extensive trust between the victims and the
perpetrators, and restore broken community ties. In addition, in most communities where victims
of rape and sexual assaults were usually stigmatized and ostracized by their families and relatives,
building trust between the victims and their respective community was crucial for victims to live
peacefully and start of the process of healing. On the national level, civic trust must be restored
between Hutus and Tutsis in order for norms of equality and reciprocity to emerge and be
incorporated in the rule of law. Given the history of oppression of the Tutsi by the Hutu-dominated
autocratic governments, these norms of equality must translate into equal rights of political
participation and equal political representation in the government. In addition, an official historical
narrative that recognizes the experiences of the Tutsi during the genocide, especially those
experienced by victims of rape and sexual assault, must be developed through transitional justice
mechanisms to facilitate the process of healing for victims.
Retributive and Restorative Justice
One of the most prominent debates in the field on the appropriate mechanisms to achieve
the various goals of transitional justice is that between retributive and restorative justice. Both
retributive and restorative theories of justice acknowledge that a balance has been disrupted by past
wrongdoings. Their shared goal is therefore the restoration of such balance through reciprocity.
Consequently, both theories believe that there must be a proportional relationship between the act
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and the response: the victims deserve something for their sufferings and the perpetrators owe
something for their offense.178 Despite this commonality, retributive and restorative justices are
different in their understandings of justice, their objectives, and their corresponding measures to
achieve those goals.
Retributive justice, in its simplest form, is understood as, “punishment of the perpetrator by
the state, through a process of judging guilt and imposing penalties commensurate with the nature
of the crime.”179 Martha Minow writes that retribution motivates punishment out of fairness and
reflects the beliefs that wrongdoers deserve blame and punishment proportionate to the harm they
inflicted. 180 Moreover, this retributive dimension of justice advocates for punishment not
necessarily with hope of deterrence or other future effects, but as a way of denouncing previous
wrongs and wrongdoers. In the bigger societal context, states use retributive justice to correct the
wrongdoers’ message that victims were less worthy or valuable, and reassert the victim’s value by
publicly punishing the wrongdoers.181 In the context of national reconstruction, retributive justice
is necessary for states since they need to adhere to international legal standards,182 and states can
do so by reaffirming the norms that grant equal rights to all.183 Regarding the relationship between
retributive justice and transitional justice, David Crocker argues that transitional justice “refers
exclusively to penal justice and even to retributive interpretations of trials and punishment.”184
Seen in this light, justice in transitional contexts must be retributive and thus requires prosecution
and punishment of wrongdoers.
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While scholars generally agree on the conception of retributive justice, transitional justice
scholars, however, often approach restorative justice differently. Gerry Johnstone defines
restorative justice as revolving around the idea that crime is “a violation of a person by another
person (rather than a violation of legal rules)” and that “efforts should be made to improve the
relationship between the offender and victim and to reintegrate the offender into the law-abiding
community.”185 Hugo van der Merwe argues that different definitions of restorative justice all
agree that the focus should be less on the crime but more on restoring or compensating for the
harm done to the victims and the society at large.186 Furthermore, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Dina
Haynes and Naomi Cahn define restorative justice as, “characterized by apologies and other forms
of direct victim confrontation with perpetrators, allowing victims and perpetrators to share a (safe)
space, allowing the perpetrators to acknowledge the “wrong” committed and the victims to
articulate the hurt or damage done to them as a result.”187
Despite their differences, these various definitions of restorative justice all share one major
common trait: the focus on and the contextualization of the relationship between the victim and the
perpetrator in the bigger context of their community and of transitional justice. Drawing upon this
common trait, Jennifer Llewellyn offers one of the most holistic and comprehensive conceptions of
restorative justice. She proposes that it is “relationship centered” and “fundamentally concerned
with restoring relationships harmed by wrongdoing to ones in which all parties enjoy and accord
one another equal dignity, respect, and concern.”188 Underpinning this theory of restorative justice,
Llewellyn argues, is the conviction that all human beings are constituted in and through
relationships, and the nature of these relationships, especially those of violence and oppression, are
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crucial to the beings of those involved.189 Restorative justice thus aims to restore and reconstruct
relationships to their ideal version, and views crimes primarily as harms to relationship and those
involved.190 She argues that while criminal justice is preoccupied with the idea that the state is the
principal party harmed by crime, restorative justice views harms and wrongdoings through the lens
of the victims, and assesses their impacts on the victims’ web of relationships.191 Because of its
focus on human and social relationship, restorative justice relies heavily on social context and thus
must be tailored to the specific needs of each society, and society therefore plays a crucial role in
the creation and solution of social conflicts.192
There are fundamental differences in the roles of retributive and restorative justice in the
bigger context of transitional justice, and these differences depend on the conception of transitional
justice itself. On the one hand, transitional justice, as “justice to the extent possible,” refers to the
extent to which justice can be achieved in a transitional context. This conception of transitional
justice is underwritten by the belief that “full” or “normal” justice is inherently retributive, and that
“full” justice may not be achieved in times of transition.193 Restorative justice seen in this account
is partial justice and is used in the absence of prosecution; restoration of the moral order is
therefore only one of the various goals served by justice.194 On the other hand, many contend that
political transitions have different demands and requirements for justice, and restorative justice in
this transitional context is the proper form of justice.195 In this account, transitional justice is and
must be restorative, and such process must focus on restoring the dignity of victims and the moral
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order. Martha Minow, for example, argues that truth commissions, as one of the essential
institutions of restorative justice, are not an alternative to criminal prosecutions but a mechanism
better suited to achieve the various goals of transitional justice.196
Both of these approaches to transitional justice, despite their differences, share a common
assumption that justice in normal times is retributive justice, and once political transition is over,
this normal demand of justice will emerge again.197 This assumption limits the influence of
restorative justice to transitional time, while its objectives, such as the restoration of social
relationships and the moral order, are often time-consuming. Retributive justice, in contrast, is
done when prosecution and punishment end. Llewellyn contends that different from retributive
justice, restorative justice is a process rather than a state of justice; it is a means to an end rather
than the end goal itself.198 A society’s decision to employ different institutions of restorative and
retributive justice will leave different impacts on victims of past harm. The focus of analysis and
political debates surrounding transitional justice has been, however, preoccupied with prosecutorial
rather than reparative objectives, and therefore with the question of how to punish perpetrators
rather than with how to help heal victims.199 Ruth Rubio-Marin argues that this tendency of
transitional justice to be preoccupied with perpetrators often results in a double marginalization:
the neglect of victims in transitional and post-conflict context, and within that, the marginalization
of women.200 This chapter now turns to an analysis of the role of women, or lack thereof, in
transitional justice and how different institutions of both retributive and restorative justice attempt
to resolve the legacy of rape and gender-based violence.
196

Minow 88
Llewellyn, “Restorative Justice,” 90
198
Ibid 96, 97
199
Pablo De Greiff, “Repairing the Past: Compensation for Victims of Human Rights Violations,” in The Handbook
of Reparations, ed. Pablo De Greiff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1,2
200
Ruth Rubio-Marín, “The Gender of Reparations: Setting the Agenda,” in What Happened to the Women?:
Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marín (New York: Social Science Research
Council, 2006), 22
197

49

GENDER AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
“Adding Women” in International Law
Since the very inception of the field, women have largely been neglected in the process of
transitional justice. Rape and sexual violence used as tools of war, however, is not a recent
phenomenon. Systemic use violence against women in conflict has been documented at least since
the rape of Chinese girls and women in Nanjing in the 1930s, the exploitation of Korean and
Chinese comfort women by Japanese soldiers in the 1940s and 1950s, abuses against Vietnamese
women by American soldiers in the Vietnam War, and the many other accounts of rape and sexual
assaults in conflicts in, but not limited to, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Darfur, Iraq, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.201 The earliest institutions of transitional justice,
the post-World War II tribunals, did not pay adequate attention to the needs and experiences of
women, and rape and sexual violence were largely considered spoils of war rather than systemic
tools of conflict.202 The very early stage of international human rights and humanitarian laws did
not prioritize a gender-sensitive framework and thus excluded the various experiences and needs of
women from the dominant practice of law at the time.203
As the concept of human rights started getting recognized and mainstreamed in the realm
of international politics, incremental changes in international human rights and humanitarian law
also occurred, including recognizing women as political actors in traditionally male-dominated
domains. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1951 Genocide
Convention, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 1984
Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhumane, and Degrading Treatment or
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Punishment (CAT), and the 2000 United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish
Trafficking in Persons altogether denounce all forms of torture, slavery, and degrading treatment as
violations of bodily-integrity rights.204 Most of these legal standards, especially the 1948 UDHR
and the 1951 Genocide Convention, however, lack a gendered perspective and reveal “a misguided
and misinformed attempt to be gender neutral, as was the common tendency in international
human rights.”205 It was not until the creation and adoption of the 1979 Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the 1993 United Nations
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, and the 1994 Inter-American
Convention on Violence that international laws started paying attention to the specific experiences
of women during conflict, especially in terms of sexual violence. Within the framework of
international humanitarian law, Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions specifically
references rape and other forms of sexual mistreatment, and states that, “women shall be especially
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution or any
form of indecent assault.” Rape is thus recognized as a crime of honor and as a human rights
violation. In addition, rape and sexual assault are considered “inhumane treatment” under Article
147 and therefore constitute “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions.206
Gender-based violence against women in armed conflicts gained specific attention in the
1990s. During this time, literature on transitional justice was dominated by the work of human
rights lawyers who argued that international human rights standards should be applicable to and
enforced during these political transitions.207 The 1990s also witnessed the rise of feminist scholars
who critiqued international human rights law and demanded the protection and promotion of
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women’s rights with specific attention to violence against women.208 As the concept of human
rights in international politics once again gained worldwide attention in the 1990s after the end of
the Cold War, interpretations of international laws also acknowledged that women experienced the
same physical harms as men in the context of political violence.209 However, feminist interventions
into international law specifically pointed to the different types of harms women experience in the
context of political violence, referencing rape and sexual assault as a general category of political
violence and using the widespread sexual violence in the Balkan and Rwandan conflicts as
examples.210 Following these conflicts, additional application and interpretation of the Geneva
Conventions was further highlighted in the findings of both the ICTY and the ICTR, and later in
the creation of the ICC through the adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute. The Rome Statue was a
landmark creation of a legal and normative foundation for transitional justice, especially in regards
to prosecuting sexual violence. The ICC categorizes “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”
as crimes against humanity,211 and defines rape as:
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration,
however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a
sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any
other part of the body.
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as
that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a
coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of
giving genuine consent. 212
This definition of rape prioritizes evidence of coercion over evidence of non-consent, recognizes
that the question of consent does not apply to everyone subjected to sexual violence, including
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children, the elderly, and the disabled, and focuses on the intention of perpetrators through the
show of coercion or threats of coercion.213 In addition, reforms were also introduced in the
investigation of war crimes to improve the recognition of gender-based human rights violations
and enhance prosecutors’ access to expertise in the prosecution of gender-based crimes.214 In
addition, the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in
2000 delivered a formal international political and legal recognition that both political violence and
its resolution are gendered, for gender is a determining factor in how individuals experience
political violence.215
Gendered Shortcomings of Transitional Justice
Despite these various developments in international law that focus on the recognition of
women as political actors and their experiences during armed conflicts, women have largely been
marginalized from both retributive and restorative transitional justice process. Christine Bell and
Catherine O’Rourke argue that one major feminist critique points to the “from” (male-defined
political violence) and “to” (liberal democratic frameworks) framework of transitional justice
discourse.216 First, the gendered nature of the public/private dichotomy reveals that since women
spend most of their lives in the private realm, a wide range of harms experienced by women,
especially gendered-based violence, is usually deemed private and thus does not fall into the
purview of state’s intervention.217 In addition, the predominantly Western liberal democratic
frameworks of transitional justice and human rights heavily prioritize civil and political rights over
economic, social, and cultural rights, and hence perpetuate the prioritization of public over private.
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In this account, transitional justice processes orchestrated by the state are more concerned with an
individual’s relationship with the government as dictated by civil and political rights.218 This major
focus on public, first-generation human rights therefore allows states to neglect both the ongoing
sexual violence happening in the private sphere during post-conflict national reconstruction.
In addition, this overwhelming prioritization of first-generation human rights translates into
major neglect of second-generation human rights, which is crucial for women especially in the
post-war economies. Post-conflict political economy is often gendered; since men are often either
killed or imprisoned after conflict, women usually assume the role of heads of households and are
responsible for family survival. These changing gender dynamics are usually neglected during the
process of national reconstruction, for states often quickly prioritize state survival and defense and
thus often either postpone or abandon gender transformation policies. 219 The presence of
international actors, primarily UN Peacekeeping forces, also intensifies this gendered nature of
post-conflict economies. First, since the purpose of peacekeeping missions is primarily to
reestablish law and order, little attention is paid to securing social and economic livelihoods for
women (and men) after conflict. A lack of focus on delivering economic, social, and cultural rights
usually forces women and girls into dire socioeconomic conditions and into risky incomegeneration activities, such as sex work, to feed their family and gain protection from men with
more resources.220 In addition, an international militarized presence often leads to the expansions
of sex industries employing women as sex workers or sex slaves, or to widespread, systemic rape
conducted by peacekeepers, as in the cases of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central
African Republic.221 In addition, since transitional justice mechanisms are often products of peace
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negotiations, and because negotiations processes themselves are gendered with negotiators being
mostly men, the conceptualization of how accountability, justice, and human rights should be
approached is overwhelmingly gendered.222 This tendency of applying gender-neutral approaches
to post-conflict reconstructions process therefore directly influences both restorative and retributive
transitional justice procedures.
a) Gendered Retributive Justice
There exist major shortcomings in investigating and prosecuting rape and sexual violence
in retributive justice mechanisms (i.e. criminal prosecution). First, in order for rape and sexual
violence to be tried as a jus cogens crime,223 those actions must be found to have occurred in a
systematic, organized pattern.224 In addition, given the personal nature of rape and sexual assaults,
survivors of these crimes are often reluctant or afraid to testify in courts. In many cases, the burden
of proving rape and sexual violence falls on the victims, intensifying their reluctance to share these
experiences. Furthermore, the general shortage of women’s representation in transitional justice
mechanisms, in this case the courtrooms, also creates a lack of female perspective and a reliance on
the application of a gender-neutral defense standard.225 This nature of traditional defense lawyering
often creates an inhospitable and under-supportive environment for victims of these crimes, and
even when the environment is supportive, not all women believe there are benefits of disclosing
traumatic experiences of rape. 226 In addition, the public and adversarial environment of the
courtroom also increases the risk of secondary traumatization for the victims, as trials may become
predominantly concerned with female accountability rather than male responsibility. Furthermore,
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testimonies of rape and sexual assault, under the potential of repetitive cross-examination, may
turn these traumatic experiences into voyeuristic and pornographic devices, resulting in further
traumatic re-victimization.227
In many trials, especially international tribunals, the Western tendency to focus on civil and
political rights also overshadows the possibility of investigating and prosecuting violations of
economic, social, and cultural rights. Even when sexual and reproductive violence is addressed,
which is already undermined by the various factors mentioned above, accountability processes
often fail to assess the various aspects of harm experienced by women. Violations of
socioeconomic rights like deliberate starvation, blockade, and destruction of food and water are
often neglected in wartime prosecutions that are heavily preoccupied with prosecuting violations of
bodily-integrity rights.228 In addition, serious long-term impacts of rape and gender based violence,
such as STDs, vaginal and reproductive tract problems, and sterility, if acknowledged, are usually
considered secondary harms.229 This disproportionate attention to physical harms and violations of
bodily-integrity rights not only has a direct effect on victims’ lives, but also poses a threat to the
long-term economic, social, and cultural sustainability of peace, which is the primary goal of postconflict reconstruction.230 Despite various progressive developments in international law, they
have often fallen short in terms of enforcement. These shortcomings help explain why the
international conviction rates for gender-based violence are low, and the conviction rates in
national courts are almost non-existent.231
b) Gendered Restorative Justice
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It is generally accepted that criminal accountability for rape and sexual assaults, which is
already incomplete in most cases, cannot by itself facilitate reconciliation for victims. Restorative
justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions, in contrast, can be utilized to compensate for
retributive justice’s shortcomings. While truth commissions do not fall under the scope of this
research, many other scholars have written extensively on the gendered aspects of truth
commissions. 232 Within the repertoire of restorative justice mechanisms, this thesis looks
specifically at reparation programs and the process of reconciliation. There is a growing consensus
in international law that the state is obligated to provide compensations for victims of gross human
rights violations committed by the governments. 233 Such obligation, if not fulfilled, carries over to
the successor government. In terms of international standards, the UN Human Rights Commission
and its Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights had discussed since
1989 and finally approved in 2005 “The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law.”234 While these principles refer to restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-repetition as forms of reparations, they do not
define what constitutes either “gross violations of international human rights law” or “serious
violations of international humanitarian law.”235
For women, especially victims of rape and sexual assaults, the existence and effectiveness
of reparation programs can contribute significantly to the process of reintegration and
reconciliation. For example, the tendency to cast women as secondary victims, which is as living
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survivors of those killed by political violence, makes women the prime beneficiaries of
reparations.236 In addition, since retributive justice’s overwhelming tendency to neglect secondgeneration human rights, reparation programs can help improve women’s dire socioeconomic
conditions. Rubio-Marin notes the general trend of women’s preference of basic social services,
such as medical and psychological rehabilitation, education for children, and housing-related
assistance, to meet their family’s needs as the ideal form of reparation over restitution of lost
property or monetary compensation.237 In addition, for victims of rape and sexual violence and
those living with HIV/AIDS, medical and psychological services as reparations might play a
crucial role in their psychological rehabilitation process.238 While the material needs of victims are
overwhelming and criminal accountability by itself appears to be shallow justice, reparation
programs, especially in the forms of material recompense and social services, can be significantly
valuable to victims of rape and sexual assaults, at least in the short term.239
Neil Kritz argues that compensation and reparation can also contribute to the long-term
process of national reconciliation by serving at least three functions: (1) it aids the victims to
manage the material aspect of their loss; (2) it constitutes an official acknowledgment of their pain
by the nation. Both of these facilitate the societal reintegration of people who have long been made
to suffer in silence; and (3) it may deter the state from future abuses, by imposing a financial cost
to such misdeeds. 240 In addition, while retributive justice focuses on holding perpetrators
accountable, Reparations, in contrast, may be “the most tangible manifestation of the efforts of the
state” to remedy the harms the victims have suffered.241 Similarly, Rubio-Marin argues that
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reparations can become measures to promote both interpersonal trust and trust in the institutions of
the new state and in its legitimacy, thus contributing to the creation of a more sustainable
democratic state.242 Colleen Duggan and Adila M. Abusharaf also argue that reparation programs
can contribute to the long-term process of women’s reconciliation by: 1) putting the womencitizen/State relationship on a more just and equitable footing, 2) creating a more supportive
environment for victims to claim reparations, 3) establishing a societal conviction that victims of
sexual violence must not be silenced and guaranteeing accountability for the crimes perpetrated
against them, and 4) taking advantage of the transitional context to redefine the social norms that
have fostered sexual violence, and forging an essential connection between the enforcement of the
right to reparation and the establishment of public policies to prevent sexual violence in the
future.243
Despite these various long-term and short-term advantages of reparation programs,
government in political transitions often encounter various challenges that prevent victims of
sexual violence from receiving the full benefits of reparations. In the case of Sierra Leone, the
transitional government faced competing demands to finance retributive justice mechanisms
(tribunals) and restorative justice mechanism (national reparation programs), and the resources
allocated for remedying gender crimes were often curtailed.244 In addition, the various social and
cultural taboos surrounding rape and sexual assaults that prevent victims from testifying in courts
also discourage women from registering for reparations.245 The case of Sudan also highlights the
fact that allocating resources for sexual violence reparations also means a state-sponsored
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acknowledgment of these crimes, and, while necessary for reconciliation, is often tantamount to
admitting to the dishonoring of an entire society.246 Balancing the demands for both national and
individual reconciliation, while creating a hospitable environment for victims to receive the
benefits of reparations, proves to be a major challenge for many societies. In addition, while it is
recognized that victims of these crimes should receive full restitution, intangible assets that were
loss as a result of these crimes – such as purity, social standing, and marriageability – can never be
returned.247 Compensating materially for these assets is complicated and depends heavily on the
social and cultural context of each society.
The social and cultural context of each society, furthermore, also impacts the individual
and national process of reconciliation extensively. Donna Pankhurst writes that while there is
considerable international and national debate about how reconciliation may be achieved, there is
“virtually no discussion about ‘gender reconciliation,’” and that women are often expected to
identify themselves with the gender-neutral concepts of reconciliation and peace-building
interventions.248 As mentioned in Chapter 1, this thesis examines reconciliation by dividing it into
six different subcomponents: 1) understanding the past, present and envisioning the future of
Rwanda, 2) citizenship and identity, 3) political culture, 4) security, 5) justice, and 6) social
cohesion. Several challenges to criminal prosecutions and reparations programs in bringing justice
for victims of rape and sexual assaults have been demonstrated throughout this chapter. These
challenges in turn create significant obstacles to victims’ pursuit of justice and reconciliation
process. The citizenship and political culture components of reconciliation can be developed with
peace negotiations and designing transitional justice mechanisms. These processes, as
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aforementioned, also often fail to include women in the decision-making process. Other factors of
reconciliation, including acknowledging the past, security, and social cohesion, rely on the
recognition of women as equal members of society, and the destruction of pre-existing conditions
that allow rape and sexual assault to happen in the first place. The challenge, in other words, is to
deconstruct unequal gender relations.249 Gender relations and ideologies stem from the deeply held
traditions in which patriarchal societies regard women as property, and that their values reside only
in women’s productive and reproductive labor.250
Deconstructing these traditions, and eliminating the culture of stigma and ostracism that
discriminates victims of rape and sexual assault, while necessary for reconciliation, are
overwhelming tasks that transitional justice mechanisms often lack the capacity and time to
implement. In addition, improving gender relations between men and women can partly come from
improving women’s political representation in a democracy, which transitional justice can help
build but cannot produce. Reconciliation for victims within their communities must occur at the
grassroots level, where victims face the daunting tasks of living with the perpetrators who have
raped them. This process of reconciliation requires a fundamental change in which sexual violence
is perceived.251 Yet this fundamental change requires a political will to accept women’s values as
equal members that post-conflict communities often do not possess. Reconciliation for victims of
rape and sexual assault thus requires a fundamental reconstruction of societal relations, in which
women themselves are unfortunately often underrepresented. Reconciliation is therefore the most
daunting task facing transitional justice mechanisms, which this thesis seeks to analyze.
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In conclusion, both retributive and restorative justice for victims of rape and sexual assaults
face the various contextual challenges that societies need to address through transitional justice
mechanisms, while simultaneously encountering distinctive challenges because of the inherently
personal nature of these crimes. This chapter is, at the most basic level, a review of the literature in
the field, analyzing the gendered aspect of both armed conflicts and transitional justice. Rwanda,
with both its local and international transitional justice mechanisms, attempted to resolve this
complicated and multifaceted legacy of rape and sexual assaults. The next two chapters provide a
comparative analysis of the strengths and weakness of these local and international mechanisms in
reckoning with this painful legacy. While scholars have written extensively on the strengths and
weaknesses of each transitional justice mechanism in post-genocide Rwanda, few have looked at
these mechanisms from a comparative perspective. Even fewer scholars have analyzed this
comparison from a gender-sensitive perspective with a focus on survivors of sexual violence. This
thesis thus fills the gap in the literature by providing an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of
domestic and international attempts to bring both retributive and restorative justice to victims of
rape and sexual assaults through a comprehensive and in-depth case study.
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3. LOCAL CRIMES, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA & TRIALS BASED
ON THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
With Akayesu, Pillay made history again. “Rape had always been regarded as one
of the spoils of war,” she said in a statement after the verdict. “Now it is a war
crime, no longer a trophy.”252

On May 31, 1994, the then-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros BoutrosGhali, presented a report on the situation in Rwanda to the Secretary Council, in which he states:
The magnitude of the human calamity that has engulfed Rwanda might be
unimaginable but for its having transpired. On the basis of evidence that has
emerged, there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide, since there have
been large-scale killings of communities and families belonging to a particular
ethnic group.253
The Rwandan genocide therefore happened against the backdrop of willful ignorance of the
international community, which was aware of genocide yet refused to intervene. During the
genocide, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, however, did appoint Ivoirian law
professor René Degni-Segui as the Special Rapporteur on the situation in Rwanda. The Special
Rapporteur’s reports showed clear evidence of genocide and crimes against humanity, and
recommended either the establishment of an international ad hoc tribunal or the enlargement of
the jurisdiction of the ICTY to bring those responsible for the massacres of the genocide to
justice.254 These recommendations were made in the context that the ICTY, an ad hoc tribunal,
was created a year earlier. Given the severe crimes investigated by the ICTY, the reports on
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serious violations of international humanitarian law and the commission of crimes against
humanity in Rwanda, and the lack of international efforts to stop the genocide, an international
judicial institution, similar to the ICTY, was deemed to be of crucial importance. On December
18, 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 955, establishing the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
Between the end of the genocide in July 1994 and the establishment of the ICTR,
millions of Rwandans fled the country to Europe, North America, and various African countries.
Many of those fleeing were responsible for organizing and participating in the genocide.
Rwanda, however, did not have extradition treaties with many states to obtain custody of
suspects living in foreign countries. Many governments also refused to return these suspects,
concerned about a judiciary in shambles in Rwanda and its questionable capacity to provide fair
trials to suspects who might be returned to the country. Given the widespread acceptance of the
fact that a genocide happened in Rwanda, and an international pressure to prosecute those
responsible for the crimes committed during the conflict, twelve countries to which these
perpetrators had fled organized trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction.
This chapter analyzes and evaluates the extent to which the ICTR and trials based on the
principle of universal jurisdiction were successful in bringing comprehensive justice to victims
of rape and sexual violence during the genocide. The chapter first provides a brief background of
the ICTR, including its mandate and objectives, and summarizes its record in prosecuting rape
and sexual violence. It then provides a brief introduction to the legal framework for the creation
of universal jurisdiction trials in other states, and summarizes their records. The chapter
continues with an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these two mechanisms in bringing
both retributive and restorative justice to victims of rape and sexual assaults.
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Both mechanisms were able to bring some high-level perpetrators of rape and sexual
violence to justice, and thus partially fulfilled their retributive justice mandate. Through both the
testimonies of victims and the convictions of perpetrators, a partial historical record about rape
and sexual violence during the genocide also emerged. This historical record contributed to a
collective memory about what happened during the genocide, and confirmed that rapes and
sexual violence were not only opportunistic attacks but also systemic elements of the genocide.
Moreover, the ICTR was particularly successful at establishing an international jurisprudence for
prosecuting rape and sexual violence under international law. Despite these successes, the ICTR
also faced several institutional challenges as an international justice mechanism trying local
crimes, and thus failed to bring comprehensive justice to many other victims. The Tribunal was
inconsistent in defining rape and sexual violence, and different prosecutors demonstrated
different levels of willingness to prosecute these crimes. Various cases moved through trials
without sexual violence charges despite substantial evidence, creating a sense of frustration for
many victims who had the courage to testify. In addition, the environment at the Tribunal was
sometimes hostile to survivors of sexual crimes. Finally, the ICTR’s record also reflects an
incomplete picture of sexual crimes during the genocide, and the Tribunal paid insufficient
attention to restorative justice.
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (ICTR)
On September 28, 1994, upon Special Rapporteur Degni-Segui’s recommendation,
Rwanda formally sent a request to the President of the UNSC to establish an ad hoc tribunal. On
December 8, 1994, the UNSC passed Resolution 955 establishing the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania
with a sub-office in Kigali, Rwanda:
for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
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Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations
committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994255
This location was set to avoid the appearance of “victor’s justice” by the new Tutsi-dominated
Rwandan government.256 However, locating the ICTR in Tanzania, despite good intentions,
caused a significant physical and psychological distance between the Tribunal and Rwandan
society.
Despite its formal request less than three months earlier, the Rwandan delegation to the
UN cast the sole vote against the creation of the ICTR, with an abstention by China. Several
reasons explain this opposition. Gerald Gahima, who served as the principal liaison between the
Rwandan government and the ICTR, argues that the newly established government showcased a
clear desire to assert its national ownership over the international aspect of accountability
mechanisms, to emphasize its sovereignty in dealing with the international community during the
reconstruction process, and to protect its military from exposure to prosecution by the proposed
court. 257 Second, the Rwandan delegation also cited various reasons for opposing the
establishment, including, but not limited to: 1) the prohibition of capital punishment, which
could lead to principal genocide planners receiving prison terms from the ICTR while their
subordinates could face death penalty if found guilty in Rwanda’s national courts, 2) the
limitation on temporal jurisdiction to the 1994 calendar year, which excludes the period of Hutu
planning for the genocide that can be arguably traced back until 1990, 3) poor staffing, as the
ICTR and ICTY would share an appeal chamber and a prosecutor, 4) the nominated judges’
potential conflict of interests in excluding their co-nationals who might be complicit in the
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genocide, 5) the possibility of sentences being served outside Rwanda, and 6) the refusal to
locate the seat of the Tribunal in Rwanda itself.258
Despite this opposition by the Rwandan government, the ICTR was nevertheless
established with three main organs: 1) the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), which investigated
allegations, issued indictments, and prosecuted cases in court; 2) the Registry, which performed
administrative tasks, and 3) the Chambers. There were three Trial Chambers, and one Appeals
Chamber that was shared with the ICTY at The Hague. The Chambers had sixteen permanent
members, of whom seven served at the Appeals Chamber and nine as ad litem judges. Judges
were nominated by their home state and elected by the UN General Assembly, and no two judges
could come from the same country.259 During the first nine years of its operation, the ICTR
shared a common Prosecutor with the ICTY, until the Security Council determined that both
Tribunals would be more effective and efficient if each had a separate Prosecutor and appointed
one for the ICTR in 2003. Four individuals served in this role: Richard Goldstone of South
Africa, Louise Arbour of Canada, Carla Del Ponte of Switzerland, and Hassan B. Jallow of
Gambia.
The ICTR was established with a ratione materiae, or material jurisdiction, over the
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the 1949
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.260 According to the statute of the ICTR, rape
constitutes a crime against humanity under Article 3; rape, enforced prostitution, and any forms
of indecent assaults are also violations of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
258
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and of Additional Protocol II. In relation to the genocide, the ICTR statute uses verbatim the
Genocide Convention’s definition.261 With this jurisdiction, the ICTR became the world’s first
genocide court with several objectives.
Gerald Gahima summarizes seven main goals and expectations for the ICTR: 1) holding
perpetrators accountable, 2) fighting impunity and promoting respects for human rights in
Rwanda and other countries, 3) deterring future human rights violations, 4) facilitating the return
of Rwandan refugees, 5) restoring and maintaining peace, 6) promoting reconciliation in
Rwanda, and 7) supporting the rebuilding Rwanda’s justice system.262 The original language of
UNSC Resolution 955 stresses two main objectives: holding perpetrators accountable and
promoting reconciliation. The UNSC was determined that the crimes in Rwanda “constitute a
threat to international peace and security,” and that the Tribunal would take “effective measures
to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them.”263 the Security Council also
believed that by delivering retributive justice to the perpetrators of genocide, the Tribunal would
“contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of
peace.”264 This mandate is different from that of the ICTY, for facilitating reconciliation was
discussed in Security Council debates but was never included in the actual resolution that
established the ICTY.265
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On December 31, 2015, the ICTR formally closed its operations. In its 20-year existence,
the ICTR indicted 93 individuals, of which 62 were sentenced, 14 were acquitted, 10 were
referred to national jurisdictions for trials, three were fugitives and referred to the Mechanisms of
International Criminal Tribunals (MCIT), and two died before judgment was handed down. In
addition, two indictments were withdrawn before trial.266 The MCIT assumed responsibility for
all of the ICTR’s tracking operations at the beginning of July 2012.267 With regards to sexual
crimes, 52 out of the total 93 indicted were charged with rape or other crimes of sexual violence.
Of these 52 cases, 43 cases proceeded to trials, seven were referred to Rwanda or France for trial,
and two high-level fugitive cases have been transferred to the MCIT. 14 of the accused were
convicted of these crimes;268 27 were acquitted; and sexual violence charges in seven cases were
dropped as part of plea negotiations or through amendment of the indictments.269 The OTP was
successful in prosecuting and holding perpetrators accountable for rape and sexual violence as
constituent acts of genocide (Akayesu, Ngirumpatse, Karemera), as crimes against humanity
(Akayesu, Nyiramasuhuko, Gacumbitsi, Bagosora…), and as a war crime (Bizimungu and
Nyiramasuhuko).
TRIALS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
Universal jurisdiction is defined as “a legal principle allowing or requiring a state to bring
criminal proceedings in respect of certain crimes irrespective of the location of the crime and the
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nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.”270 Based on this principle, states can hold trials for
international crimes committed by anybody, anywhere in the world. Traditionally, two main
ideas justified this principle. First, there are crimes that are so grave – such as genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture – that they pose significant threats to the
international community. Second, due to the severity of these crimes, there must be no safe
havens available for those who committed them.271 Given the human rights violations committed
during the genocide and the international community’s commitment to hold perpetrators
accountable, the Rwandan genocide was a legally and morally justified backdrop against which
states could exercise universal jurisdiction.
Twelve countries have been involved in holding perpetrators of the genocide accountable
based on this principle, including: Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Finland,
Denmark, Germany, Spain, Norway, United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. The extent
to which these countries exercised universal jurisdiction was, however, different and dependent
on the political will of the country. Belgium, for example, has been one of the leading states in
exercising universal jurisdiction for crimes committed during the Rwandan genocide. Several
factors can explain this commitment, including the murder of Belgian peacekeepers during the
genocide, the large number of Rwandan refugees seeking asylum in Belgium, its colonial history
in Rwanda, and its decision to withdraw peacekeepers as the genocide escalated.272 Belgium’s
commitment to universal jurisdiction led to successful investigation and prosecution of a
significant number of cases, including the landmark Butare Four case.273 In contrast, while
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France had by far the largest number of ongoing investigations related to the Rwandan genocide
(25 genocide suspects), as of 2013, it has failed to complete any of the investigations and has yet
to bring a Rwandan genocide case to trials.274 Gahima argues that this failure in investigating and
prosecuting Rwandan genocide cases can be attributed mostly to the French government’s lack
of political will.275
While the scope of this thesis and my current available resources prevent me from
analyzing in-depth the records of universal jurisdiction trials, it is clear from the current literature
that trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction have not been very successful in
prosecuting crimes of rape and sexual assaults. Perpetrators of rape have been convicted of war
crimes (Ephrem Nkezabera in Belgium and Desiré Munyaneza in Canada) and crimes against
humanity (Desiré Munyaneza) in only a few cases, while in practice most of these crimes were
ignored. Given the lack of research on universal jurisdiction trials for cases related to the
Rwandan genocide, this chapter focuses on the achievements and shortcomings of the ICTR. In
the realm of international judicial mechanisms, the contribution of third-party trials was in the
aspect of creating an international jurisprudence.
ANALYSIS: MAJOR STRENGTHS AND SUCCESSES
The Landmark Case of Prosecutor v. Akayesu
Jean-Paul Akayesu, the former bourgmestre276 of the Taba Commune, was responsible
for acts of genocide and violations of humanitarian law that occurred in the area under his
control during the 100 days of the genocide. His initial indictment on February 16, 1996 included
charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva
against international law. For more information about this case, see Luc Reydams, "Belgium's First Application of
Universal Jurisdiction: The Butare Four Case," Journal of International Criminal Justice 1 (2003): 428-436.
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Conventions. None of these charges, however, included acts of rape or sexual violence.277 Eight
days into the trial, Witness J testified and began talking about the rape of her daughter during the
genocide without being asked by either the Judges or the Prosecutor. This narration led to more
questions about other rapes she had witnessed, many of which were asked by the sole female
Judge at the time – Judge Navi Pillay of South Africa. These events were confirmed many weeks
later when Witness H took the stand and also testified about the sexual violence she had
witnessed at the communal bureau under Akayesu’s control.278 These testimonies, those from
five other witnesses, and various human rights reports about rape and sexual violence during the
Rwandan genocide helped the prosecution link the evidence to the actions of the accused, which
eventually led to an amendment that charged Akayesu with rape and sexual violence as
genocide.
Akayesu pleaded not guilty on the basis that he did not commission any acts of rape and
sexual assault, and that many testimonies were fabricated against him.279 The Trial Chamber held
that a number of Akayesu’s statements, such as “Don’t ever ask again what a Tutsi woman tastes
like” and “You should first of all make sure that you sleep with this girl,” constituted sufficient
evidence that while he did not personally rape anyone, Akayesu was responsible for overseeing
and encouraging rape against Tutsi women.280 Furthermore, in contextualizing rape and sexual
violence in the bigger picture of the genocide, the Tribunal concluded that:
Tutsi women were subjected to sexual violence because they were Tutsi. Sexual
violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group – destruction
of the sprit, of the will to live, and of life itself.281
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In this conclusion, the Trial Chamber established that Akayesu was responsible for not
only facilitating rape and sexual violence, but also encouraging those crimes with the intent to
destroy Tutsi women and the Tutsi as a population.282 The Trial Chamber also established that
rape and sexual violence in the Taba commune, while by themselves did not constitute crimes
against humanity, were committed as parts of the widespread and systemic attack against the
Tutsi population with a discriminatory intent to destroy them, and thus were qualified as crimes
against humanity.283 It is also crucial to note that rape is not included as a prohibited act in the
1948 Genocide Convention, and that gender is also not included as a protected group.284 Given
that there was no judicial record and legal framework of prosecuting rape and sexual assaults as
genocide that the ICTR could follow, the fact that the Tribunal was able to reach the conclusion
that these crimes were just as genocidal as other brutal methods of killings is remarkable. In
addition, through this judgment, the Tribunal exemplified a heightened awareness of sexual
crimes by recognizing that some forms of sexual violence were easier to deny than other visibly
obvious crimes of violence.285 More importantly, the ruling also concluded that a superior who
knew or had reasons to know that their subordinates would or had committed rape and sexual
violence with a genocidal intent was individually liable under international criminal law.286 This
recognition therefore created a framework for investigating and prosecuting perpetrators of
sexual violence in the future. The Akayesu trial, in establishing that rape and sexual violence
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were serious crimes that can be prosecuted under international law, successfully created a shift in
paradigm of how these crimes should be perceived in the international community.287
More importantly, in establishing rape and sexual violence as elements of genocide and
as crimes against humanity in the Akayesu Judgment, the Trial Chamber offered definitions of
these crimes as follows:
The Chamber defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on
a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence which includes
rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a
person under circumstances which are coercive.288
The Trial Chamber established that rape was a form of aggression, of which central elements
“cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts.”289 In addition, citing
the similarity between rape and torture, the Trial Chamber argued that rape was used for
“intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a
person.”290 In this account, rape was defined by the perpetrators’ purpose in context and by the
specific sexual nature of the crime. Through this definition, the Trial Chamber moved the
definition of rape from one of non-consent (non-consent must be established beyond reasonable
doubt in order to hold the accused responsible) to one of coercion. Sexual violence, which
includes rape, was defined in a similar light, which focused on the coercive nature of the attack.
The Chamber used this definition to include acts such as forced nakedness and forced gymnastics
while being naked as sexual violence in prosecuting Akayesu.291
Through these definitions, the Chamber argued that while it was clear that rape itself was
an unwelcome act, its coercive nature took the burden of proving non-consent from the
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prosecution.292 In other words, using this definition allows judges to infer non-consent from the
coercive background of the attack (such as genocide in the case of Rwanda) without requiring
evidence of the perpetrator’s force, threat of force, or the victim’s resistance. This judgment also
emphasized that coercion was often inherent in armed conflicts or when the military and militias
were present.293 As a result, the Chamber successfully incorporated into its definition of rape the
context of violent inequality common to the crimes it was statutorily authorized to prosecute,
and, arguably for the first time, defined rape “in law as what it is in life.”294 This progressive
definition of rape set a legal framework to prosecute perpetrators of sexual violence during the
ICTR’s operation. For instance, in the Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, the Appeal Chamber
confirmed that “the Prosecution can prove non-consent beyond reasonable doubt by proving the
existence of coercive circumstances under which meaningful consent is not possible” and that
“the Trial Chamber is free to infer non-consent from the background circumstances, such as an
on-going genocide campaign or the detention of the victim.”295
By contextualizing rape and sexual assaults into the bigger genocidal campaign where
genuine consent was not possible, the ICTR pioneered a prosecution strategy by inferring nonconsent from coercive contexts to hold perpetrators accountable. This decision caused a
significant blow to some national courts’ unjustified emphasis on evidence of the perpetrator’s
physical force or the victim’s resistance to prove non-consent and the perpetrator’s knowledge
thereof.296 This progressive understanding of rape was subsequently used in ICTY and ICTR
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judgments, such as the 1998 ICTY Celebici judgment and ICTR judgments in Musema (2000),
Niyitegeka (2003), and Muhimana (2005).297 More importantly, this focus on coercion instead of
non-consent is also utilized by the ICC Statute’s current definition of rape as a crime against
humanity:
The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as
that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of
a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable
of giving genuine consent.298
This definition was also incorporated into legislation in the states of Illinois and California,
which both define gender violence for civil purposes in part to include “a physical intrusion or
physical invasion of a sexual nature under coercive conditions.”299
The Case of Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al.
In 2002, the New York Times published an article by Peter Landesman titled “A
Woman’s Work,” in which he details the role of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko – the former Minister
of Family and Women’s Affairs – in perpetrating sexual violence in Butare during the Rwandan
genocide.300 During Landesman’s interviews with those who confessed to taking part in the
slaughter in Butare, Nyiramasuhuko came up as the coordinator of rape. She commanded the
Interahamwe that, “Before you kill the women, you need to rape them,” and in other cases,
asked, “Why don’t you rape them before you kill them?” 301 Landesman argues that
Nyiramasuhuko led the soldiers to see rape as a reward for participating in the genocide. In
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Butare, rape was frequently accompanied by other forms of physical torture, staged as public
performances to multiply terror and degradation, and oftentimes served as a prelude to murder.302
Rape in Butare, as it was in many areas throughout Rwanda, was part of the genocidal campaign
that was aimed at destroying the Tutsi.
At the ICTR, Nyiramasuhuko was the only woman to be tried and convicted of genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Along with five other accused, including her son
Arsène Shalom Ntahobali, she was tried in the famous Butare Trial – known for being the
Tribunal’s longest trial having lasted for ten years. The case was successful in confirming that
women were capable of perpetrating sexual violence and genocide, and added to the historical
record of the Rwandan genocide that Nyiramasuhuko was among the many women who
participated as génocidaires. In fact, she was the first and only woman to be convicted of rape as
a crime against humanity, and was sentenced to 47 years in prison. While the Prosecutor did not
charge Nyiramasuhuko for rape as a tool of genocide, the Trial Chamber did acknowledge in its
trial judgment that intent behind the rape perpetrated by Nyiramasuhuko was in fact genocidal.
303

Other Techniques to Prosecute Rape and Sexual Violence
Beside the prosecution strategy to use coercive background to infer non-consent, the
ICTR also succeeded in using additional techniques to prosecute rape and sexual violence during
the Rwandan genocide. As demonstrated earlier, one of the biggest institutional challenges that
the ICTR faced in fulfilling its mandate was to link the accused to rape and sexual violence and
to attach criminal culpability. The ICTR was, however, successful in prosecuting perpetrators of
rape and sexual violence in some cases by using the concept of joint criminal enterprise (JCE).
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Given that in various cases, perpetrators who fell under the jurisdiction of the ICTR did not
personally commit rapes, using JCE enabled the prosecution of rape and other forms of sexual
violence that were committed by other individuals. 304 Having originally emerged from the
jurisprudence of the ICTY, a JCE requires “a plurality of co-perpetrators who act pursuant to a
common purpose involving the commission of a crime.”305 The first category of the JCE is the
basic form represented by cases where all co-perpetrators possess the same criminal intent and
act pursuant to a common purpose. The second category is a “systemic” form of JCE
characterized by the existence of an organized system of ill-treatment. The third category, the
“extended” form of JCE, covers cases involving a common purpose to commit a crime where
one of the perpetrators commits an act that is outside of the common purpose but is nevertheless
a natural and foreseeable consequence of that common purpose.306
The Prosecutor was successful in using the third category of JCE in holding Édouard
Karemera and Matthieu Ngirumpatse accountable for genocide and crimes against humanity for
rape and sexual violence, on the basis that these crimes were a natural and foreseeable
consequence of the JCE whose purpose was to destroy the population.307 The Trial Chamber
found that because both of the accused had participated in the MRND political party and because
of Karemera’s role as Minister of the Interior of the Interim Government from May 1994, both
individuals were aware that the widespread rapes and sexual assaults against Tutsi women
constituted at least a possible consequence of the JCE, and that they were willing to take the risk
of more rapes and sexual violence by continuing to participate in the JCE despite the widespread
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occurrence of sexual crimes.308 As Linda Bianchi argues, the Prosecutor v. Karemera et al. case
stands as a strong precedent on prosecuting leaders who were physically distant from the actual
rapes and sexual assaults, but nevertheless had influence over these crimes, knew about their
occurrences, and were liable for allowing sexual violence to continue.309
Additionally, one of the biggest challenges in prosecuting rape and sexual violence in any
legal systems is how to best approach and solicit evidence from victims/survivors. As an
international tribunal located in a different country with judges and lawyers coming from around
the world, accompanied by the stigma around victims of rape and sexual violence in Rwandan
society, the ICTR inevitably faced this challenge. In some cases, the ICTR managed to solicit
enough evidence and testimonies from other sources beside direct victims of rape and sexual
assaults to investigate and prosecute these crimes. Given the leadership roles of the accused in
many cases that involved rape and sexual violence, rape was often charged under a form of
superior liability.310 This approach allowed the OTP to bring relevant and eyewitness testimonies
about rape at particular crime scenes without necessarily having to call the victims themselves.
This method was used in the Bagosora et al. case, where the majority of the evidence was
solicited from witnesses, especially General Roméo Dallaire and Major Brent Beardsley, who
were not victims themselves.311 This method proved to be successful, as Bagosora was convicted
on the basis of evidence of sexual assaults carried out by his subordinates.312

308

Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44T, Trial Judgment, February 2, 2002, para. 1483
(Hereinafter as Karemera Trial Judgment)
309
Bianchi, “The Prosecution,” 135
310
Linda Bianchi, “Challenging Impunity for Crimes of Sexual Violence: The Efforts of Prosecutor Jallow to Set the
Record Straight,” in Promoting Accountability Under International Law for Gross Human Rights Violations in
Africa: Essays in Honour of Prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow, eds. Charles Chernor Jalloh and Alhagi Marong
(Brill Academic Publishers, 2015), 365 (Hereinafter as “Challenging Impunity”)
311
Ibid 366
312
Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Trial Judgment, December 18, 2008, paras. 1908, 19201924 (Hereinafter as Bagosora Trial Judgment)

79

In addition, the OTP was also successful in using a variety of sources to support its cases,
including written statements and facts found in previous, relevant cases.313 In Karamera et al.,
the Prosecutor, concerning the widespread occurrences of rape and sexual violence throughout
Rwanda, requested the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice thereof as adjudicated facts. When
the Trial Chamber denied vital aspects of this motion, the Prosecutor appealed. In upholding the
appeal, the Appeal Chamber found that the fact that a genocide happened in 1994 was reasonably
indisputable common knowledge, and that rape was part of the violence in this conflict.314
However, the Appeal Chamber reasonably deferred the matter to the Trial Chamber to determine
if it would take judicial notice of the occurrence of rape in a named location, such as the
widespread sexual violence in the Taba commune under Akayesu’s control, as an adjudicated
fact. A careful use of this discretion by Trial Chamber would ensure respect for the rights of both
the accused and of the victims, in that a Chamber may admit the occurrence of rape in a specific
location as adjudicated facts without having to question the victims of rape and sexual
assaults.315
Lessons Learned from Rwanda: Best Practices Manual for the Investigation and Prosecution
of Sexual Violence Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions
As noted earlier, the ICTR, together with the ICTY, were the first international judicial
institutions to prosecute rape and sexual violence as international crimes. The ICTR, by its mere
establishment, was there positioned to make important legal precedents for its successor, the
ICC, and other future national and regional courts. Due to the low conviction rate for sexual
crimes, especially in light of a rather successful conviction rate for other crimes within the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the OTP created a Committee for the Review of the Investigation and
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Prosecution of Sexual Violence in June 2007.316 The Committee went through several stages of
reviewing the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, looking into cases where allegations of sexual violence
had been included in the indictments, and analyzing the factors that contributed to either
convictions or acquittals of those crimes. 317 This review process resulted in the creation and
adoption of the Best Practices Manual for the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Violence
Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions: Lessons Learned from the Office of the Prosecutor for the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Going through several reviews and editions, the
final version of the Manual was produced and distributed in January 2014. The Manual
summarized the lessons learned by the OTP in the investigation and prosecution of rape and
sexual violence, and provided an annex that included detailed statistics from the ICTR’s rape and
sexual violence cases.318 In addition, the Manual also highlighted major findings of the ICTR –
including that rape was used and subsequently prosecuted both as an element of genocide and a
crime against humanity – and provided recommendations on how to best investigate and
prosecute these crimes in an international setting.
The production and distribution of this Manual was significant to the prosecution of
sexual crimes in Rwanda for two main reasons. First, through its details about the ICTR’s major
findings, the Manual contributed to the process of acknowledging the past and reaffirmed the
recognition that rape and sexual violence were as much a part of the genocide as other brutal
methods of killing. The fact that the OTP produced an official document that focused solely on
rape and sexual violence contributed to the overall historical record about what happened during
the genocide. Second, the distribution of this Manual also strengthened the ICTR’s jurisprudence
on rape and sexual violence by offering lessons and creating a framework upon which future
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trials can better prosecute sexual violence. For instance, the earlier version of the Manual was
used in a 2009 conference held in Arusha for prosecutors from national jurisdictions who were
involved with prosecuting international crimes in their home states.319 In 2014, the ICTR’s
successor, the ICC, released its Draft Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes. This
Paper refers specifically to the work of the ICTR and the Best Practices Manual, and
incorporates several of the Manual’s major recommendations, such as the need to pay attention
to specific challenges confronting the prosecution of rape and sexual violence and necessary
measures to prevent the possible secondary or re-traumatization of the victims.320 Furthermore,
the Best Practices Manual was also cited frequently as the major influence for the “International
Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict, Basic
Standards of Best Practice,” a part of the United Kingdom’s Prevention of Sexual Violence
Initiative, by providing a legal precedential guide on the development of this Protocol.321
ANALYSIS: MAJOR WEAKNESSES AND FAILURES
Lack of A Comprehensive Prosecution Strategy
A closer look at the landmark Akayesu case shows an often-overlooked fact: its initial
indictment did not include any rape or sexual violence charges. Although numerous early reports
highlighted the prominence of rape and sexual violence during the conflict,322 these crimes were
never considered a central element of the prosecution strategy, which partly explained the
Tribunal’s poor conviction rate.323 Usta Kaitesi argues that the initial failure to indict Akayesu
for his sexual crimes could be best explained by the failure to link evidence of rape and sexual
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violence evidenced in human rights reports to the crimes of the accused.324 In other words, while
rape and sexual violence were widespread, genocidal, and well-known, they were not deemed
worthy of prosecution at the beginning of the Tribunal. It was not until the courageous victims
decided to speak about their experiences of rape, in tandem with the repeated push by the sole
female judge at the time – Judge Navi Pillay of South Africa – that more narratives on rape and
sexual violence were solicited and that Akayesu was convicted of sexual crimes.
While this landmark case of the ICTR had the potential to dictate the course of the
Tribunal in prosecuting rape and sexual violence, the initial lack of a prosecution strategy to
investigate these crimes still nevertheless impacted the operation of the ICTR. Binaifer Nowrojee
argues that because of this systemic lack of attention to sexual crimes that by 2004, ten years
after the ICTR was opened, only two defendants were specially convicted for their role in sexual
violence crimes, the third conviction was reversed on appeal, and none of the rape acquittals
were appealed by the Prosecutor.325 In addition, Nowrojee notes that in the first ten years of the
Tribunal, cases were moved forward without rape charges even when the Prosecutor possessed
strong evidence. Moreover, in a significant number of cases, rape charges were added belatedly
as amendments and as an afterthought, rather than an integral part of a prosecution strategy that
acknowledged rape as a form of genocidal violence.326
As Nowrojee argues, the lack of a political will to prosecute rape and sexual violence was
demonstrated in the ways in which Tribunal approached these crimes.327 Since the ICTR was
established as the first “genocide tribunal” in the world, its focus was holding perpetrators
accountable for crimes such as genocide, murder, and extermination. This focus led to a
324
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prosecution approach in which the OTP sought to establish whether these already targeted and
indicted persons had also been involved in rape and sexual violence. The OTP then hoped to find
an actual woman who had been raped by that target, which was equivalent to “looking for a
needle in a haystack.”328 As Chiseche Salome Mibenge argues, while human rights reports on
Rwanda have shown that it is hard to find a woman in Rwanda who was not raped, international
judicial procedure at the ICTR reframed the challenge as “show me a woman who was raped.”329
Despite the fact that Akayesu established rape as a tool of genocide, the prosecution strategy
utilized by the OTP nevertheless seemed to portray sexual violence as occurrences that happened
on a random basis rather than a part of the greater atrocity that took place in Rwanda.330
Furthermore, this lack of attention to sexual violence prosecution resulted in poor
investigations of these crimes throughout the operation of the Tribunal. As sexual crimes were
not a central focus, many investigators had no prior experiences in the investigation of sexual
violence.331 Investigators also did not receive any training on interviewing methods for rape
victims, and many even believed that rape and sexual violence were not crimes that deserved
specific attention.332 While it has been established that victims of rape and sexual violence often
felt more comfortable sharing their experiences with other women, in 2003, only five of the 100
investigators were women.333 Given the lack of financial resources for a long-running Tribunal,
investigators often chose to collect statements in areas where they received a higher stipend, thus
paying less attention in areas such as Kigali where there was a high level of sexual violence.
Sexual violence investigations, as a result, were often poor in quality and not trial-ready, forcing
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attorneys, in many cases, to travel from Arusha to Rwanda to conduct their own
investigations.334
Binaifer Nowrojee also argues that the OTP’s willingness to prosecute rape and sexual
violence was not consistent over the years.335 The OTP gained some momentum in prosecuting
rape under some Prosecutors, and lost such momentum under others. In his two-year tenure as
the first Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone of South Africa never translated his pronounced
commitments to punishing sexual crimes into action.336 The OTP gained more momentum during
the tenure of Canadian Prosecutor Louise Arbour from 1996 to 1999. By the last year of her
mandate, all new indictments contained sexual violence charges, and the OTP was poised for a
rapid acceleration in performance and efficiency with regards to prosecuting sexual violence.337
This momentum was, however, lost completely when Carla Del Ponte of Switzerland took
charge of the OTP. There was a steady decline in the number of new indictments that contained
sexual crime charges and a lack of commitment to using evidence for prosecution in cases where
rape charges were included. Del Ponte moved several cases, such as Cyangugu, through trial
without rape charges even when OTP possessed strong evidence.338 Mibenge argues that under
the pressure to speed up trials, Del Ponte regarded sexual violence charges as unnecessary and
the least relevant of the crimes being investigated, and in many cases, sacrificed them in the
interests of expediency.339 As a result of this lack of attention, the proportion of new indictments
including sexual violence charges dropped from 100% in 1999-2000 to 35% in 2001-2002, and
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by her last year as Prosecutor, none of the new indictments contained rape charges.340 Prosecutor
Hassan Jallow of Gambia replaced Del Ponte in 2003, and served at the Tribunal until its
conclusion. In many aspects, he was the Prosecutor most committed to prosecuting rape and
sexual assaults. Major achievements of the ICTR, such as using the JCE and creating the Best
Practices Manual, were gained during his tenure. 341 Despite these commitments shown by
Prosecutors Arbour and Jallow, the overall inconsistency in the willingness to prosecute rape and
sexual violence led investigators to:
gather too little or the wrong kind of evidence, which does not prove all elements
of the crimes; fail to keep track of the evidence over time; use inappropriate
methodology; miss investigatory opportunities; and potentially create a disconnect
between the charges in the indictment and what the prosecution can actually prove
at trial, which results in the need to amend indictments to drop charges, or leads to
acquittals.342
In other words, the overall inconsistent willingness to try rape cases that underpinned the
operation of the OTP and the significant failures during the tenure of Prosecutor Del Ponte
ultimately undermined the record of prosecuting rape and sexual violence at the ICTR.
Inconsistency in Defining and Prosecuting Rape as Genocide
Despite its trailblazing legacy in offering a progressive definition of rape and in
prosecuting rape as an element of genocide, Akayesu still stands out as an anomaly in the ICTR’s
record of prosecuting rape and sexual violence. While Akayesu’s definition of rape has been used
internationally in both the ICTY and the ICC, the extent to which it was utilized at the ICTR was
rather discouraging. The only other instances that explicitly accepted the Akayesu formulation
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were the Musema, Niyitegeka, and Muhimana cases.343 In contrast, some later cases at the ICTR,
such as in Semanza, Kajelijeli, and Kamuhanda, seemingly reverted to a more traditional
understanding of rape that was rejected by Akayesu, and accepted a narrower consent-based
definition endorsed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Kunarac.344 In addition, the Semanza
ruling in 2003 also considered Akayesu definition too “broad,” and the Kunarac definition
“narrower.”345 While Trial Chamber I in Akayesu succeeded in contextualizing rape in the bigger
context of coercion that was genocide, other Trial Chambers unfortunately reversed to a more
mechanical definition. MacKinnon argues that this failure was partly a result of the Tribunal’s
unwillingness to hold the superiors responsible for rapes, and showed the common tendency to
think of rape as individual, decontextualized, once-at-a-time attacks.346 Similarly, Alex OboteOdora adds that close analyses of the ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence show that Trial Chambers in
these Tribunals often seemed reluctant to abandon consent as an element of rape as it existed in
the legislation of most national jurisdictions.347 This inconsistency in defining rape can arguably
be attributed to the fact every Judge at the ICTR came from a different country and thus had
different legal training and interpretation of international law. Indeed, while Akayesu is one of
the ICTR’s most applauded achievements, a closer look at the record of the Tribunal
nevertheless shows that this achievement was an anomaly in a Tribunal that often forgot to place
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rape in the context of genocide, which resulted in many missed opportunities to prosecute rape
and sexual violence as elements of genocide.
An Inhospitable Environment for Victims of Rape and Sexual Assaults
The literature review in Chapter 2 demonstrates that victims of rape and sexual assaults
often find it difficult to testify about their experiences in private, if not more so in a public,
international tribunal. The record of the ICTR, however, shows this was not always the case.
Throughout the Tribunal, various victims came forward and testified about their experiences,
even when they were not asked to, as exemplified by the courageous witnesses in the Akayesu
case. Unfortunately, in most of the cases, the Tribunal did not respond well to this astonishing
courage of the victims, and faced similar criticism of international judicial mechanisms trying
intimate crimes such as rape and sexual violence.
Legal commentators have criticized the manner in which judges presided over sexual
violence cases, especially for permitting the re-traumatization and humiliation of victims during
“inept” and “insensitive” cross-examination by defense counsel.348 One incident that was heavily
criticized by human rights groups happened during the Butare Trial in 2001. While Witness TA,
a victim of multiple of rapes, was being cross-examined insensitively by the defense counsel, all
three judges suddenly burst out laughing.349 Not only did the judges show a reluctance to limit
and restrain excessive cross-examination, they also showed a disrespectful insensitivity to the
emotionally wrenching position of the victim. In addition, Binafer Nowrojee also notes that rape
victims were often harassed on the stand by the defense counsel for hours, days, and even
weeks.350 This harassment was often worsened in joint trials with numerous defendants, when
victims got asked the same questions over and over again by different defense attorneys.
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Moreover, these questions were sometimes highly offensive. Witness TA was asked questions
such as, “Did you touch the accused’s penis?” and “How was it introduced into your vagina?” In
the same Butare Trial, a prosecution lawyer noted that a rape victim whom she led on the stand
was asked 1194 questions by the defense counsel.351
In addition, even in cases where the victims and eyewitnesses felt comfortable testifying
about their experiences or what they witnessed, these victims oftentimes felt a cultural constraint
and lack of sufficient words to explain what happened.352 Because of Rwandan culture, victims
often refrained from saying directly what happened to them and opted for euphemisms, such as
“he married me/her,” “he took her/me by force,” and “he took advantage of me/her.” 353
Moreover, post-trial interviews with victims also showed that they often could not find sufficient
words to describe and explain the extreme trauma of rape. 354 This tension between an
international Tribunal and the experiences of victims in a local setting, in which foreign judges
often did not understand how the local culture could impact victims’ ability to testify, was one of
the main institutional challenges that confronted the ICTR, and in many ways, affected the
Tribunal’s record of prosecuting rape and sexual violence.
In addition, one of the most horrifying aspects of testifying at the ICTR for victims was
that their names could be leaked back into Rwanda. Pre-trial witnesses were informed by the
OTP that their identities would be kept confidential, and they often testified behind the curtain
using pseudonyms. However, the Tribunal rules required that the defense know the names of the
witnesses testifying against the accused, which means that oftentimes these names got leaked
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back to Rwanda.355 There are significant social stigmas surrounding victims of rape and sexual
assaults, and the fact that they were raped could destroy their chance to marry, upon which their
survival often depended. In the case of Witness TA at the Butare Trial, her experiences at the
Tribunal attracted significant attention and resulted in her fiancé leaving her, and she has not
been able to marry.356 This danger placed a significant burden on the victims and witnesses who
testified at the ICTR. Not only were they subjected to insensitive and offensive questioning
during the trials, their ability to reconcile and reintegrate to society could also be severely
impeded by the ICTR’s lack of protection for witnesses. While the ICTR did provide protection
for the witnesses during trials, it argued that the burden of post-trial protection fell onto the
government of Rwanda.357 This argument reflects the need for more coordinated efforts between
the ICTR and the Rwandan government.
An Incomplete Picture of Rape and Sexual Violence
The ICTR served not only as a judicial process to bring perpetrators of the genocide to
justice, but also as a truth-telling mechanism that documented a historical record about what
happened during the genocide. This uncovering of truth happened not only by the convictions of
the perpetrators, but also through the victims’ and witnesses’ articulation of their experiences and
observations, which are now presented in the trials’ transcripts. The picture of rape and sexual
assault during the genocide is, unfortunately, incomplete in many aspects.
First, the rather poor conviction rate of the Tribunal, while partly contributing to the
historical record, did not portray the full picture of who was responsible for the genocide,
especially given the high acquittal rate. In addition, throughout the Tribunal’s operation, only
Tutsi women appeared to be victims of rape and sexual violence, and other categories, such as
355
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Hutu and male victims, were neglected. Chiseche Salome Mibenge argues that the ICTR’s
dominant narrative of gender and violence is monolithic and overtly exclusive, for it solely
consisted of sexual violence against Tutsi women.358 For instance, the rape and sexual assault of
moderate Hutu Prime Minister Agathe Uwingiliymana was completely erased from the legal
findings of the Tribunal. In the Bagosora judgment, the sexual aspect of her death – a bottle was
shoved into her vagina – did not receive any legal consideration,359 whereas in Akayesu, thrusting
a piece of wood into the vagina of a Tutsi woman was considered rape. Mibenge charges that this
erasure of sexual violence against the Prime Minister was made possible because her Hutu
identity did not fit into the dominant rape narrative of the ICTR, which explicitly indicated a
dichotomy of only Tutsi women as rape victims and Hutu men as perpetrators.360
This dichotomy also impacted the ICTR’s consideration of sexual violence against a
prominent Tutsi man – Assiel Kabanda. He was killed and castrated, and his head and genitals
were subsequently hung up and displayed near his fruit shop.361 In the Niyitegeka judgment, the
ICTR mentioned the killing, decapitation, and castration of Kabanda as crimes against
humanity,362 yet ignored the fact that castration was not merely an amputation but an attack
against a male sexual and reproductive organ, which was often considered a symbolic
amputation of one’s masculinity.363 In other words, while there was sufficient evidence about
sexual violence against a male victim, the Tribunal’s record never referred to this attack as
having a sexual nature, thus failing to create a more comprehensive record of truth about sexual
violence against men and boys during the genocide. Usta Kaitesi also notes that the Tribunal’s
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record only mentioned two situations of sexual violence against men in three cases, as two cases
shared the same victim.364 Moreover, this neglect fits into a trend in the field of transitional
justice, in which researchers have largely ignored the issue of sexual violence as a form of
gender-based violence against men in armed conflict.365
Finally, the ICTR was located in Arusha, Tanzania to avoid the appearance of “victor’s
justice.” The UNSC reiterated on many occasions, especially during the first ten years of the
ICTR’s mandate, the need to investigate and prosecute human rights violations that were
committed by the RPF. 366 The Tribunal, however, failed to uncover truth about and prosecute
these crimes, which undermined the very decision to locate it in a foreign country.
Insufficient Attention to Restorative Justice
As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis divides restorative justice into reparations and
reconciliation. The ICTR and trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction as
international judicial processes, however, were mechanisms of retributive justice. Both
mechanisms had no mandate to provide reparations for victims. The ICTR did, in 2000-2001,
launch a service program to distribute monetary, legal, and medical support to women through
five Rwandan women’s organization; yet the program was only largely symbolic and not
implemented widely.367 This lack of attention to reparations for victims of the genocide in
general was a result of an institutional challenge facing the ICTR. Established as a “genocide
tribunal,” its tasks were to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and other violations of
international humanitarian law. This mandate therefore systemically shaped the focus of the
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ICTR on prosecuting violations of first-generation and bodily integrity rights, while neglecting
violations of economic, social, and cultural crimes. With regards to gender-based violence, only
rape and other physical invasions of the women’s body were paid attention to and prosecuted as
“sexual violence.” Crimes such as the intentional spread of HIV/AIDs and other STDs were
never considered under the Tribunal’s mandate. This systemic lack of attention to the long-term
impacts of sexual crimes and other forms of gender-based violence on victims led to an
unfortunate situation: while those in the ICTR’s custody received adequate healthcare, their
victims, especially those in needs of HIV/AIDs treatment, completely lacked basic access to
healthcare.368
The other aspect of restorative justice – reconciliation – was, however, included in the
mandate of the ICTR. UNSC Resolution 955 states that the ICTR would contribute to “the
process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.” This chapter
now analyzes the extent to which the ICTR facilitated the reconciliation of victims of rape and
sexual assaults through six main elements laid out in the introduction: 1) understanding the past,
present and envisioning the future of Rwanda, 2) citizenship and identity, 3) political culture, 4)
security, 5) justice, and 6) social cohesion. The ICTR, by its role as a judicial mechanism and as
a truth-uncovering mechanism, had the potential to push for more understanding of the past and
to bring perpetrators to justice. In her interviews with victims of rape and sexual violence,
Binafer Nowrojee noted that victims were primarily interested in two aspects of the Tribunal:
jurisprudence and justice.369 In other words, they wanted public acknowledgment of the crimes
committed against them, and wanted information about the fate of their perpetrators in the legal
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process.370 The Tribunal was somewhat successful at facilitating reconciliation for victims and
survivors who testified and saw their perpetrators being brought to justice, yet failed many others
when it moved cases through trials without rape charges despite substantial evidence. Inadequate
retributive justice delivery and an incomplete picture of rape and sexual violence thus prevented
the ICTR from fulfilling its objectives. In addition, the extent to which a judicial mechanism can
facilitate reconciliation for victims depends on whether the victims know about its record.
Located in Arusha, Tanzania, the ICTR was already an institution physically and psychologically
distant from the majority of the victims of sexual assaults. Its frequent maltreatment of victims
and witnesses also created major impediments to reconciliation, such as re-traumatization, for
those who testified in front of the tribunal in pursuit of justice and closure.
Moreover, the majority of the Rwandan population was generally under-informed of the
progress that the ICTR made over the years. This lack of knowledge about the ICTR can be
attributed to the Tribunal’s lack of outreach efforts.371 Those who testified at the Tribunal
received little or no information about the trial process and its results. This lack of information
and follow-up gave many victims a sense of having been used; as one witness said, “our tribunal
gives us nothing, not even a thank you.”372 The one exception was after the Akayesu case, when
the OTP staffers returned to Taba and held a public town hall meeting to explain the judgment.
While it is reasonable to argue that the Tribunal did not have the responsibility to follow up with
survivors who testified, public outreach effort similar to the town hall meeting after Akayesu was
crucial to facilitate reconciliation, which was included in UNSC Resolution 955 as one of the
ICTR’s objectives. As a retributive justice institution, the ICTR had the ability to facilitate
reconciliation for survivors by publicly acknowledging the wrongness of the crimes committed
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against Rwandans, which could only happen if the victims actually knew about the punishment
of their perpetrators. As Dina Temple-Raston argues:
The ruling would have meant more if the thousands of women in Rwanda who
had been victims of rape during the genocide had known it even occurred. This,
too, was one of the problems with the ICTR. It meted out justice and Rwandans
were never informed.373
The fact that the ICTR was located in Tanzania required a more proactive effort in public
outreach if the Tribunal wanted to contribute to survivors’ reconciliation, from which the ICTR
unfortunately fell short.
Moreover, the work of the Tribunal spanned over 20 years. Many cases, such as the
Butare Trial, lasted for a long time and were difficult for victims to follow. In addition, after
heavy criticism for its slow progress, the ICTR assigned more cases to each trial chamber, and on
any given day, it was extremely difficult to know what was happening at which time. 374
Information about the ICTR and its procedures were only available in English and French, with
little or no information available in Kinyarwanda. This selective and rather discriminatory access
to information, which aimed at a small, literate middle class while the rest of the population did
not know what was happening, created major impediments to reconciliation for those who
wished to know about the judgment of the perpetrators who had raped and ruined their lives. In
addition, the physical disconnect between the ICTR and the Rwandan population almost
completely prevented the ICTR from fulfilling other aspects of reconciliation, such as citizenship
and identity, political culture, and security. In many instances, such as with Witness TA from the
Butare Trial, testifying at the Tribunal even worsened the victims’ prospect of security and
reintegrating into their communities as full citizens. As Gahima argues, the various shortcomings
that the ICTR confronted made it unlikely that the ICTR would contribute to or have any long373
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term impact on “fighting impunity, deterring human rights abuses, promoting reconciliation, and
advancing sustainable peace.”375 In addition, Nicola Palmer’s empirical research in Rwanda
showed that reconciliation did not consistently or broadly emerge as an impact of the Tribunal,
while developing an international jurisprudence was identified as the dominant contribution.376
CONCLUSION
As this chapter has demonstrated, the major strengths and successes of international
transitional mechanisms lay predominantly in the sphere of retributive justice – criminal
prosecution and setting legal precedents. Francois-Xavier Nsanzuwera argues that, “the Tribunal
has contributed positively to the overall situation in Rwandan by arresting, detaining, and
convicting many of the key figures responsible for genocide, and so prevented these perpetrators
pursuing their genocidal goals.” 377 These mechanisms also created a strong international
jurisprudence for the prosecution of sexual crimes in international law. These legal precedents
were necessary, as both mechanisms were two of the first international institutions to prosecute
rape and sexual violence as either genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Prior to the
establishment of the ICTR, rape and sexual violence were not treated as serious violations of
international humanitarian law, given the international record of non-prosecution of these
crimes.378 The international jurisprudence created by the ICTR and those of the ICTY and ICC
all support the assertion that prosecuting sexual violence, at the very least rape and sexual
slavery, has risen to the level of jus cogens.379 Setting legal precedents, while necessary, was not
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sufficient; only future victims of rape and sexual assaults in other international and national
conflicts can receive the benefits that this international jurisprudence gave to international law.
In other words, these international mechanisms were not successful at bringing comprehensive
justice to the victims they intended to serve, but have the potential and power to bring justice to
future victims of rape and sexual assault.
In addition, some aspects of restorative justice were achieved. Through the testimonies of
the victims and witnesses, a partial record of truth about sexual violence during the genocide
emerged from the ICTR and contributed to a collective memory in Rwanda. In other words, as
both a judicial and truth-telling mechanism, “the Tribunal wrote the genocide story.”380 The
findings of the ICTR have confirmed that these crimes of a sexual nature must not be seen as
opportunistic attacks, but rather as essential parts of the intent to destroy the enemy in armed
conflicts. Women were also active participants in the genocide, and were also responsible for
perpetrating rape and sexual violence. Crimes of a sexual nature therefore must be considered
amongst the most serious international crimes worthy of prosecution under international law, and
these two international mechanisms have contributed significantly to this acknowledgment. Both
mechanisms, however, failed to uncover more information about sexual violence against men
and boys, the Hutus, and crimes committed by the RPF, rendering this record of truth and justice
incomplete.
As one of the first international tribunal since the Tokyo and Nuremberg Trials and the
ICTY, the ICTR faced an unprecedented task of prosecuting perpetrators of genocide, especially
those who committed sexual violence. Given the lack of judicial framework of prosecuting
sexual crimes as genocide that it could follow, the fact the ICTR was able to gain these
achievements is indeed remarkable. However, the ICTR’s overall record reflects several
380
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institutional challenges for prosecuting crimes and rape and sexual violence. Different
Prosecutors demonstrated different levels of willingness to prosecute rape cases, even when the
OTP possessed strong evidence. While the ICTR did incrementally utilize more tools to
prosecute rape, such as using the JCE theory, it was unfortunate that sexual crimes were rarely
included as a central element of investigation, which resulted in many missed opportunities to
hold perpetrators accountable. Many victims felt that the environment at the Tribunal was too
hostile and foreign for them to testify about intimate experiences of sexual violence. In addition,
while the ICTR possessed the ability to contribute to the process of reconciliation for survivors
of sexual crimes, particularly by developing a partial record of truth and justice, it failed almost
completely to follow up with victims who testified and oftentimes gave them the feeling of
having been used. While it is difficult to ask an international, retributive justice mechanism to
pay specific attention to restorative justice, being aware of the need for information-sharing and
restorative measures can further contribute to the success of future tribunals.
In conclusion, both the ICTR and universal jurisdiction trials in other states showed both
strengths and weaknesses in bringing both retributive and restorative justice to victims of rape
and sexual violence. Their major contribution – leaving legal precedents to prosecute crimes of a
sexual nature under international law – should not be underestimated. The extent to which that
this contribution impacted the peacetime status of rape victims in general and of women in
particularly is rather contested. Changing and improving the status of women in Rwandan
society, and eliminating the social stigma surrounding the victims of rape and sexual assault,
requires systemic and internal efforts that international mechanisms did not possess. The next
chapter analyzes the extent to which domestic mechanisms of transitional justice were successful
in carrying these internal efforts.
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4. INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, LOCAL JUSTICE
NATIONAL COURTS, GACACA COURTS, AND REPARATIONS PROGRAMS
“Why do you foreigners [abazungu] ask such stupid questions?!? How can you
ask me about reconciling with my neighbors when I see their children wearing my
[dead] children’s clothing, when they are in their house eating at my table, when
they cook in my pots? Reconciliation!?! It’s not possible.”381

As the genocide ended, Rwanda was left with a seemingly insurmountable task of
rebuilding its social, economic, and political fabric and restoring the rule of law. The wounds of
the genocide were too painfully visible to be ignored, and bringing justice to victims of the
genocide became a central part of rebuilding the country. As the international community
attempted to prosecute international crimes of genocide and other crimes against humanity at the
ICTR and trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction in other states, Rwanda itself also
tried to reckon with its painful past. The Rwandan government first used its domestic courts to
try crimes of genocide, yet its post-genocide collapsed justice system soon proved to be utterly
ineffective. Confronted by both a devastated, overburdened judicial system and an overwhelming
desire for justice from the population, the Rwandan government resorted to the gacaca court – a
local and communal justice system deeply rooted within Rwandan culture and popular in
Rwandan society. In many ways, post-genocide gacaca incrementally evolved both as a
complement to and as an alternative of the national courts. In addition, the Rwandan government
acknowledged that justice solely in terms of criminal prosecution was not enough for a
population overwhelmed by the daily struggles of survival; reparations therefore became of
crucial importance. Genocide victims could claim reparations as civil parties in both the national
381
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courts and gacaca. Furthermore, the government introduced legislation to establish two
reparation programs: the FARG assistance fund (Fonds National d'Assistance aux victimes les
plus nécessiteuses du génocide et des massacres) and the FIND indemnification/compensation
fund (Fond d'indemnisation).
While challenges confronting post-genocide Rwanda were overwhelming, the Rwandan
government’s attempts to solve these problems were extensive and aspirational. Rwanda’s
domestic responses to the crimes of genocide stood out for the unprecedented lengths to which
the state has gone to hold perpetrators accountable and to bring justice to victims.382 Within the
scope of this thesis, a question arises: How successful were these transitional justice mechanisms
in bringing comprehensive justice to Rwandan victims of rape and sexual assaults? A UN report
estimated that there were between 250,000 and 500,000 people who were raped and sexually
assaulted during the Rwandan genocide.383 While the ICTR and universal jurisdiction trials were
primarily concerned with prosecuting the mastermind of the genocide, domestic mechanisms
were more concerned with trying other categories of perpetrators. To victims of sexual violence,
domestic mechanisms brought the possibilities of bringing those who directly raped and sexually
assaulted them to justice. The victims’ proximity to the justice mechanisms and their potential to
claim reparations showcased a promise of justice and reconciliation.
This chapter analyzes the extent to which domestic mechanisms – national courts, gacaca
courts, and reparation programs – were able to fulfill their promises. It first provides a brief
background to these mechanisms and summarizes their records. The chapter continues with an
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanisms in bringing comprehensive justice
– both retributive and restorative justice – to victims of rape and sexual violence. The chapter
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argues that given the Rwandan government’s commitment to justice, domestic mechanisms were
somewhat successful at prosecuting at most 9,000 perpetrators of rape and sexual violence, and
were able to provide reparations in the form of assistance programs to a portion of victims,
especially widows of the genocide. Despite this commitment, domestic mechanisms faced
several institutional challenges that came from the genocide and from the social norms deeply
embedded within Rwandan society. As a result, while domestic mechanisms were able to bring
justice to some victims, they also unfortunately failed many others. Within these mechanisms,
gacaca deserves particular attention for its cultural values and its pioneering approach to
transitional justice. However, modern gacaca was heavily modified to fit the Rwandan
government’s pursuit of justice, and arguably became a justice mechanism unsuitable for crimes
of rape and sexual violence.
NATIONAL COURTS
Between 1994 and 1996, the Rwandan government discussed with national experts the
possibility of criminal justice and accountability for genocide-related crimes within the domestic
legal framework. This two-year discussion culminated in the adoption of Organic Law No. 08/96
on the Organization of Prosecution of Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide and Crimes
Against Humanity.384 With this 1996 law, Rwandan became the first country to pass domestic
criminal legislation on genocide.385 This law established the first legal and judicial framework to
prosecute genocide-related crimes within Rwanda, and created four categories of offenders
subjected to prosecution. Category one consisted of organizers or leaders of genocide, wellknown killers, and perpetrators of sexual torture. Category two included murders and
accomplices to murder or serious attacks. Category three included persons who committed
384
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serious attacks without the intent to cause death, and category four included those responsible for
property damage.386 This chapter is primarily concerned with category one offenders who raped
and committed acts of sexual torture.
As the 1996 Genocide Law entered into force in December 1996, several institutional
challenges facing national courts soon came to the fore as the courts attempted to try more than
120,000 persons accused of genocide-related crimes. At the end of the genocide, Rwanda
counted only 20 judicial staffers for criminal prosecutions and only 19 lawyers, and by 1997, the
448 judges serving in national courts by 1997 were poorly trained.387 Given this limited human
resource and the lack of financial resource, the courts were only able to try 1,292 genocide
suspects by 1998 and, at that rate, genocide trials would have continued for more than a
century.388 The justice system was so overwhelmed by the caseload that even serious crimes such
as sexual torture – category one crimes subjected to the most severe punishments – were not
investigated and prosecuted.389 This slow pace of justice, overcrowding and inhumane prison
conditions, and insufficient due process for the accused in trial practices, all led to heavy
criticism of the government.390 With regards to rape and sexual violence, Human Rights Watch
states that “between 1998 and 2004, an extraordinary small number of cases of genocidal sexual
violence were prosecuted at the domestic level.”391 Between December 1996 and December
2003, the national courts tried 9,728 persons accused of genocide-related crimes, of which only
32 cases included charges of rape or sexual torture.392 Rwandan women’s organization AVEGA
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(Association des Veuves du Genocide – The Association of the Widows of Genocide) estimated
that less than 100 rape cases were heard in the national courts, while Usta Kaitesi in an interview
estimated that there were much fewer than 1,000.393
GACACA COURTS
Responding to the nearly complete destruction of the judicial infrastructure and the high
level of civilian participation in crimes of the highest degrees, the Rwandan government resorted
to the traditional justice process called gacaca, which some scholars deemed as the “last hope for
justice and reconciliation” in Rwanda.394
2001 Gacaca Law
Traditional gacaca mainly dealt with civil matters such as land disputes and general
family relations, and was a private affair rooted within restorative justice elements, especially the
restoration of relationship between parties.395 Gacaca can be traced back until at least the 17th
century, and operated throughout the Belgian colonial period. Traditional gacaca operated under
the Habyarimana regime, and families continued to resolve intrafamilial conflict through gacaca
when necessary.396 Modern gacaca – the modified version that was implemented following the
Rwandan genocide – was, however, drastically altered to fit the need for post-genocide justice,
and its proceedings turned into a public affair with the entire community participating. Gacaca
trials were judged by inyangamugayo, local elder leaders who were elected by citizens for their
integrity and standing within the community. While traditional gacaca operated in an ad hoc
manner, its modern version was based on a complex written law, with systematic administrative
393
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divisions and the power to impose prison sentences (but not the death penalty) on the accused.397
More importantly, while women were often not permitted to speak in traditional gacaca,398
modern gacaca addressed this shortcoming. Women were elected as inyangamugayo,
participated both as victims and as perpetrators, and actively contributed as eligible members of
the general assembly.399
On March 15, 2001, the Rwandan government adopted Organic Law No. 40/2000 on
Setting up ‘Gacaca Jurisdiction’ and the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences constituting
the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed between October 1, 1990 and
December 31, 1994,400 and established the gacaca courts as a concurrent justice mechanism to
operate alongside the national courts. Gacaca was established with five main objectives: 1) to
reveal the truth about the genocide, 2) to speed up the cases of genocide and other crimes against
humanity, 3) to eradicate the culture of impunity, 4) to strengthen unity and reconciliation among
Rwandans, and 5) to prove the Rwandans’ capacity to solve their own problems.401 Each gacaca
court was comprised of a General Assembly (100 community members), a Bench (19
Inyangamugayo judges, who were all elected by the community), and a Coordination Committee
(one President, two Vice-Presidents, and two secretaries who altogether managed the operation
of gacaca). 402 The 2001 Gacaca Law established approximately 11,000 gacaca courts at
different administrative levels – the cell, sector, district, and province levels – for the pilot
phase.403
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The 2001 Gacaca Law used the same four categories of crimes established by the 1996
Genocide Law, but expanded category one to include the crime of rape. Under this law, all
genocide-related cases had to first go before gacaca. Gacaca took place once a week in public if
the quorum (at least five members of the bench and 100 members of the general assembly) was
present. Gacaca operated in three stages: information gathering, categorization of crimes, and
trials. During the last step of the information-gathering phase at the cell level of gacaca,
witnesses testified publicly or in writing before the assembly. Information was also collected in
confessions and guilty pleas of the perpetrator. During phase two, gacaca judges reviewed the
files and categorized the accused in accordance with the hierarchy of crimes created by the 1996
Genocide Law. The gacaca court then tried and delivered verdicts on crimes of the latter three
categories, while category one crimes including rape were transferred to the national courts
system for prosecution.404 Since traditional gacaca was a form of communal justice, modern
gacaca also required every citizen to take part in the procedure, for every Rwandan was witness
to the crimes of genocide.405
Regarding rape and sexual violence, one important trend emerged. While the initial legal
procedures within the national courts remained private and rather limited to the related parties,
every case must go through the public proceedings of gacaca under the 2001 Gacaca Law. The
pilot phase report revealed that the public nature of the information gathering and guilty pleas
exposed victims of sexual torture to further victimization and social stigmas surrounding these
crimes. Between the launch of the pilot phase and June 2002, 581 gacaca courts in ten provinces
registered approximately 134 cases of rape and sexual torture, as compared to the approximately
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3,308 cases of non-sexual violence crimes.406 In response, the government adopted a new law in
2004 to address the weaknesses identified, such as the public nature of the information-gathering
process during the pilot phase.
2004 Gacaca Law
Organic Law No. 16/2004 on the Organization, Jurisdiction, and Functioning of the
Gacaca Courts407 was adopted on June 19, 2004 and laid out several changes in accordance with
the lessons learnt in the pilot phase. To speed up the nationwide implementation of gacaca,
gacaca at the provincial and district levels were abolished, and cases in these levels were
transferred to various sector gacaca courts. Categories two and three were combined in a new
category two, and the former category four became the new category three. The number of
judges in each gacaca court was reduced from 19 to 9 with 5 alternates, and additional training
programs for gacaca judges were developed and implemented.408 Nationwide implementation of
gacaca began with the launch of the information-gathering phase in 2005.
Specific procedural changes were implemented to protect victims of rape and sexual
violence from the public nature of the information-gathering stage, and the 2004 Gacaca Law
prohibited publicly gathering information on sexual violence. Victims of sexual crimes were
supposed to give evidence in closed settings to a single judge of their choosing or, if they did not
trust any of the judges, could give the evidence directly to the public prosecutor at the national
courts. Perpetrators could make confessions about rape but must not do so in public, and third
parties, such as witnesses, were prohibited from publicly reporting sexual violence crimes.409
2008 Amendment
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The last significant changes in the operation of gacaca, especially with regards to rape
and sexual violence, occurred after the adoption of the 2008 amendment to the 2004 Gacaca
Law on May 19, 2008. In order to speed up first category trials at the national courts, the 2008
amendment extended the jurisdiction of gacaca to cover some first category crimes, including
trying perpetrators of rape and sexual torture and their accomplice. Under this law, cases arising
from the information gathering phase and those already at the prosecution office of the national
courts were transferred to the competent gacaca courts. Prior to this amendment, everyone could
either testify or confess about what they saw or experienced during the genocide. Under this
amendment, for new claims, only victims had the right to lodge new rape cases, and in case the
victim was dead or incapable, other concerned parties could lodge it; all of these claims had to be
submitted secretly.410 After 2008, between 6,608 and 8000 cases that included rape and sexual
violence charges were estimated to have been transferred from the national courts to gacaca.411
Trials began in January 2009 and ended in July 2010. The exact number of delivered verdicts
that included rape and sexual torture crimes is not currently available.
In addition, the law also required that rape trials must be in closed sessions (in camera)
where the general public was excluded. There were usually six people allowed in the trial room:
the victim, the accused, the judge, a security officer, a gacaca representative, and a trauma
counselor chosen by the victim. 412 As a safeguard for human rights, all judgments were
announced publicly. In addition, the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdiction (SNJG), which
monitored the implementation and progress of gacaca and the post graduate training institute for
the justice sector in Rwanda, organized a 10-week, expert training program for various
individuals, who would in turn train the Inyangamugayo on approaching cases of rape and sexual
410

Kaitesi and Haveman 396
Amick 3; Human Rights Watch, Justice Compromised, 112; Kaitesi 82
412
Amick 52
411

107

torture. This interdisciplinary training covered both legal and psychological aspects of the law
and judicial process.413
REPARATION PROGRAMS
Several reparation programs were proposed in the aftermath of the genocide with a focus
on two different types of reparations: compensation that made up for the loss suffered by the
victim, and assistance that aimed at helping the neediest among the population. In reality,
however, only one program was eventually established and maintained financially, while others
were never adopted or did not have the financial capacity to be effective. Regarding reparations
for victims of rape and sexual violence in particular, the prospects were even grimmer.
Reparations Within Genocide Trial
Under the 1996 Genocide Law, the specialized chambers were given the competence to
adjudicate the victims’ reparation claims within criminal trials. Perpetrators of first category
crimes, including rape and sexual torture, incurred civil liability for all damages suffered by the
victims during the genocide throughout the country.414 Reparation claims were to be paid by the
perpetrators and their families. By the end of the 1990s, the government, overwhelmed by the
heavy caseload and the slow progress of justice at the national courts, had given up on the idea of
individualized compensation awarded by the national courts, and looked at solutions involving
administrative compensation distributed by a fund that was to be established in the wake of the
introduction of the gacaca system.415
The Assistance Fund (Fonds d'Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide – FARG)
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In 1998, the government decided to create an independent fund named FARG, which
would distribute assistance in the form of education, healthcare, housing, and income-generating
programs.416 The two most important criteria to qualify as a FARG beneficiary were being “in
need” (orphan, widow, and the handicapped) and being a “réscape.” A réscape was defined as “a
person who escaped the genocide or the massacres committed between October 1, 1990 and
December 31, 1994. The FARG did not provide legal definitions of genocide and massacre but
only referred to the element of intent: the intent of the genocide was to target and exterminate
individuals and to destroy their properties because of their ethnic background or their political
opposition to the genocide. 417 This definition shied away from the notion of victimhood.
Rombouts argues that while “harm” and “loss” is central to the notion of victimhood, central to
the notion of réscape is “having escaped persecution,” which was often interpreted in an ad hoc
manner by local authorities.418 Because of this interpretation, some survivors of rape and sexual
violence were categorized as réscapes while others were not. Since the fund was perpetually
underfunded, only a fraction of those entitled to receive assistance was able to receive it.419
The Compensation Fund (Fond d'indemnisation - FIND)
While the creation of a compensation fund was announced in the 1996 Genocide Law,
two different drafts for a FIND law did not take place until 2001 and 2002 respectively. The
funds would come partly from the Rwandan state, partly from those convicted of genocide, and
from the international community and individuals on a voluntary basis. The profits from
community service programs would also be transferred to the fund for distribution. The process
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of implementation of this fund came to a standstill in the wake of the 2003 elections, and has not
been taken up again since. While the 2003 Constitution contains a provision on the “welfare of
victims of genocide,” it also states that such provision is only manageable within the limits of the
state’s capacity. The two FIND drafts have never been adopted, and most observers no longer
believe in the implementation of this fund.420
ANALYSIS: MAJOR STRENGTHS AND SUCCESSES
As noted in Chapter 2, human rights reports and transitional justice scholars have largely
employed a pessimistic and negative viewpoint while analyzing the prospects for comprehensive
justice for victims of rape and sexual violence in political contexts of transition. In Rwanda, the
number of rape and sexual violence cases heard in both the national courts and the gacaca courts
in total amounts to fewer than 9,000, a significantly small figure compared to the estimated
250,000 – 500,000 cases of rape and sexual violence during the genocide. Yet to argue that
domestic mechanisms did not bring any justice to victims of rape and sexual violence is to
unfairly undermine the work they have done, and to underestimate the unparalleled challenges
they faced as the country attempted to reckon with the legacy of the genocide.
Justice and Jurisprudence
The inclusion of rape and sexual torture within category one of genocide-related crimes
deserves particular consideration. This inclusion, after various debates within Parliament, moved
rape cases from category three (serious assaults against persons without clear genocidal intent) to
category one, whose perpetrators were subjected to life imprisonment or death penalty. This
decision unequivocally acknowledged that rape and sexual torture not only constituted an
essential part of the genocide, but also amounted to the category of most serious crimes
deserving the heaviest forms of punishment, which altogether had “considerable impact on the
420
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perception of rape as a spoil of war.”421 Symbolically, this decision showed an appreciation the
severity of the experience suffered by hundreds of thousands Rwandan during the genocide.
Practically, some of these victims were able to see their perpetrators being brought to justice by
either serving their prison terms or being executed.
To some extent, both national courts and gacaca were able to facilitate the creation of a
partial historical record of truth about what happened during the genocide. For gacaca, its major
potential in uncovering truth lay in the information-gathering and investigation stage. While
formal legal procedures such as the criminal courts often restrained the victims’ testimonies, the
informal nature of gacaca allowed for more truth to be discovered. Truth emerged not only from
the confessions of perpetrator and testimonies of victims and witnesses, but also from the
judgments that were made public by the judicial authority. While rape and sexual violence trials
were in camera, all judgments had to be made public. These judgments had both potential
retributive and restorative impacts: they not only put the perpetrators within the confines of the
justice system and removed them from their communities for punishment, but also affirmed the
wrongness of the violence committed against the victims. These impacts were arguably more
powerful within the context of gacaca, since gacaca could be seen as a blend of retributive and
restorative justice with “confessions and accusations, guilty pleas and trials, forgiveness and
punishment, community service and incarceration.” 422 While cases in national courts often
happened far away from the communities in which the victims and perpetrators lived, gacaca
situated such justice process within the community itself. The fact that gacaca sessions could
only start when 100 members of the general assembly were present means that open judgments
of rape and sexual violence cases were arguably intended to provide the community with a better
421

Chitra Nagarajan, "An Appraisal of Rwanda's Response to Survivors Who Experienced Sexual Violence in
1994,” Wagadu: A Journal of Transnational Women's and Gender Studies 10 (2012): 117
422
Waldorf 52-53

111

understanding of what happened during the genocide, and could help facilitate the emergence of
truth about what happened during the genocide within such community itself. The National
Service of Gacaca Courts published a final report in 2012 titled Gacaca Courts in Rwanda,
which included a section about what gacaca uncovered about rape and sexual torture.423
Modern gacaca was not only a legal institution, but also a social institution as well. This
combination of both legal and social functions dominates some scholars’ compliments of
gacaca’s impact. Matthew Braley argues that the gacaca was capable of “empowering a
disenfranchised citizenry and offering an institutional space in which alienated individuals and
groups can recognize a degree of interdependence.”424 By allowing victims to testify about their
experience and publicly denouncing those acts of violence, gacaca offered victims of rape and
sexual violence a platform to talk and to be listened to, and validated them by acknowledging
their sufferings. Emily Amick argues that the real value of gacaca came in its provision of a kind
of truth commission, a community-wide discussion about what took place during the genocide,
and a beginning of the conceptualization of how individuals would engage with their neighbors
in the new Rwanda and would altogether form a common society.425 In theory, truth telling in
gacaca served as “a manner to develop a common language of morality,” and gacaca provided a
space for a renegotiation of the mores of everyday society and affirmation of social moral
norms.426 Many women who testified in gacaca felt that it “enabled them to relieve their hearts,
to have their experiences and their suffering during the genocide recognized, and to urge others
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to act to prevent these crimes from ever happening again.”427 Bert Ingelaere argues that it was
this discursive nature of gacaca – in which people were not forced but chose to talk about their
experiences – that functioned as a catalyst of the transitional justice process.428
Gacaca, as a unique approach to transitional justice by serving both as a judicial and
social institution, deserves particular attention for the length it went to seek truth, justice, and
reconciliation. The extent to which gacaca was successful in doing so, especially in bringing
justice to victims of rape and sexual violence, requires more field research that I do not have the
capacity to implement. Writing about the extent to which truth telling can contribute to
sustainable peace and reconciliation, Tristan Borer points to the phenomenon of equating
“aspiration with empiricism,” in which claims about truth-telling mechanisms are presented as
facts while insufficient empirical work has been done to substantiate them in reality.429 As this
chapter later demonstrates, there existed significant institutional challenges that impeded the
justice process at gacaca and prevented many victims of rape and sexual violence from
participating. Truth and justice that emerged from gacaca were at least symbolic and at most
partial; it is arguable that the compliments and observations made by the authors mentioned
above may somewhat be too aspirational while there are reasons to believe that gacaca was not
that successful.
Saying that gacaca was not successful at all, as this section does not in any way attempt
to, is an extreme oversimplification that undermines the courage of the victims that came
forward. A partial historical record about what happened during the genocide and justice served
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by those who were convicted at gacaca are undoubtedly better than no truth and justice at all,
especially in a country where insufficient legal personnel could barely make the national courts
system work. While acknowledging the gaps in the current literature on the lack of empirical
evidence supporting aspirational claims about the success of gacaca, this thesis does want to
give credit where credit is due. Through both the national courts and gacaca, the collective
memory in the form of a partial record of truth and the justice served by those convicted of rape
and sexual torture could arguably contribute to both national and individual reconciliation. This
thesis examines reconciliation by dividing it into six different components: 1) understanding the
past, present and envisioning the future of Rwanda, 2) citizenship and identity, 3) political
culture, 4) security, 5) justice, and 6) social cohesion. The recognition of rape and sexual
violence as some of the most serious forms of genocide not only contributed to the emerging
understanding of the past, but also to the justice and security components by isolating and
punishing the perpetrators in those 9,000 cases that included rape charges. Moreover, AnneMarie de Brouwer – a prolific scholar who has conducted field research and written extensively
on sexual violence and transitional justice in Rwanda – argues that the public was gradually
beginning to comprehend the significance of hearing stories of rape and sexual violence in
gacaca in order to effectively respond to rape and sexual violence in the future.430 While this
contribution was rather limited given the number of cases actually heard and tried within the
national courts and gacaca, it is nevertheless important to acknowledge such contribution,
especially to the victims who were able to see their perpetrators brought to justice.
Procedural Changes to Protect Victims of Rape and Sexual Violence
Up until 2008, national courts and gacaca operated as concurrent justice mechanisms to
prosecute genocide-related crimes. Both institutions thus were never static but ever changing,
430

De Brouwer, “The Importance of Understanding Sexual Violence,” 659

114

and gacaca itself went through at least five different amendments. 431 Through these
amendments, the gacaca courts were able to incorporate more procedural changes to protect and
encourage victims of rape and sexual violence to participate. After the pilot phase in the early
2000s, the Rwandan government soon realized that the information-gathering stage exposed
some victims to heavy social stigmatization once their families and communities found out that
they were raped. The 2004 Gacaca Law thus prohibited the publishing of information regarding
to rape, and the lodging of these cases had to be done in private and reported directly to one
Inyangamugayo. The 2008 Gacaca Law, which transferred cases of rape and sexual torture to the
gacaca courts, established in camera trials so victims and perpetrators could testify/confess about
their cases in protected settings. As aforementioned, the victims were also able to choose the
judge to hear their case, and choose a counselor to assist them within the process. One woman
interviewed by Human Rights Watch preferred her case to be heard before gacaca, because the
procedures were less formal and she could speak more freely with emotional support.432 The law
also included provisions on punishments for individuals who breached this secrecy and exposed
the victims to trauma and social stigma. The 2008 Gacaca Law also laid out a framework for
extensive gender-sensitive trainings for judges to deal with rape and sexual violence cases.
In addition, the 2008 Gacaca Law also allowed the victims in criminal cases to determine
whether the case should be tried or not.433 Ordinary criminal justice often does not reflect the
needs of the victims and may do justice at the expense of victims. Usta Kaitesi and Roelof
Haveman argue that this provision was rooted in a restorative justice purpose, for it allowed all
stakeholders to participate not only in the court but also in the decision to either enter the case in
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the criminal process or not.434 This provision was also intended to protect the victims, since some
accusations were lodged maliciously to expose and further attack the victims.435 As this chapter
further demonstrates, these provisions were able to help some victims feel more welcomed to
testify at gacaca while simultaneously not being able to help many others. Some victims were
either too overwhelmed by the fear of social stigmas surrounding sexual violence; others did not
want to come forward at all and had already learned to live with their lives. These procedural
changes, however, demonstrated that the Rwandan government was well aware of these
challenges confronting victims and survivors of sexual violence, and that it had no control over
some of these challenges – such as culturally embedded social stigma. The government was
nevertheless willing to modify the gacaca process throughout the years, especially based on the
lessons learned in the pilot phase, as demonstrated by the fact that major changes in gacaca law,
such as those in 2004 and 2008, contained specific provisions on helping victims of rape and
sexual violence come forward. It is because of this good intention and willingness to address
challenges facing victims – despite the acknowledgment that it was only able to fix some but not
fundamentally counter all of these challenges – that the Rwandan government should be
applauded.
Assistance and Reparation for (Some) Women
Traditionally, women were often regarded as dependents of their male relatives, and their
position in society was limited in public settings and built around their roles as daughters,
mothers, and wives. Gender relations have changed since the genocide, since the Rwandan
government seized the post-conflict period as an opportunity to improve gender equality.436 As
early as 1999, the government changed the discriminatory inheritance rule, under which women
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could not inherit from their husbands or fathers, and women have since become rightful owners
of land.437 This development was particularly important, since many women became widows
during and after the genocide; being able to own and work on their lands was an essential
component of life sustenance. Understanding that the economy was destroyed after the genocide,
which inevitably affected women disproportionately, the government also created the Ministry of
Gender and Women in Development to oversee development programs with a focus on women.
In addition, the 2003 Constitution explicitly underscored gender equality and stipulated that alldecision making bodies should be composed of at least 30% women.438
Structural, top-down changes were thus made to facilitate the incorporation of women
into post-genocide Rwanda, many of whom were victims of rape and sexual violence. More
importantly, these women were often widows, and thus fell under the definition of “the neediest
réscapes” that qualified them as beneficiaries of the FARG fund. In other words, reparations and
assistance coming from FARG was not organized around victimhood of sexual violence, but
rather around widowhood. The fact that the FARG fund was somewhat gender-sensitive proved
to be beneficial to various victims of rape and sexual violence who were widows. Heidi
Rombouts argues that widowhood was a much safer banner for women because organizing
themselves around a victimhood of sexual crimes would involve a much too explicit and public
assertion of their experiences that might result in further re-traumatization or social stigmas. The
fact that FARG targeted “the neediest” among Rwandans also indirectly made women the
primary beneficiaries of its assistance, since they were generally poorer than men, and femaleheaded households were usually in more dire situations than male-head ones.439
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FARG’s census in 1998 showed that out of 282,000 réscapes, 80,000 women and 53,000
men were without shelter, and one of FARG’s first initiative was to provide houses to réscapes
of the genocide.440 Since new houses were often grouped together, some women were able to
establish contacts with other victims instead of being forced to live with their old neighbors
whom they did not trust.441 In addition, FARG also established a health program that provided
medical health cards with which réscapes could go to several hospitals for free medical care,
including genocide-related diseases, such as wound infections and medical consequences of
mutilation.442 These assistance services were of particularly importance for women in general
and victims of rape and sexual violence in particular, who were in overwhelming needs to
overcome physical harms and to generate income in order to start their life. In addition, the
FARG fund was also particularly successful in working with women’s groups, such as IBUKA
and AVEGA, to help distribute their services packages to widows who lived far away from the
capital. While the FARG fund did not pay specific attention to trauma and HIV/AIDs, which
victims of rape and sexual violence generally experienced, AVEGA incrementally became more
involved with providing services that dealt with these problems while simultaneously focusing
on helping widows with their daily survival, including distributing clothes and housing and
looking for funds to support income-generating projects.443 AVEGA has arguably remained the
only lifeline for genocide survivors by providing guidance and moral support as well as concrete
assistance.444
As noted in Chapter 2, transitional justice scholars have generally pointed out the
significant need to provide reparations for victims of gross violations of human rights, especially
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for victims of rape and sexual violence. It was generally impossible for some victims to think
about justice and reconciliation when they still struggled to survive and fulfill basic needs every
day. The various developments in national law that focused specifically on women and the
distribution of service packages by FARG could in theory facilitate reconciliation by gradually
constructing a political culture that is gender-sensitive and reflects the specific needs of victims
of rape and sexual violence. In addition, the constitutional provision that requires the
representation of women in executive and legislative branch did in fact contribute to the
citizenship and identity component of reconciliation. As of 2014, Rwanda managed to reach 64%
women in its Parliament, a figure that is practically unheard of anywhere else.445 Women’s
representation in the government reflects a significant power in a society dominated by
patriarchal norms that often relegate women to the private sphere and fail to give women the full
benefits of citizenships. The fact that Rwandan women are overwhelmingly represented in
government shows the potential that the needs of rape victims would be assisted in the future.
ANALYSIS: MAJOR WEAKNESSES AND FAILURES
Throughout the years, the national courts, gacaca courts, and various reparation programs
have received heavy criticism for their failure to bring justice to victims of rape and sexual
assaults. The total number of rape and sexual assaults cases heard in the national courts and
gacaca was fewer than 9,000. The number of perpetrators actually convicted of these crimes is
not available, but is presumably equally small, if not smaller. This figure is disproportionately
small compared to the estimated number of rape and sexual violence incidents during the
genocide (between 250,000 and 500,000). Many victims indeed never saw their perpetrators
brought to justice. Similarly, while some victims of rape and sexual violence received
reparations from FARG, many did not. The question remains: what factors impacted the
445
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adjudication of rape and sexual violence cases and the distribution of reparations? This section
sheds light on some institutional and systemic challenges confronting domestic justice
mechanisms, over many of which these mechanisms had no control.
Social Norms Inhibiting the Justice Process
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, one major theme dominates in transitional justice
literature on how different mechanisms reckon with the legacy of rape and sexual violence:
victims are generally afraid to come forward to either testify about their experiences or to receive
benefits as victims of rape and sexual violence. Societal and cultural norms dictate women’s
behaviors and discussion of sexuality across the world, if not more so in Rwanda. Female
victims of rape often talked about feeling of shame, depression, and stigmatization, and the fear
of isolation and rejection by their family and communities as the main reasons why they did not
testify in the national courts and gacaca.446 Many found that it was impossible to testify because
“the words to describe some sexual acts do not even exist in Kinyarwanda,”447 while others
hesitated to talk about rape for fear that such revelation would lead their husbands to reject them
or make them unmarriageable.448 In a patriarchal country where women depended heavily on
marriage for survival and sustenance, this fear was so overwhelming and extensive that in many
cases it overshadowed the victims’ desire for justice and reconciliation. While both men and
women were victims of rape and sexual violence, social stigma affected women
disproportionately. A 2002 survey conducted by the National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission of Rwanda found that sixty percent of sexual violence survivors thought that
women would testify significantly less than men because of the nature of these crimes, and that
the risks of testifying for female survivors were so much greater than those of men that many
446
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families would prevent young girls from testifying about their experiences of wartime sexual
violence.449
Karen Brounéus’s field research in Rwanda also shows that gacaca impacted men and
women differently. From this research, women demonstrated significantly higher levels of warrelated trauma, depression, and PTSD than men.450 Men had more positive attitudes towards
integrating prisoners than women, and women found it more difficult than men to interact with
someone who was accused in gacaca.451 Women were significantly more negative than men in
their perspectives of gacaca: they did not believe that gacaca made living together easier and
believed to a higher extent than men that gacaca intensified suffering.452 While this study did not
focus specifically on victims of rape and sexual violence, the fact that many participants
experienced sexual violence during the genocide demonstrates that these results are applicable to
the analysis of this thesis.
In addition, Human Rights Watch and other NGOs in Rwanda such as AVEGA and
IBUKA argued that the categorization of rape and sexual torture as category one crimes, whose
perpetrators were subject to either death penalty or life imprisonment, also impeded the justice
process despite its good intention.453 First, the severity of punishment for category one offenders
discouraged many from making confession, pleading guilty, and asking for forgiveness, which
undermined the discovery of truth about what happened during the genocide.454 Second, such
categorization placed a significant burden on the victims. A report by the Penal Reform
International stated that since perpetrators of sexual violence could receive harsh punishment,
449
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sexual violence victims faced enormous pressure from their communities not to testify for fear of
reprisals.455
The national courts were primarily concerned with justice and holding perpetrators
accountable, and truth was often deemed as a by-product rather than a goal of this mechanism.
Gacaca was, however, institutionally more concerned with establishing a record of truth about
what happened during the genocide. 456 As a community-based justice system, gacaca was
created to succeed only if community members were willing to come up and testify. An
incapacity to speak of their most intimate experiences of sexual violence, accompanied fears of
social stigmas and reprisals, constituted an institutional challenge to both the victims who needed
to tell their stories and to the entire justice process that needed to take into account these
narratives. Because of this challenge, Emily Amick argues that gacaca was an unsuitable to hear
and prosecute the crimes of rape and sexual violence.457
Gacaca: Not a Suitable Mechanism to Prosecute Rape and Sexual Violence?
While the national courts were considered a more private justice system for rape victims
to testify about their experience since community members were not allowed, this privacy was
essentially undermined when the gacaca courts were launched to gather information and
categorize perpetrators for prosecution purpose in 2001. The public nature of gacaca in its pilot
phase exposed women to significant social stigma if they chose to testify in front of more than
100 members of their communities. In various cases during the information-gathering stage,
perpetrators intentionally testified to harm the victims, as guilty pleas or public confessions could
serve as a means to strike “one last blow against the surviving victims especially before an
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audience which does not expect any better from these perpetrators.” 458 Moreover, many
perpetrators also confessed in public as part of the plea bargain process during this phase, and
these public confessions exposed women who did not want to reveal their past to retraumatization. In addition, the public nature of these hearings means that family and friends of
the accused were often present during the process, and women had a well-founded fear of
reprisals. There have been many allegations and cases of witness disappearances, beatings, and
killings after they testified at gacaca.459
The concurrent justice framework, in which both the national courts and gacaca courts
operated together to gather information and to prosecute perpetrators, was often criticized for
imposing heavy burdens on victims of rape and sexual violence. Until 2008, this dual jurisdiction
framework forced victims who wanted to testify to bring their cases before gacaca and then the
national courts. Testifying at gacaca was only relevant for gathering information and
categorizing perpetrators, and the victims had to testify again at the national courts.460 Victims
were responsible for convincing the gacaca judges and the general assembly that sexual
offenders had actually assaulted them to categorize these perpetrators as category one offenders,
so that the case against the accused could include rape charges and move to the national courts
for trials. In most cases, victims often did not possess the medico-legal evidence of their
experiences, and physical evidence suggestive of forced sexual relations was often not collected
immediately following the assault.461 Since the social and medical fabric of the country was
destroyed after the genocide, Rwanda also did not have the capacity to medically examine the
victims and preserve evidence. This lack of evidence was a significant challenge for victims in
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proving their cases.462 Moreover, most gacaca judges were community members who did not
have a legal background and often had the tendency to not believe the victims or blame the
offences on the victims themselves.463 These various challenges often resulted in the failure to
record the charges of sexual violence, and many perpetrators were granted provisional release.464
This failure was two-fold: the victims were not able to see their perpetrators being held
accountable despite the excruciating justice process, and they were forced to face these
perpetrators again within their communities once they were released, which both impeded the
reconciliation and reintegration process for these victims.
While the 2004 and 2008 Gacaca Laws included several provisions for protecting victims
of sexual violence and maintaining confidentiality, these changes oftentimes were not able to
overcome the communal nature of gacaca. First, many women did not know of the options laid
out in these laws, and thus viewed the justice process as a public one that would expose them to
stigma and ridicule, discouraging them from coming forward.465 Despite the closed-door nature
of the new proceedings, Human Rights Watched reported that everyone in the community would
still know that the case involved rape because on the day of the gacaca sessions, whether public
or private, community members would see a woman and a man enter a room and therefore guess
the nature of the case.466 Furthermore, the communal and informal nature of gacaca also posed
various risks of miscarriage of justice. Many women reported that they did not believe their cases
would be heard fairly and impartially given the judges’ ties with the community. Some women
said that at times rapists or their family members had served as gacaca judges in various rape
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cases.467 Chitra Nagarajan also reports that while judges in the national courts were believed to
be better able to understand the delicacy of rape cases, give equitable judgments, and keep
confidentiality, gacaca judges were often viewed as less likely to maintain information private
because of their close ties to the community.468
Because of these various institutional challenges, many of which resulted from the
cultural norms surrounding women and discussion on sexuality, gacaca was often criticized for
being an inadequate platform to prosecute rape and sexual violence. The International Rescue
Committee conducted surveys in 2002, 2005, and 2006, which showed that Rwandans’ belief in
the appropriateness of gacaca to deal with sexual violence cases had actually diminished over
time.469 The percentage of people agreeing that revelations of rape at gacaca would hinder the
reconciliation process also increased over time: 26% in 2002, 22% in 2005, and 34% in 2006.470
Because of this belief, women’s groups such as IBUKA and AVEGA often criticized the 2008
amendment that transferred rape cases to gacaca.471 This amendment also came as a shock to
many rape victims, some of whom had been reluctant to come forward in the first place and did
so only after receiving assurance that their cases would be heard in the national courts and not
their local communities.472 Moreover, this adjudication phase started in January 2009 and ended
in July 2010, presenting a brief time frame for gacaca to address the 6,608 cases of rape and
sexual torture that were transferred from the national courts. 473 The brief timeframe for
prosecution, an uninspiring number of cases heard and tried within gacaca, and various
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institutional challenges inhibiting the justice process altogether undermined gacaca’s legitimacy
as it aimed to bring justice to victims of rape and sexual violence.
Lack of Reparations for Many Victims of Rape and Sexual Violence
The fact that reparations in Rwanda came predominantly from FARG, and that such
assistance was focused on the neediest réscapes of the society, over time showcased a
marginalization of various groups of victims. First, since the perpetrators were usually poor,
victims often found it very difficult to recover compensation from the national courts. Second,
the two FIND drafts were never adopted due to the lack of political will, thus further
exacerbating the prospects of victims receiving reparations for the harms done to them.474 Third,
the distribution of assistance programs within FARG itself also exposed significant tension.
Since one of FARG’s main target groups was widows of the genocide, this focus did not include
young girls, married and unmarried women, or widows whose husbands died before or after the
genocide. 475 Widowhood because of the genocide was thus often interpreted in a strict,
mechanical way that excluded many female victims who needed help. In addition, for men and
boys who were raped, the prospects of receiving reparations were even grimmer because of
cultural norms on masculinity and the fact that they were not the targeted beneficiaries of
FARG.476 Moreover, since the Rwandan genocide has been predominantly referred to as one
against the Tutsi both nationally and internationally, Hutu men and women who were raped or
sexually assaulted were not categorized legally as beneficiaries of FARG.477
Even to those who should have been or were considered beneficiaries, the
implementation of the FARG fund also created major barriers to receiving assistance. First, the
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status of réscapes was not awarded by an independent body, but instead must be recognized by
neighbors, victims’ organizations or local authorities.478 This fact often meant that women who
had a higher social status, a better social network, or lived in Kigali where the funds were
located, had a higher chance of receiving assistance, thus marginalizing those with direr
socioeconomic status that desperately needed help. Second, while FARG’s education program
could have been beneficial to women who needed professional skills to strengthen their
economic status, this program had often neglected women and rather focused on covering school
fees for the younger population attending secondary schools and universities.479 Third, since
FARG was gender-sensitive but not oriented towards victims of rape and sexual violence,
treatments for traumas and harms specific to sexual crimes such as HIV/AIDs and unwanted
pregnancy were often neglected in FARG’s health program.480 In addition, women often reported
that they feared maltreatment while using FARG’s health assistance, since nurses and doctors
often questioned why they deserved free care while others needed to pay. Taking care of harms
and psychological traumas caused by rape required a basic trust between the doctor and the
patient, which was often undermined by social tensions within a post-genocide Rwanda.481
CONCLUSION
As this chapter demonstrates, domestic transitional justice mechanisms – the national
courts, gacaca, and reparation programs – had both strengths and weaknesses in bringing
comprehensive justice to victims of rape and sexual violence. On the one hand, retributive justice
mechanisms were able to prosecute at most 9,000 rape and sexual violence cases. This
prosecution not only held various perpetrators accountable and contributed to the prospects of an
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emerging culture of justice embedded in the rule of law, but also facilitated the development of a
partial historical record of truth about what happened during the genocide, especially in terms of
rape and sexual violence. Both national courts and gacaca were not static institutions but everchanging ones, as the Rwandan government did attempt to introduce amendments that could
make these institutions a more welcoming environment for victims of rape and sexual violence.
This political will itself and the fact the rape and sexual torture were considered the highest level
of genocide-related crimes deserve attention and compliments. Reparation programs from FARG
were also able to help a segment of victims who desperately needed assistance with daily
survival. To those who were lucky to see their perpetrators brought to justice and to receive
reparations, domestic mechanisms had the potential to facilitate their process of reconciliation
and reintegration.
On the other hand, however, many more victims were not that lucky. Compared to the
estimation of between 250,000 and 500,000 cases of rape during the genocide, the estimated
9,000 cases heard in domestic mechanisms, in many of which perpetrators were also acquitted
and released, were underwhelming. Moreover, thousands of victims of rape and sexual violence
never received reparations since they were not technically categorized as beneficiaries of
FARG’s programs. Overall, Hutu victims of the genocide and male victims of sexual violence
were often neglected in both retributive and restorative justice processes.482 In a country torn by
colonially imposed ethnic tensions, this appearance of “victors’ justice,” in which crimes
committed by the RPF were never investigated and prosecuted, significantly undermined the
overall legacy and legitimacy of transitional justice. The imbalance of justice for some and
injustice for many others not only hampers the process of national reconciliation in a country
completely wrecked by the genocide, but also personal reconciliation as well. In all fairness, no
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judicial system or transitional justice system in the world has been designed to cope with the
requirements of prosecuting crimes committed during a genocide with such a significantly high
rate of civilian participation and an even higher rate of victimization.483 Bringing comprehensive
justice to victims of gross human rights violations is hard in any transitional justice context, but
even more so in a post-genocide Rwanda and to victims of rape and sexual violence. Cultural
norms that discourage victims from talking about sexual violence because of social ostracism
and reprisals constituted significant challenges for victims to testify about their experience.
As this chapter unfolds, I grapple with an emerging question: To whom, exactly, was
justice served? This question became excruciatingly hard to answer in the context of gacaca, for
it was both a restorative and retributive mechanism that possessed both a public, communal
nature in general and a private setting for victims of rape and sexual violence in particular. First,
gacaca was a restorative justice and social institution because it allowed the victims in general to
choose to come forward and tell their stories in front of their neighbors and communities. While
the law required all citizens to participate in gacaca, the decision to actually tell their story was
ultimate the choice of survivors. This designated choice gave the victim a sort of agency that is
often lacking in criminal justice mechanisms. In traditional retributive justice settings, victims
often testify because they are called in by the justice system whenever necessary but not
generally out of their own choosing. The basic assumption underlying this choice was that the
victims should be able to comfortably testify, and that such testimonies were welcomed and
necessary for a historical record of truth. However, victims often saw this choice differently.
While many women wanted to “shout it from the rooftops,” others did not want to participate
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because of the fear, shame, and stigma associated with victims of rape and sexual violence.484
The conception of justice thus varied significantly amongst the victims, whereas such conception
was rather monolithic when the government reestablished gacaca. The fact that information
obtained within in camera trials could be leaked to the public also worsened this tremendous fear
for these victims. In addition, post-genocide Rwanda was a society in which living together was
not a personal choice but a simply necessity and reality of life.485 The fact that gacaca was
implemented nationwide only in 2005 – more than ten years after the genocide – meant that this
cohabitation had become the norm, and the initial mutual fear amongst neighbors had diminished
progressively with the passing of time.486 In this context, gacaca could be arguably seen as “too
little too late,” as many victims had already learned to go on with their lives. Reconciliation and
reintegration often come together, and in this case, forced reintegration out of sheer necessity
may have in fact contributed to a sense of forced reconciliation as well, especially to the victims
who decidedly did not want to remember their experiences.
Another institutional tension within gacaca lay in the nature of the modern system that
was implemented following the genocide. While traditional gacaca was a purely restorative
justice mechanism that operated privately with the concerned parties in order to ease social
tension, modern gacaca was an institutionalized, state-mandated, and public affair with new
retributive functions. This modification of gacaca came from the fact that the Rwandan
government was more concerned with speeding up the criminal justice process within the
national courts rather than using gacaca in its original and popular form. Modern gacaca can
thus be seen as an “invented tradition” with a new prosecutorial logic that functioned according
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to typical Western trial proceedings.487 This modification undermined the restorative justice
nature of traditional gacaca. Victims were under social burdens to not testify because of
potential reprisals by the perpetrators’ family, and perpetrators were less likely to confess
because of the potential punishment as analyzed above. As a result, while the discovery of truth
was one of gacaca’s main objectives, such discovery was heavily weakened by the prosecutorial
functions of modern gacaca.488 In addition, since gacaca was mandated and supervised by the
government, the Tutsi-dominated RPF, the truth emerging from gacaca was thus state-mandated
and notoriously ignored crimes committed by the RPF itself during the civil war. This partial
record of truth thus bore the appearance of the “victors’ truth,” which seriously undermined the
process of reconciliation for Hutu victims of the genocide. Many Rwandans argued that the
absence of any trials for war crimes committed by RPF soldiers challenged gacaca’s
contribution to establishing the truth about the conflict.489 Modern gacaca therefore had to
grapple with the classic transitional justice tension between truth and justice, which it had
decidedly sided with the latter at the expense of the former in various cases, even though not
much justice was actually served.
With regards to cases of rape and sexual violence, another tension lay in the fact that
while it was a public process, victims of rape and sexual violence had the ability to testify in
private. This ability came from the 2004 and 2008 Gacaca Laws that aimed to protect victims
from re-traumatization. To some, these protection measures did make gacaca a more
accommodating environment for them to come forward. However, these measures also
simultaneously took away the ability for some women who wanted to tell their community about
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their experience in the form of a public testimony. If gacaca’s main strength was its existence as
a type of truth commission, the insistence on in camera trials took the discussion of sexual
violence during the genocide out of the public narrative and such discussion was not interwoven
into the community narrative and the emerging common morality.490 In a similar light, Human
Rights Watch argues that since gacaca derived its legitimacy from popular participation, hearing
sexual violence cases behind closed door undercut the very rationale of using this local court and
thus was not compatible with the nature of gacaca.491 To decide whether the insistence on in
camera trials was good or bad is almost impossible. Some victims preferred the closed, protected
setting, while others wanted the entire community to know about what was done to them. The
fact that victims have different conceptions of justice and reconciliation therefore makes it
extremely difficult to determine whether a community-based justice system like gacaca was
successful.
In conclusion, similar to any transitional justice mechanisms, the national courts, gacaca,
and domestic reparation programs possessed both strengths and weaknesses in bringing
comprehensive justice for victims of rape and sexual violence. These mechanisms faced various
institutional challenges, over many of which they had no control, such as cultural and social
norms that are deeply patriarchal. Within these mechanisms, gacaca deserved particular attention
for its pioneering method of using a local justice mechanism during transitional justice processes.
Gacaca was, without a doubt, not a perfect mechanism, as it was forced to grapple with
significant tensions that resulted from the modification in 2001. Reports from Rwanda
nevertheless send positive signals about its contribution to reconciliation. The NURC’s 2015
survey on reconciliation states that on average, 92.5% of Rwandans who participated in the study
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felt affirmed that they were somewhat able to reconcile with the past.492 In addition, the final
gacaca report concludes that 87.3% of the participants in a study carried by the Centre for
Conflict Management of the National University of Rwanda believed that gacaca did contribute
to the objective of national unity and reconciliation.493 Given the various shortcomings analyzed
above, it is rather hard to assume that victims of rape and sexual violence were actually that
successful at achieving reconciliation facilitated by domestic mechanisms.
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5. LOOKING BACK, MOVING FORWARD
LESSONS LEARNED FROM RWANDA

In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, nothing seemed possible. Domestically,
Rwanda was confronted with the seemingly insurmountable tasks of rebuilding every aspect of
its social, political, and economic fabric, while simultaneously bringing perpetrators of the
genocide to justice and moving the country towards reconciliation. By 1999, Rwandan prisons
were filled with approximately 120,000 genocide suspects, and thousands of criminal
proceedings were seemingly beyond the political and economic capacities of this post-conflict
society. Internationally, the international community, despite possessing sufficient and early
evidence that a genocide took place, bore the responsibility of failing to intervene to stop it. The
United Nations Security Council – the most powerful international organization to date – was
tasked with reasserting its legitimacy as an international authority that aims to protect world
peace and global security. Within the multitude of challenges confronting post-genocide
Rwanda, this thesis is primarily concerned with the attempts to reckon with the legacy of
widespread, genocidal rape and sexual violence during the genocide. This thesis starts out with a
simple question: Could there ever be justice for Rwandan victims of rape and sexual violence,
and what would such justice look like?
As this thesis demonstrates, there were no easy answers to such a question. The length to
which both Rwanda and the international community have gone to seek truth, justice, and
reconciliation was inspiring and aspirational. Both international and domestic transitional justice
mechanisms attempted to bring comprehensive justice to survivors of rape and sexual violence in
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various ways. The extent to which these mechanisms were successful is, however, difficult to
quantify. The thesis shies away from the notion of “success,” since defining and operating
success is almost an impossible task. The thesis therefore focuses on analyzing the strengths and
weaknesses of domestic and international mechanisms in bringing comprehensive justice to
victims of rape and sexual violence, rather than focusing on determining which mechanism was
more successful. This chapter concludes the thesis, summarizes major research findings, and
offers some recommendations for future research and transitional justice projects.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
The first question this thesis asks is, “given the personal nature of rape and gender-based
violence, and the social stigma surrounding victims of such crimes, what were the strengths and
weaknesses of local and international transitional justice mechanisms in delivering different
elements of restorative and retributive justice for victims of rape and gender-based violence?” As
shown in Chapter 3 and 4, no transitional justice mechanisms were perfect; each possessed
different strengths and weaknesses. All mechanisms were able to bring some measure of justice
to some victims while simultaneously failing to bring justice to many others. While a blanket
statement of how one mechanism was more successful than the other would surely be more
satisfying, reality was rather much more nuanced.
Achievements and Shortcomings of Retributive Justice
The fact that the ICTR was established within a short timeframe of discussions at the
UNSC immediately after the genocide was already in and of itself an important milestone in the
realm of international law. The ICTR convicted 14 high-level individuals for sexual violence
crimes as elements of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Despite the lack of
data on universal jurisdiction trials in other states, it was evident that a few individuals were also
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convicted of sexual violence. The Belgian court convicted Ephrem Nkezabera of rape as a war
crime, and the Canadian court convicted Desiré Munyaneza of rape as both a war crime and a
crime against humanity. The Nkezabera case stood out as the first instance in Belgian judicial
history when rape was convicted as a war crime.494
Within Rwanda, both the national courts and the gacaca courts were able to hear at most
9,000 cases of rape and sexual violence. While the data on how many perpetrators were actually
convicted of sexual crimes is not currently available, this number is presumably equally small, if
not smaller. As the UN estimated that between 250,000 and 500,000 individuals were rape and
sexually assaulted during the Rwandan genocide, the fact that transitional justice mechanisms
were not able to bring more perpetrators to justice is indeed frustrating. However, in a postgenocide context where the justice system was devastated, the fact that these mechanisms were
at least able to bring some perpetrators justice is undoubtedly better than no justice at all.
Moreover, undergoing the complex practice of investigating the darkest period of Rwanda’s
history is already an accomplishment unto itself.
Additionally, the prosecution of rape and sexual violence in all retributive mechanisms
also served as an unequivocal acknowledgment of the responsibility to try these crimes. While
sexual crimes in armed conflicts have been historically regarded as opportunistic attacks, spoilers
of war, and results of “a few bad apples,”495 widespread rape and sexual violence during the
genocide proved that these crimes were not only systematic but also perpetrated with an intention
to destroy the enemy. These crimes therefore had to be considered and prosecuted as elements of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and transitional justice mechanisms for
Rwanda somewhat succeeded in doing so. Within Rwanda, rape and sexual violence were
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category one crimes at the national courts and gacaca – the most serious category of crimes
whose perpetrators were subjected to life imprisonment and execution. 496 Additionally,
international mechanisms were particularly successful in developing new international
jurisprudential norms. The ICTR affirmed that crimes of a sexual nature were international
crimes that had to be prosecuted under international law, and offered progressive definitions of
rape and sexual violence. The Tribunal was also able to attach criminality to the masterminds of
the genocide, many of whom did not personally rape but oversaw the perpetration of sexual
crimes, by using the Joint Criminal Enterprise theory. The ICTR also offered lessons on
prosecuting sexual violence by publishing the Best Practices Manual for the Investigation and
Prosecution of Sexual Violence Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions: Lessons Learned from the
Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
In the repertoire of transitional justice mechanisms for Rwanda, the ICTR stood out for
its contribution to international law. While the ICTR was an ad hoc tribunal, its successor, the
ICC, is a permanent court; lessons from the ICTR could provide guidance for future cases at the
ICC. As a result, additional cases of rape and sexual violence have been prosecuted at the ICC,
and this permanent tribunal has been investigating and prosecuting sexual crimes committed in
Uganda, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic.497 More
importantly, the international jurisprudential norms created by the ICTR and those by the ICTY
and ICC all affirm that prosecuting sexual violence, at least rape and sexual torture, has risen to
the level of jus cogens. 498 In other words, the prosecution of rape and sexual violence as
international crimes is now a judicial norm so fundamental to the peace and security of the
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international community that it binds states even if they have not given formal consent.499 This
development confirms the hypothesis that international mechanisms, especially the ICTR, had
the potential to push for more positive changes in international law concerning victims of rape
and gender-based violence. In other words, creating international jurisprudence on prosecuting
sexual crimes under international law is the international mechanisms’ biggest contribution.
Despite these contributions to retributive justice, domestic and international mechanisms
also faced several shortcomings. One of this thesis’s hypotheses is that the physical distance of
the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, the language barrier between the victims and the court, and the
public nature of an international tribunal would create an inhospitable environment for victims to
come forward. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, this hypothesis is only partially true. The language
barrier was undoubtedly a challenge for many victims. However, many victims nevertheless still
came forward to talk about their experience of sexual violence, even when they were not asked
to, such as in Akayesu. The public nature was therefore not the problem for many. It was the way
some judges presided over sexual violence cases and did not pay due attention to the emotional
position that many survivors were in when they were testifying, and the insensitive,
overwhelming questioning and cross-examination of the defense counsel that made the
environment inhospitable.
In addition, as shown in Chapter 3, various other factors not listed in the hypothesis did
impact the ICTR’s shortcomings. The Tribunal did not have a clear and comprehensive
prosecution strategy regarding sexual crimes, although early human rights reports that came out
after the genocide all showcased that sexual violence was widespread and genocidal during the
conflict. As a result, sexual crimes were rarely included as a central element of investigation and
prosecution. Moreover, prosecuting sexual crimes depended heavily on the Prosecutor’s
499
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willingness to do so, which was inconsistent amongst the four individuals who had served in this
role at the ICTR. Many cases were moved through trials without rape charges although the
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) possessed strong evidence, often because these charges were
considered irrelevant while the OTP needed to speed up the justice process. In addition, while
Trial Chamber I offered progressive definitions of rape and sexual violence that allowed judges
to infer non-consent from the coercive background of the attack, such as genocide in the case of
Rwanda, without requiring evidence of the perpetrator’s force, threat of force, or the victim’s
resistance, other Chambers were not quite successful in consistently using these definitions.
Similarly, domestic retributive justice mechanisms – the national court and gacaca – also
faced several shortcomings. Chapter 4 confirms the hypothesis that the devastated judicial
system in post-genocide Rwanda rendered the national courts ineffective and insufficient in
prosecuting rape and sexual violence. It was not until gacaca was implemented as a concurrent
justice mechanism, which first classified perpetrators into different categories and moved
category one cases, including rape and sexual torture to the national courts, that this domestic
mechanism was able to hear and prosecute more cases. Chapter 4, however, confirms that the
hypothesis that the communal nature and cultural legitimacy of gacaca created a less hostile
environment for victims to come forward was only partially correct. For some victims who
wanted to tell their stories to their communities and see their perpetrators being brought justice,
gacaca offered them the opportunity to fulfill this desire. However, to many other survivors, the
social stigma surrounding victims of sexual violence, fear of reprisals by community members
and the perpetrators’ families, lack of trust in judges who had close ties with the community, and
fear of not being able to marry and/or being isolated by their communities prevented them from
testifying at gacaca. The proximity of gacaca thus proved to be a double-edged sword: it
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facilitated the process of justice and reconciliation for some while maximizing the fears for
others.
Achievements and Shortcomings of Restorative Justice
This thesis divides restorative justice into two components: economic justice through
reparations, and reconciliation. Reconciliation is further divided into six subcomponents: 1)
understanding the past, present, and envisioning the future of Rwanda, 2) citizenship and
identity, 3) political culture, 4) security, 5) justice, and 6) social cohesion.
On the one hand, as international retributive justice mechanisms, the ICTR and universal
jurisdiction trials did not pay due attention to reparations. While there was a short service
program at the ICTR to distribute monetary and medical support to Rwandan victims through
five Rwandan organizations in 2000-2001, this program concluded shortly and was largely
symbolic. Similarly, the Belgian court was able to provide some reparations to a few victims,
which was also a symbolic effort rather than a comprehensive one. The Rome Statue of the ICC
did address these shortcomings by allowing victims to request reparation.500 For instance, Article
79 of the Rome Statute provides that a "Trust Fund shall be established by decision of the
Assembly of States Parties for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court, and of the families of such victims.”501
On the other hand, national mechanisms were more successful in providing reparations
for victims. While there were several proposals for different reparation programs, the assistance
FARG (Fonds d'Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide – Assistance Fund for Genocide
Survivor) fund was the only one that was actually implemented and is still currently operating.
FARG, however, focused on providing reparations for the neediest rescapés after the genocide,
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and was thus oriented towards helping Rwandan widows rather than victims of rape and sexual
violence specifically. While there was undoubtedly some overlap between the two categories,
many rape survivors were not categorized as beneficiaries of FARG. Local authorities often
interpreted the definition of “rescapés” in an ad hoc manner, which included victims of sexual
violence as rescapés in some cases while neglecting other victims in other situations. While
there was a systemic effort to provide service packages to widows, especially in terms of
housing, FARG has faced several challenges, such as the perpetual lack of funding, which has
deprived a large number of sexual violence survivors of reparations.
With regards to non-economic reconciliation, the ICTR, universal jurisdiction trials, the
national courts, and gacaca, as retributive justice mechanisms, all contributed partially to the
security and justice components by removing a handful of perpetrators from their communities,
putting them within the confines of the justice system, and convicting them for crimes of rape
and sexual violence. In addition, retributive justice mechanisms also served as truth-uncovering
platforms. Through the convictions of perpetrators and individual articulations of survivors about
what they witnessed and experienced, these mechanisms were able to contribute to the creation
of a partial historical record of truth about what happened during the genocide, and thus helped
facilitate an understanding of the past. This historical record is part of a collective memory about
the genocide, and is now presented in trials’ transcripts, in the ICTR’s Best Practices Manual,
and in the National Service of Gacaca Courts’ Gacaca Courts in Rwanda.
Truth from these retributive mechanisms was, however, extremely partial and
incomplete. As Bert Ingelaere argues, truth emerging from criminal tribunal was at best “forensic
truth,” which entailed answers to basic questions of who, where, when, how, and against whom,
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and the context, causes, and pattern of violations.502 Other aspects of truth – narrative, social, and
restorative – were hardly achieved. Another way of thinking about different types of truth is the
distinction between “knowledge” and “acknowledgment.” While knowledge is akin to forensic
truth and contributes to an understanding of the past, acknowledgment – such as narrative, social,
and restorative truth – contributes more directly to the personal healing of victims.503 In addition,
all mechanisms were insufficient in uncovering truth about crimes against Hutu and male
victims. This lack of truth and justice thus constituted a major impediment to reconciliation for
these victims. Moreover, the fact that no mechanisms were successful at prosecuting and
uncovering truth about crimes committed by the RPF is detrimental to national reconciliation.
The Rwandan genocide was one against Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus, which was partly
the result of long-lasting ethnic tensions between the two ethnic groups that could be traced back
until the colonial period. The fact that all justice mechanisms created jurisprudence that appeared
to be “victors’ justice,” in which crimes by the RPF remained hidden and unprosecuted, can
undermine the efforts of reconciliation between the two ethnic groups. While Rwanda banned
ethnicity as a criterion of social classification in 2004, the extent to which such law could
overcome the shortcomings of this partial truth and justice requires more empirical research.
Beside these contributions, how national and international mechanisms contributed to
other aspects of reconciliation varied extensively. As international mechanisms located outside
of Rwanda, both the ICTR and universal jurisdiction trials had almost no power and impact over
components of reconciliation such as citizenship & identity and political culture. This impotence
is demonstrated in the statement by one of the staffers at the ICTR who was interviewed by
Nicola Palmer:
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This is not just for Rwanda… nor is it our way to fix the Rwandan judiciary. The
ICTR does not exist to please the Rwandan community. If the issue had been
about strengthening the Rwandan judiciary then the trials should have happened
in Rwanda, there could have been assistance through foreign staff and there
would be an application of Rwandan law.504
While creating legal precedents remains as international mechanisms’ most significant
contribution, the extent to which such contribution has translated into concrete impacts on
Rwandan society and judiciary was rather limited. In addition, as demonstrated in Chapter 3,
while reconciliation was one of the ICTR’s objectives listed in its mandate, the ICTR showed
insufficient attention to this component of restorative justice. In order for retributive justice to
contribute to reconciliation, victims must know about the judgments against their perpetrators
and the affirmation of the wrongness of the acts committed against them. The ICTR throughout
its operation, however, was systematically inadequate in its effort to follow up with Rwandan
society, leaving many victims who testified with the feeling of having been used. This lack of
attention could be attributed to the fact the ICTR was one of the first international tribunals of its
kind and had little in the way of a precedential framework to follow.
In contrast, domestic mechanisms, especially gacaca, had more potential to contribute to
these components. For instance, while women were often not permitted to speak in traditional
gacaca, modern gacaca included women in every aspect of its process: as judges, as members of
the general assembly, and as victims and perpetrators. In addition, as shown in Chapter 4, the
Rwandan government also implemented several laws that aimed to advance the status of women
within Rwandan society, which could positively contribute to both the citizenship and identity
and the political culture components. The fact that the Rwandan parliament currently has the
highest level of women’s representation in the world shows potential for improvement of
women’s social status in the future. This acknowledgment does not deny that the aforementioned
504
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social stigmas surrounding victims of rape and sexual violence still exist, but rather affirms an
optimistic believe that Rwandan women’s social status can be improved over time. Based on
these observations, it is therefore arguable that international mechanisms paid more attention to
violations of first-generation rights, especially bodily-integrity rights, while national mechanisms
were more balanced in their approach to both first-generation rights (women’s representation in
government) and second-generation rights (economic assistance through reparations).
Finally, the social cohesion component of reconciliation has not been analyzed
extensively thus far. The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission of Rwanda defined
social cohesion as a combination of trust, tolerance, solidarity, conviviality, and friendship
among Rwandan citizens.505 Bert Ingelaere’s research shows that many Rwandans did manage to
cohabitate alongside one another. 506 This cohabitation was common in rural areas, since
neighbors depended on each other in their daily activities and their fight for survival; tensions
and conflicts were thus often kept in the dark. Since the Rwandan genocide had a high rate of
civilian participation, it was often the norm that survivors and perpetrators came from the same
community. Cohabitation, in many ways, was not a direct result of transitional justice, but rather
borne out of sheer necessity and the reality of life.507 How cohabitation could amount to social
cohesion is, however, open to interpretation and further research. “Social cohesion” – the most
difficult aspect of reconciliation to both achieve and quantify – requires extensive empirical
research that this thesis does not have the resource to implement. This thesis is the product of one
year of research, most of which was qualitative and heavily focused on current secondary
literature. Because of this limitation, this thesis hopes to stay away from the phenomenon of
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“aspiration without empiricism,” in which scholars present aspirational claims about the impact
of transitional justice without having empirical evidence to substantiate them.508
As Chapters 3 and 4 both demonstrate, patriarchal norms embedded within Rwandan
society constituted an independent factor that inhibited the justice and reconciliation process at
both international and national mechanisms. These norms include, but are not limited to, social
ostracism and rejection of victims of rape and sexual violence, the tendency to not believe or
constantly question rape victims, the fear of being unable to marry once it was revealed that they
were raped, and the fact that life sustenance depended heavily on marriage. Despite several
measures of protection developed at the ICTR and gacaca, many victims still refused to come
forward because of these well-founded fears. As an international mechanism located in a
different country, the ICTR certainly had no control over, or the power to change, these norms.
In addition, while gacaca was a local mechanism popular with the Rwandan population, it was
only implemented nationwide in 2005 and ended in 2012. This relatively short time period gave
gacaca insufficient power to fundamentally alter patriarchal norms deeply embedded within
society. Patriarchal norms surrounding women can only be changed incrementally and
organically through education, government policy, and local initiatives. It is rather unrealistic to
think that transitional justice mechanisms – which were ad hoc and short-term in their nature –
actually had the power to change these norms.
Internally Incompatible Goals
One of the principal research questions of this thesis is whether the objectives of local
and international transitional justice mechanisms conflicted with each other, and if so, how such
discrepancies could affect the outcomes of transitional justice for victims of rape and sexual
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violence? As this thesis has shown, it was hardly the case that these different mechanisms had
conflicting goals, but rather that there were incompatible goals within each mechanism itself.
The ICTR was primarily concerned with punishing high-level perpetrators, contributing
to reconciliation, and restoring and maintaining peace. Locating the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania
was primarily based on a good intention of avoiding “victor’s justice,” since the UNSC was
determined to prosecute crimes committed by the RPF as well. The physical distance of the
ICTR, however, unfortunately took away from the ICTR the power to directly influence
deterrence justice, the rule of law, and reconciliation within Rwanda itself. The fact that ICTR
failed to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by the RPF counteracted the very decision
to locate the Tribunal in a foreign country. In addition, while the ICTR was able to foster legal
precedents in prosecuting rape and sexual violence as serious violations of international law, the
Tribunal hardly implemented any public outreach efforts. The fact that most Rwandans did not
know about the ICTR’s judgments significantly undermined the impact that the Tribunal could
have on the victims’ process of reconciliation. Furthermore, Nicola Palmer’s field research
shows that most legal personnel and staffers within the ICTR identified the development of an
international case law as the Tribunal’s central contribution.509 This belief was understandable,
because the ICTR was a judicial institution through which the UNSC attempted to re-establish
the authority of the international community for its failure to protect civilians during the
genocide.510 This authority first started with the condemnation of gross human rights violations
at the ICTR. While it is difficult to argue that the ICTR was more attuned to recreating the
international rule of law rather than helping Rwandan victims reconcile, the fact that the Tribunal
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paid insufficient attention to restorative justice, especially by its lack of reparations for and
communications with those who testified, was indeed frustrating to many victims.
In Rwanda, the national courts and gacaca were primarily concerned with holding
perpetrators accountable. It is crucial to acknowledge that no judicial system has the power to
render justice for a mass atrocity on the scale of the Rwandan genocide, especially given the high
rate of civilian participation. The RPF-dominated government was nevertheless committed to the
pursuit of mass justice. While discussing potential transitional justice mechanisms in the
immediate aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan government never seriously considered a
truth commission, since both policy makers and genocide survivors considered a truth
commission to be “a grossly inadequate response to the horror of the genocide.”511 The national
courts were the Rwandan government’s first choice, and the pursuit of justice and accountability,
sometimes at the expense of truth, became the dominant objective of transitional justice within
Rwanda itself. Lars Waldorf argues that RPF’s insistence on mass and often arbitrary arrests and
extensive criminal prosecutions only worsened the terrible situation immediately after the
genocide; such insistence “saddled a devastated justice sector with the impossible task of trying
some 120,000 Hutu suspects and it fostered a culture of denunciation, both of which have
undermined efforts to establish the rule of law.”512 As Chapter 4 shows, this national courts
system was unfortunately extremely inadequate. Rwanda never had an independent and impartial
system of administration of justice prior to the genocide and this already imperfect justice system
was further destroyed as a direct result of the genocide, making it impossible to fulfill the pursuit
of mass justice.
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Since the national courts soon proved to be insufficient, the pursuit of justice
subsequently became the main goal of gacaca. The modification of gacaca from its private,
communal, restorative, and ad hoc form into a public, state-mandated, and mandatory affair,
however, created various tensions within gacaca. While traditional gacaca drew its legitimacy
and popularity from its private and restorative nature, in which concerned parties could resolve
familial and intra-familial conflicts among themselves, this nature was completely lost when
modern gacaca was introduced and implemented as a quasi-judicial mechanism. It is arguable
that offences such as genocide and crimes against humanity, especially rape and sexual violence,
were too serious to be tried in gacaca since, “historically, it was not competent to handle serious
crimes.”513 In addition, while the national courts only considered truth a byproduct of justice,
among gacaca’s various objectives were both holding perpetrators accountable and uncovering
truth about what happened during the genocide. Pursuing both truth and justice about sexual
violence was, however, impossible in gacaca. The classification of rape and sexual torture as
category one crimes at both the national court and gacaca was intentionally aimed at giving
perpetrators of the most serious crimes maximum punishment, which included the death penalty
until 2007. Such classification, while necessary for retributive justice, undermined the pursuit of
truth. Perpetrators had less incentive to confess their sexual crimes because of fear of life
imprisonment or execution, and victims were also less willing to come forward and testify for a
well-founded fear of reprisals from the perpetrators’ families. While truth and justice are often
inseparable goals in the field of transitional justice, national courts and gacaca decidedly focused
on the pursuit of justice at the expense of truth, despite the fact that not much justice was
delivered either.
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LARGER TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE LESSONS
In this thesis, I investigate transitional justice in post-genocide Rwanda because prior to
1994, the combination of both domestic and international mechanisms was without many
precedents. As countries emerging from social conflicts attempt to reckon with legacies of gross
violations of human rights, both achievements and shortcomings of transitional justice in
Rwanda can provide helpful lessons for future transitional justice projects. As this thesis
demonstrates, social stigmas surrounding victims of rape and sexual violence constitute an
independent variable that impedes the justice process, and these stigmas are almost universal
across the world. Lessons from Rwanda teach us that first, in order for transitional justice to be
effective for victims of sexual violence, these stigmas must be taken into account at the very
formation stage. Second, a clear prosecution strategy that includes sexual violence as a central
element of investigation is of crucial importance. Third, different protection measures must be
implemented to help maintain victims’ privacy and security if they decide to come forward and
testify. Finally, different transitional justice mechanisms must be attuned to the needs of these
victims, including both justice and reparations, as they attempt to reconcile with the past. To
elaborate on the lessons learned from Rwanda, this section provides some preliminary
suggestions for future transitional justice projects.
War is Gendered; So is Peace514
There is an increasing recognition within academia and the field of law that gender is an
independent variable that impacts how men and women experience war and peace differently.
This thesis is yet another affirmation of this acknowledgment. The premise of this thesis lies in
the belief that since victims of rape and sexual violence had unique and gendered experiences
during the genocide, the way in which transitional justice impacted these victims was
514
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undoubtedly gendered as well. As this thesis has shown, the fact that many transitional justice
mechanisms in post-genocide Rwanda did not look at peace-building and transitional justice
through a gendered lens resulted in many missed opportunities to bring justice to survivors of
sexual violence. Without a gendered lens, the conception of truth, justice, and reconciliation will
be inevitably incomplete. Future transitional justice projects must therefore take sexual violence
into account at the formation stage of justice mechanisms. Opportunities should be created and
supported for women to take up more leadership roles so that they can have more influence on
the construction of these mechanisms. With regards to retributive justice, having women as
judges and investigators is very important; victims of rape and sexual violence, especially
women, are more likely to feel comfortable talking about their experience to women than to men.
It is hard to imagine the successful outcomes of Akayesu had it not been for the constant push for
more truth about sexual violence by the only female judge at that time – Judge Navi Pillay.
Victims’ Conceptions of Justice and Reconciliation Vary
The core objectives of all transitional justice projects are holding perpetrators
accountable and helping victims reconcile with the past. Victims, especially survivors of rape
and sexual violence, often have different conceptions of justice and reconciliation. In the case of
gacaca, while many victims wanted to tell their communities of their experiences and hear an
acknowledgment of the wrongness of the acts committed against them, many already learned to
live with the past and did not want to relive those memories at all. In contrast, Nicola Palmer’s
coding of interview materials in Rwanda showed a popular understanding that Rwandans wanted
a full record of truth about the genocide and the civil war, even more than justice and
accountability. 515 Moreover, while many wanted to see truth and justice, many preferred
reparations programs that could help alleviate the daily struggles of life sustenance. This lack of
515
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uniformity in the perception and desired outcome of transitional justice unfortunately suggests
that to many victims of rape and sexual violence, a full notion of justice is simply not possible. It
is crucial for future transitional justice projects to be more attuned to what victims envision as
justice and reconciliation so that such projects can be best oriented towards the needs of the
victims.
While it was unfortunate that the FARG program has not been able to provide sufficient
reparations to all victims of the genocide, particularly survivors of sexual violence, it is even
more disheartening to know that the government diverted resources away from these survivors
towards criminal prosecution. Instead of focusing on funding reparation programs, the
government and international donors spent millions of dollars incarcerating and occasionally
trying genocide suspects.516 While criminal prosecution was important, reparations and economic
justice were equally, if not more, important as well. The fact the Rwandan was too focused on
mass justice while neglecting the needs of millions of victims who had to build their lives from
the ground up was yet another missed opportunity to orient justice towards the needs of the
survivors.
Social Context Matters
As this thesis has demonstrated, social stigmas surrounding rape and sexual violence
were an independent factor that impeded the justice and reconciliation process for victims of
these crimes. This factor also once again confirms that transitional justice must be multifaceted;
bringing justice for victims of sexual violence must be equated with improving their
socioeconomic status within society as well. Moreover, social stigmas are deeply embedded not
only within Rwandan society, but also across the world. While the Rwandan government noticed
how social stigmas impacted the justice process at the national courts and gacaca, and
516
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subsequently implemented several procedural changes throughout the years to ensure a more
hospitable environment for victims to come forward, the ICTR did not pay adequate attention to
these norms. The Tribunal thus faced a common shortcoming of international justice
mechanisms attempting to solve the legacy of local crimes: they often do not have adequate
understanding of the local context. Understanding the context of the conflict and the country is
thus important and must be considered central to any transitional justice projects. Just as
different conflicts have different characteristics, transitional justice projects must reflect this
diversity as well. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to transitional justice, and each
mechanism must be carefully tailored to fit the particular context to address the needs of the
population.
Realistic Expectation for Transitional Justice
As countries attempt to reckon with the legacy of social conflicts and gross violations of
human rights through transitional justice, they often have high expectation for the outcomes of
these processes. In Rwanda, however, it is hard to imagine that any justice mechanisms could
have had the potential to reconcile a country that was almost completely devastated by the fastest
and most effective genocide the world has witnessed since the Holocaust. As the historical
context section of Chapter 1 shows, prior to the genocide, Rwanda already had a history of ethnic
tension, human rights violations, and a culture of impunity. Indeed, while the Rwandan
government aspired to establish the rule of law and a culture of human rights through its
transitional justice processes, it is unimaginable that such goals were attainable in the aftermath
of genocide. Future transitional justice projects therefore should have realistic goals and
expectations. These goals, more importantly, should be tailored to the need of the population in
the wake of conflict. It is inevitable that any justice mechanism would have both strengths and
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weaknesses; to realize these traits and to target these strengths to the specific context are tasks
that must be done at the formation stage of transitional justice. In addition, it should be
understood that to many victims, a full conception of justice is somewhat unattainable.
Moreover, building a culture of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy are longterm goals that transitional justice mechanisms are often unable to obtain within their relatively
short operations. Moreover, societies coming out of violence are often not in a good position to
undertake all transitional justice and peace-building activities. Gacaca, for instance, was only
implemented nationwide in 2005, more than ten years after the genocide, because of planning
and experimentation during the pilot phase. Commitments to successful outcomes of transitional
justice must entail constant self-reflection and incremental changes to best suit the need of the
population. As the literature review in Chapter 2 also points out, actual and long-term
reconciliation for victims of rape and sexual violence often require a fundamental change in the
gender relation between men and women, and an improvement of women’s socioeconomic and
political status in general. It is quite impossible, if not naïve, to believe that any transitional
justice process actually has the capacity to fulfill these tasks. If the international community and
the country in context genuinely want to help victims of rape and sexual violence, they must pay
attention to developing laws and carrying out social programs that can first address the needs of
the victims. In Rwanda, legislation like the 1999 law allowing women to become rightful owners
of land and the 2003 constitutional provision requiring a high level of women’s representation in
every decision-making body is a good beginning.
International Support and NGO Advocacy Matter
If it takes a village to raise a child, it also takes the entire international community to
make any comprehensive transitional justice project successful. In many aspects, this was the
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case in Rwanda. First, the ICTR and universal jurisdiction trials were particularly important, as
this thesis has demonstrated. Second, one of the main tasks confronting post-genocide Rwanda
was to rebuild its economy while simultaneously funding trials and reparation programs. While
the international community unfortunately diverted resources away from reparations programs, it
was nevertheless able to fund the national courts and gacaca. Additionally, as countries
emerging from conflicts engage in transitional justice in both domestic and international levels,
there must be extensive communications among different mechanisms, and between these
mechanisms and the population they intend to serve.
As this thesis also demonstrates, NGO advocacy is also particularly important to the
success of transitional justice. International NGOs and human rights groups, such as Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, and AVEGA, constantly advocated for more rape and
sexual violence indictments at the ICTR, which resulted in the prosecution of some high-level
perpetrators. Within Rwanda, national and local NGOs and human rights groups such as
AVEGA and IBUKA also helped distribute reparation packages, while simultaneously providing
additional services, such as trauma counseling and HIV/AIDs treatments, to survivors of rape
and sexual violence when reparation programs fell short. NGOs therefore played a crucial role in
every aspect of transitional justice in Rwanda, and it is imperative that future transitional justice
projects consult extensively with local and international NGOs for advising, capacity building,
training, and logistical assistance.
FURTHER RESEARCH
While the current literature offers a large amount of information on the successes of each
transitional justice mechanism in Rwanda, few studies focus on a comparative analysis of these
mechanisms. Even fewer scholars have looked at this comparison through a gendered lens. This
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thesis contributes to the growing field of transitional justice by offering a systematic comparative
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of both domestic and national transitional justice
mechanisms in bringing comprehensive justice for victims of rape and sexual violence during the
Rwandan genocide. As the result of one year of research, this thesis undoubtedly lacks the
capacity to make claims based on quantitative data. The author has actively tried to look for
empirical studies to substantiate the claims made in this thesis. Given this limitation, this section
aims to provide some implications for future research.
As Chapter 4 shows, while many scholars applauded gacaca as a pioneering local
approach to transitional justice that left positive impacts on reconciliation, these aspirational
claims were often not substantiated with extensive empirical evidence. Future research projects
must therefore pay attention to both quantitative and qualitative research to make a nuanced
evaluation of transitional justice. Without accurate statistics and empirical data, all that is left is
theoretical framework, which is often not reflective of the experiences in everyday life. Since all
transitional justice mechanisms in Rwanda recently ended, the ICTR in 2015 and gacaca in
2012, this is a crucial time to quantitatively and qualitatively evaluate the impact of transitional
justice in post-genocide Rwanda.
Moreover, future research should also focus on victims of rape and sexual violence
specifically. While there was some empirical research about how transitional justice process
impacted Rwandan survivors, almost none of these projects paid specific attention to victims of
rape and sexual violence. This thesis does recognize that approaching survivors of these crimes,
inviting them to open up about the past, and asking them to participate in research projects
require scholars to have a substantial amount of gender-sensitive training and a high level of
cultural understanding. These tasks, while overwhelming, are not impossible; they are also
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necessary. If transitional justice outcomes in Rwanda offer one lesson, it would be that victims of
rape and sexual violence are sometimes more courageous and willing to talk about their
experiences for the pursuit of justice more than the current literature depicts. Understanding how
transitional justice impacts victims of rape and sexual violence means that future project can
learn from both the achievements and shortcomings of these mechanisms as well.
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, nothing seemed possible. Yet, as this thesis
demonstrates, domestic and international transitional justice mechanisms were somewhat
successful at making the impossible possible. Some justice was served, some truth was
uncovered, and some reparations were delivered to victims. It goes without saying that partial
truth and justice is better than no truth and justice at all. Moreover, a critical analysis of these
mechanisms’ weaknesses and failures is not, in any way, an attempt to undermine their
legitimacy. Understanding the shortcomings of the past is a crucial to achieving successes in the
future.
Truth, justice, and reconciliation have emerged as the principal objectives of societies
emerging from violent conflict. At the heart of this thesis is the belief that in order for these
complex theoretical concepts to be translated into reality, they must be seen through a gendered
lens. Rape and sexual violence in armed conflicts have never been only opportunistic; they are
almost always deliberate, systemic crimes committed with specific intent to destroy the enemy as
well. It is imperative, as more countries engage in transitional justice, that governments and the
international community broaden the concept of success of transitional justice mechanisms to
include the victims of rape and sexual violence. More importantly, it is crucial to note that with
the emergence from the dark chapter in Rwanda came the promise of “Never Again” – a promise
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that the international community would never sit idly by and let atrocities such as the Rwandan
genocide ever happen again. This, unfortunately, has not been the case. The Syrian civil war and
its subsequent refugee crisis, ethnic cleansing and persecution of the Rohingya Muslims in
Burma, and devastating civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African
Republic are the just tip of the iceberg of the ongoing mass violations of human rights that are
happening every day. Transitional justice mechanisms are designed to exemplify what they
aspire to create – relationships of social equality in which all parties enjoy and accord another
equal dignity, respect, and concern.517 A commitment to human rights and equality must start
with a serious commitment to never let atrocities happen in the first place.
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APPENDIX
OVERVIEW OF CHARGES AND CONVICTIONS REGARDING RAPE AND OTHER SEXUAL VIOLENCE CRIMES AT
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

N O.

1

CASE

Akayesu, Jean-Paul

POSITION

Bourgmestre of Taba Commune

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

2 September 1998

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

1 June 2001

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR

CONVICTION

OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

Count 13: Rape as
a crime against
humanity
Count 14: Other
inhumane acts as a
crime against
humanity

2

3

Serushago, Omar

Musema, Alfred

One of the leaders of
Interahamwe in Gisenyi
Prefecture

5 February 1999

6 April 2000

Pleaded guilty

(Sentence Appeal)

Director of Gisovu Tea Factory in
Kibuye

27 January 2000

16 November 2001

=

158

FOR RAPE

Trial Judgment,
paras. 696, 697
Confirmed on
appeal, Appeal
Judgment, para.
214

Count 5: Rape as a
crime against
humanity in the
amended
Indictment of 14
October 1998

None

Count 7: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
under Articles

Trial
Judgment,
para. 967

Rape Charge
dropped in
guilty plea
negotiations

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

4

5

Bagilishema, Ignace

Semanza, Laurent

Bourgmestre of Mabanza
Commune

Former Bourgmestre of

7 June 2001

15 May 2003

159

3 July 2002

20 May 2005

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

6(1) and
6(3)

On appeal this
conviction was
overturned and
acquittal entered
on this count (see
Appeal
Judgment,
para.194)

Count 7: “outrages
on personal
dignity of women”
resulting in serious
violations of
Article 3 common
to the Geneva
Conventions of
1949 and
Additional
Protocol II
(“Common Article
3”)

None

Counts 7 and 9

Guilty of Count

(Acquitted on all
counts)

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

Bicumbi Commune, MRND
representative to the National
Assembly

include Rape as a
serious violation
Common Article 3
Count 8 and 10:
Rape as a crime
against humanity

6

Niyitegeka, Eliézer

Minister of Information of Interim
Government

16 May 2003

9 July 2004

Count 7: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 8:
Inhumane acts,
including rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 9: Rape as a
violation of
Common Article 3,
violence to life
health and physical
or

160

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

10: ‘Rape’ as a
crime against
humanity, Trial
Judgment, para.
479
Confirmed on
appeal, Appeal
Judgment, paras.
289, 290
Guilty of Count 8:
crimes against
humanity other
inhumane acts‘sexual violence’,
Trial Judgment,
para. 467.
Niyitegeka’s appeal
dismissed in its
entirety.

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

mental well
being
Count 10: Rape as
a violation of
common Article 3,
outrages upon
personal dignity
7

Kajelijeli, Juvénal

Bourgmestre of Mukingo Commune
from June to July 1994

1 December 2003

23 May 2005

One of the leaders of
Interahamwe in Ruhengeri

8

Barayagwiza, Jean-Bosco

President of CDR

Count 7: Rape as a
crime against
humanity

None

Count 11:
Humiliating and
degrading
treatment, rape,
enforced
prostitution and
any form of
indecent assault as
a violation of
Common Article 3
3 December 2003

Founder and Director of RTLM radio
station
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28 November 2007

Count 8: Outrages
upon personal
dignity as a serious
violation of

None
Acquitted at 98
bis stage

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

common Article 3

9

Kamuhanda, Jean de Dieu

Minister of Higher Education in
Interim Government

22 January 2004

19 September 2005

Count 6: Rape as a
crime against
humanity

None

Count 8: Rape,
outrage upon
personal dignity as
a serious violation
of common Article
3
10

Gacumbitsi, Sylvestre

Bourgmestre of Rusumo
Commune in Kibungo
Prefecture

17 June 2004

7 July 2006

Count 5: Rape as a
crime against
humanity

Trial Judgment,
paras. 321-333
Conviction
confirmed on
appeal, Appeal
Judgment, paras.
99-108

11

Ndindabahizi, Emmanuel

Minister of Finance in Interim
Government

15 July 2004

162

16 January 2007

Count 5 of the
Amended
Indictment of 5
October
2001(Rape as a

None

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

crime against
humanity) but
Rape count
dropped in the
amended
indictment of 1
September 2003
(Trial Judgment,
paras. 9, 13).

12

Muhimana, Mikaeli

Conseiller of Gishyita Secteur,
Gishyita Commune, Kibuye
Prefecture

28 April 2005

21 May 2007

Count 3: Rape as a
crime against
humanity

Trial Judgment,
paras. 552-563
Conviction
confirmed on
appeal (except
for the rapes of
Goretti
Mukashyaka and
Languida
Kamukina,
Appeal
Judgment,
Disposition)
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N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

13

Bisengimana, Paul

Bourgmestre of Gikoro
Commune, Kigali-Rural
Prefecture

13 April 2006

Not Appealed

Pleaded guilty

Count 8: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 9: Serious
sexual abuse as a
crime against
humanity

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

None
Rape counts
dropped in
guilty plea
negotiations

Count 11: Rape as
a serious violation
of Common Article
3
Count 12:
Causing serious
violence to life as
a serious violation
of common
Article 3

14

15

Mpambara, Jean

Muvunyi, Tharcisse

Bourgmestre of Rukara
Commune in Eastern Rwanda

Colonel in Rwandan Army and
Commander of ESO camp in

11 September 2006

12 September 2006
(Muvunyi 1)

164

Not Appealed

29 August 2008
(Muvunyi 1)

Counts 1 and 2:
Rape as part of
genocide
Count 4: Rape as a
crime against

None
(Acquitted on all
counts)
None

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

Butare

16

Rwamakuba, André

Minister of Primary and
Secondary Education in
Interim Government

20 September 2006

Not Appealed

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

humanity

(All convictions
and the sentence
were set aside and
a retrial of one
allegation of direct
and public
incitement to
commit genocide
was ordered)

(Joint amended
indictment of
…November
2001)

None
Rape charges
dropped in the
separate amended
indictment of 23
February 2005

Count 3: Rape as a
natural and
foreseeable
consequence of a
(Acquitted on all
joint criminal
counts)
enterprise to commit
genocide (JCE 3)
Count 5: Rape as
a crime against
humanity
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N O.

CA

POSITION

SE

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF RAPE
AND/OR OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE CRIMES

17

Nzabirinda, Joseph

Employee of Ngoma Commune
as Encadreur of Youth

23 February 2007

Not appealed

Counts 1 and 2: Rape as
part of genocide

Pleaded guilty
Count 4: Rape as a crime
against humanity

18

Rugambarara, Juvénal

Bourgmestre of Bicumbi
Commune, Kigali-Rural
Prefecture

16 November 2007

Not appealed

Count 7: Rape as a crime
against humanity

Pleaded guilty
Count 9: Rape, violence to
life health and physical or
mental well being, outrage
upon personal dignity, as a
serious violation of
common Article 3

19

Nchamihigo, Siméon

Substitut du Procureur in
Cyangugu and Interahamwe
leader

12 November 2008

166

18 March 2010

Count 4: “genital
mutilation” as part of other
inhumane acts

CONVICTION FOR
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

None
Rape charges
dropped in
guilty plea
negotiations

None
Rape charges
dropped in
guilty plea
negotiations

None
No evidence led on
genital

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

20

Bikindi, Simon

Musician

2 December 2008

18 March 2010

21

Bagosora, Théoneste

Directeur de Cabinet in the
Ministry of Defence

18 December 2008

14 December 2011

as a crime
against
humanity.
Counts 2 and 3:
Rape and sexual
violence as part of
genocide
Count 1: Rape and
other crimes of a
sexual nature as
part of conspiracy
to commit
genocide
Counts 2 and 3:
Rape and other
crimes of a sexual
nature as part of
genocide Count 4:
Rape and other
crimes of a sexual
nature as part of
murder as a crime
against humanity
Count 6: Rape

167

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

mutilation, Trial
Judgment, paras.
221, 361
None

Count 2: Trial
Judgment, para.
2158, under
Article 6(3)
Count 4: Trial
Chamber, para.
2186
Count 6: Trial
Judgment, para.
2194
Count 7: Trial
Judgment, para.
2203, under
Article 6(3)
Count 8: Trial

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

and other crimes of
a sexual nature as
part of
extermination as a
crime against
humanity
Count 7: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 8: Rape and
other crimes of a
sexual nature as
part of persecution
as a crime against
humanity
Count 9: Rape and
other crimes of a
sexual nature as
part of other
inhumane acts as a
crime against
humanity

168

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

Judgment,
para. 2213
Count 9: Trial
Judgment, para.
2224,
under Article 6
(3)
Count 10: Trial
Judgment, para.
2245
Count 12: Trial
Judgment, para.
2254, under
Article 6(3)
Convictions for
counts 2, 6, 7, 8,
10, 12 confirmed
on appeal, Appeal
Judgment, para.
721

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

Count 10: Killing
and causing
violence to health
and to the physical
and mental wellbeing as a serious
violation of
common Article 3
Count 12:
Outrages upon
personal dignity as
a serious violation
of common Article
3

22

Kabiligi, Gratien

Brigadier General (G3, Chief of
Operations at HQ)

18 December 2008

Not appealed

Count 6: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 8: Other
inhumane acts as
a crime against
humanity in
connection with

169

None
Acquitted on all
counts, Trial
Judgment, para.
2204

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

the sexual assault
of the prime
minister
Count 10:
Outrages upon
personal dignity as
a serious violation
of common Article
3
23

Nsengiyumva, Anatole

Colonel, Chief of Operations in
Gisenyi

18 December 2008

14 December 2011

Count 7: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 9: Other
inhumane acts as
a crime against
humanity in
connection with
the sexual assault
of the prime
minister
Count 11: Outrages
upon personal
dignity

170

None

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

as a serious
violation of
common Article 3
24

Ntabakuze, Aloys

Major, Commander of ParaCommando Battalion

18 December 2008

8 May 2012

Counts 2 and 3:
Rape as part of
genocide
Count 6: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 8: Other
inhumane acts as
a crime against
humanity in
connection with
the sexual assault
of the prime
minister
Count 10: Outrages
upon personal
dignity as a serious
violation of
common Article
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None

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

25

Rukundo, Emmanuel

Military Chaplain

27 February 2009

20 October 2010

3
Count 1: Sexual
assault as part of
genocide

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

Trial Judgment,
paras 574-576
Conviction
quashed on
appeal, Appeal
Judgment, paras.
237, 238

26

Renzaho, Tharcisse

Prefet of Kigali-Ville

14 July 2009

1 April 2011

Count 1: Acts of
sexual violence as
part of genocide
Count 4: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 6: Rape as a
serious violation of
common Article 3

Count 1: Trial
Judgment, para.
779, under
Article 6(3)
Count 4: Trial
Judgment, para.
794, under
Article 6(3)
Count 6: Trial
Judgment, para.
811, under
Article 6(3)
Convictions
reversed on
appeal for

172

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

pleading issues,
Appeal Judgment,
para. 129
27

Hategekimana, Ildephonse

Commander of Ngoma Camp in
Butare

6 December 2010

8 May 2012

Counts 1 and 2:
Rape as part of
genocide
Count 4: Rape as a
crime against
humanity.

28

Gatete, Jean Baptiste

29

Bizimungu, Augustin

President of MRND in Murambi
Commune and leader of
Interahamwe
Chief of Staff of Army

31 March 2011

9 October 2012

17 May 2011

30 June 2014

Count 6: Rape as
crime against
humanity
Count 6:
Rape as a crime
against humanity
Count 8: Rape and
other humiliating
and degrading
treatment as a
violation of
common Article

173

Count 4: Trial
Judgment para.
729, under
Article 6(3)
Confirmed on
appeal, Appeal
Judgment paras.
203, 204
None

Convicted under
Article 6(3), Trial
Judgment, paras.
2127 and
2161
Conviction affirmed.

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

30

Nzuwonemeye, François-Xavier

Commander of RECCE
Battalion

17 May 2011

11 February 2014

3
Count 6:
Rape as a crime
against humanity

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

None

Count 8: violation
of common
Article 3

31

Sagahutu, Innocent

Second in Command of RECCE
Battalion.

17 May 2011

11 February 2014

Count 6:
Rape as a crime
against humanity
and

None

Count 8: violation
of common
Article 3
32

Ntahobali, Arsène Shalom

Led a group of MRND militia men

24 June 2011

14 December 2015

Count 7: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 11: Outrages
upon personal
dignity, rape and
indecent assault

174

Count 7: Under
Article 6(1),
Trial
Judgment,
para. 6094
Count 11: Under
Article 6(3),
Trial

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

33

Nyiramasuhuko, Pauline

Minister of Family and
Women’s Development and
member of MRND

24 June 2011

14 December 2015

Bicamumpaka, Jérôme

Minister of Foreign Affairs

30 September 2011

Not appealed

Judgment, para.
6185

Count 7: Rape as a
crime against
humanity

Under Article
6(3), Trial
Judgment, para.
6093

Count 8: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 10: Outrages
upon personal
dignity, rape and
indecent assault as
serious violations
of

175

FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

as serious
violations of
common Article 3

Count 11:
Outrages upon
personal dignity,
rape and indecent
assault as serious
violations of
common Article 3

34

CONVICTION

Count 11: Under
Article 6(3), Trial
Judgment, para.
6183
Conviction affirmed.

None
Acquitted at 98 bis
stage
(Acquitted on all
counts)

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

common Article 3
35

Mugiraneza, Prosper

Minister of Civil Service

30 September 2011

4 February 2013

Count 8: Rape as a
crime against
humanity

None
Acquitted at 98
bis stage

Count 10:
Outrages upon
personal dignity,
rape and indecent
assault as serious
violations of
common Article 3

36

Bizimungu, Casimir

Minister of Health

30 September 2011

Not appealed

Count 8: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 10:
Outrages upon
personal dignity,
rape and indecent
assault as serious
violations of
common Article 3

176

None
Acquitted at 98 bis
stage
(Acquitted on all
counts)

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

37

Mugenzi, Justin

Minister of Trade and
Commerce

30 September 2011

4 February 2013

Count 8: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 10:
Outrages upon
personal dignity,
rape and indecent
assault as serious
violations of
common Article 3

38

Karemera, Édouard

Minister of Interior Affairs as of
25 May 1994

2 February 2012

First Vice President of MRND

29 September 2014

Count 3: Rape as a
natural and
foreseeable
consequence of a
joint criminal
enterprise to
commit genocide
(JCE 3)
Count 5: Rape as
a crime against
humanity

177

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

None
Acquitted at 98
bis stage

Count 3: Trial
Judgment, paras.
1670 under Article
6(1), 1671 under
Article 6(3)
Count 5: Trial
Judgment, para.
1684 under both
Articles 6(1) and
6(3)

N O.

39

CASE

Ngirumpatse, Matthieu

POSITION

President of MRND

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

2 February 2012

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

29 September 2014

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR

Nzirorera, Joseph

National Secretary of MRND

Accused deceased
during trial

AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

Count 3: Rape as a
natural and
foreseeable
consequence of a
joint criminal
enterprise to commit
genocide (JCE 3)

Count 1: Trial
Judgment, paras.
1670 under Article
6(1)), 1671 under
Article 6(3)
Count 5: Trial
Judgment, para.
1684 under both
Articles 6(1) and
6(3)

Count 3: Rape as a None
natural and
foreseeable
consequence of a
joint criminal
enterprise to commit
genocide (JCE 3)
Count 5: Rape as a
crime against
humanity

178

FOR RAPE

OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

Count 5: Rape as a
crime against
humanity

40

CONVICTION

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

41

42

Nzabonimana, Callixte

Nizeyimana, Ildéphonse

Minister of Youth and Associative
Movements in the Interim
Government

31 May 2012

Captain in the Forces Armées
Rwandaises (" FAR");
S2/S3, in charge of intelligence and
military
operations at the Ecole des SousOfficiers (ESO) in Butare
Prefecture

19 June 2012

29 September 2014

29 September 2014

FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

Count 7 of the
initial Indictment
of 21
November 2001:
Rape as a crime
against humanity,
but charge
dropped in the
amended
indictments of 12
November
2008 and 24
July 2009, Trial
Judgment, paras.
1828,
1829; and para.
1841

None

Counts 1 and 2:
Acts of sexual
violence as part of
genocide

Acquitted on rape
counts.

Counts 4: Rape as
a crime against
humanity
Count 6: Rape as

179

CONVICTION

Rape count
dropped

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

a serious violation
of common
Article 3
43

Ngirabatware, Augustin

Minister of Planning in the
Interim Government

20 December 2012

44

Bizimana, Augustin

Minister of Defence

At Large

18 December 2014

Count 6: Rape as a
crime against
humanity (through
JCE 3)
Counts 1 and 2:
Rape as part of
genocide
Count 5: Rape as a
Crime against
Humanity
Count 6: Torture as
a crime against
humanity
Count 7: Other
inhumane acts as a
crime against
humanity

180

Trial Judgment
paras. 13901393.
Rape count was
reversed.
If arrested,
Accused will be
tried before MICT

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

Count 8:
Persecution as a
crime against
humanity
Count 10: Torture
as a violation of
common Article 3
Count 11: Rape
as a violation of
common Article 3
Count 12: Cruel
treatment as a
violation of
common Article 3
Count 13:
Outrages upon
personal dignity as
a violation of
common Article 3

181

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

45

Munyagishari, Bernard

Secretary General of the MRND for
the Gisenyi City, President for the
Interahamwe of Gisenyi

Counts 2 and 3:
Rape as part of
genocide

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

Case transferred to
Rwanda

Count 5: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
46

Ndimbati, Aloys

Bourgmestre of Gisovu
commune

At Large

Counts 1 and 2:
Rape as part of
genocide

Case transferred to
Rwanda

Count 6: Rape as a
crime against
humanity)
Count 7: Rape as
part of persecution
as a crime against
humanity
(Rape charges
added in the second
amended
Indictment filled on
8 May 2012)
47

Ntaganzwa, Ladislas

Bourgmestre of Nyakizu Commune

At Large

182

Counts 1 and 2:
Rape as part of

Case transferred to
Rwanda

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

genocide
Count 5: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
(Rape charges
added in the second
amended
Indictment filled on
30 March
2012)
48

Ryandikayo,

Businessman in Mubuga secteur

At Large

Counts 1 and 2:
Rape as part of
genocide
Count 6: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 7: Rape as
part of persecution
as a crime against
humanity
(Rape charges
added in the
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Case transferred to
Rwanda

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

49

Mpiranya, Protais

Commander of the Presidential
Guard Battalion of the Rwandan
Armed Forces (FAR) and
Commander of the Presidential
Guard "Camp Kimihurura”

At Large

second amended
Indictment filled
on 8 May 2012)
Count 5: Rape as a
crime against
humanity, or
alternatively Rape
as a natural and
foreseeable
consequence of a
joint criminal
enterprise to
commit genocide
(JCE 3)

Count 7: Other
inhumane acts as a
crime against
humanityincluding acts
committed on the
body of the Prime
Minister , or
alternatively Rape
as a

184

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

If arrested,
Accused will be
tried before MICT

N O.

CASE

POSITION

DATE OF TRIAL
JUDGMENT

DATE OF APPEAL
JUDGMENT

CHARGE OF
RAPE AND/OR
OTHER SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

CONVICTION
FOR RAPE
AND/OR OTHER
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
CRIMES

natural and
foreseeable
consequence of a
joint criminal
enterprise to
commit genocide
(JCE 3)
50

Munyarugarama, Pheneas

Lieutenant Colonel in the FAR,
Commander of Gako Camp

At Large

Counts 1 and 2:
Rape as part of
genocide

Case transferred to
Rwanda

Count 7: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
51

Munyeshyaka, Wenceslas

Priest, Vicar of St. Famille
Parish, Kigali City

52

Bucyibaruta, Laurent

Prefet, Gikongoro Prefecture

Case transferred to France
(Accused residing in
France)
Case transferred to France
(Accused residing in
France)

185

Count 2: Rape as a
crime against
humanity
Count 6: Rape as a
crime against
humanity

Case transferred to
France
Case transferred to
France
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